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Time is an under-represented topic in security studies and International Relations (IR). The 
development and implementation of security measures are often justified as necessary 
responses to the contemporary rate of global change yet little attention is granted time and 
temporality as factors influencing the politics and practices of security. This thesis proposes 
that security can be understood within the framework of a ‘politics of time’ (chronopolitics), in 
which collective perceptions of time and temporality are constitutive of security politics and 
practices. Its principal object is cyber security, which aims to regulate and exploit complex 
sociotechnical systems of networked and interdependent information technologies. The thesis 
examines how cyber security actors imagine time and temporality in (post)modernity and the 
implications of these temporal biases for the politics of cyber security. It explores how cyber 
security actors imagine the accelerating present and the relative deceleration of political 
decision-making; how apocalyptic narratives of imminent catastrophe illustrate concerns 
about the immanent dangers of technology; how the past is mobilised through historical 
analogies to understand dystopian futures; how the future is metaphorically inhabited through 
preparedness exercises and simulations, and literally populated through education, training 
and recruitment. These ‘chronotypes’ inform the cyber security imaginary and disclose a 
manifold of deeper chronopolitical tendencies, theorised here as the logics of assemblage, real 
time, event, and eschaton. The thesis makes an original contribution to IR by promoting the 




The copyright of this dissertation rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 




 Acknowledgements   …………………………………………………………………………………….……... 5 
   
1 Introduction   ………………………………………………..…………………………………………………….. 6 
 1.1  Cyber Security   ………………………………………………….……………………………….…………. 8 
 1.2  Imagination and Community   ………………………………………………………………….……. 15 
 1.3  Time in International Relations   ……………………….………………………………….……….. 22 
 1.4  Approach and Methods   ………………………………….………………………….………………… 25 
 1.5  Thesis Structure   ……………………………………..………..………….………..……………………. 30 
   
2 Towards a Politics of Time    
 2.1  Introduction: From Time to Temporality   …………………………………………….……..… 35 
 2.2  Emergent Sociotemporality   ……………………………………………….……………….……….. 40 
 2.3  Knowing Nonhuman Temporalities   …………………………………………….…….……….. 45 
 2.4  Now and the Present   ………………………………………………………………….……….………. 50 
 2.5  Temporality and Narrative   ………………………………………….………………………..…….. 57 
 2.6  The Time of Politics   ………………………………………………………………….…………….……. 62 
 2.7  Towards a Politics of Time   ………………………………………………………………….…….…. 70 
   
3 Diagnosing the Present     
 3.1  Introduction: The Revolutionary Present   ……………………………….……………….…… 76 
 3.2  Speed and Acceleration   ………………………………………….…………………..……..……….. 84 
 3.3  Netspeed I: Acceleration   ………………………………………….……………………………….…. 91 
 3.4  Netspeed II: Deceleration   ………………………………………….…………………..……………. 101 
 3.5  Diagnosing the Present   …………………………………………….…………….……….………….. 112 
   
4 Imagining the Future    
 4.1  Introduction: Future and Futurity   …………………………….………………………….………. 115 
 4.2  Imagination and Dystopia   …………………………………………..……………………………….. 120 
 4.3  Catastrophe and Apocalypse   ………………………………………..……………………….…….. 126 
 4.4  Immanence and Accident   ………………………………………….…………………………….….. 135 
 4.5  Revelation, Transformation and Desire   ………………………….………………………….… 145 





5 Arguing Through the Past    
 5.1  Introduction: Past, Present and the Appeal to History   ………….……………………... 157 
 5.2  Provocative Politics   ………………………………………………….………….………………………. 167 
 5.3  Memory and Identity   …………………………………………….………………….…………………. 178 
 5.4  Arguing Through the Past   ………………………………….………………………….…………….. 189 
   
6 Inhabiting the Future    
 6.1  Introduction: Anticipation and Preparation   ……………………….…………………........ 197 
 6.2  Exercise and Simulation   …………………………………………..………………………………….. 204 
 6.3  The Public Sensorium   …………………………………………….………………….………………… 213 
 6.4  Recruitment and Education   ……………………………………….……………………….……….. 223 
 6.5  Inhabiting the Future   …………………………………………….………………………….…………. 236 
   
7 Cyber Security and the Politics of Time    
 7.1  Introduction: Logics and Chronopolitics   ………………………….………….…………..…… 241 
 7.2  The Logic of Assemblage   ………………………………….…….……………………………………. 243 
 7.3  The Logic of Real Time   ……………………………..…………………….……………………………. 249 
 7.4  The Logic of Event   ……………………………………….……………….……………………………… 257 
 7.5  The Logic of Eschaton   …………………………………….………………………….………………… 264 
 7.6  Cyber Security and the Politics of Time   ………………………………………….……………. 271 
   
8 Conclusion   ………………..……………………………………………………………………….………………. 278 
   








I would like to thank David Bhowmik, Daniel Cordle, Kathryn Marie Fisher, Chris Fryer, Mike 
Innes, Jo Kovacik, Sean Lawson, Sam Liles and Jan Nederveen Pieterse for sharing ideas and 
research materials. I have benefited greatly from the collegiality and wisdom of my colleagues 
at King’s College London, particularly Neville Bolt, Peter McBurney, Nick Michelsen, Richard 
Overill, Thomas Rid and John Stone. My supervisors deserve particular gratitude: David Betz 
marshalled this project to completion and my debt to him is immeasurable; Theo Farrell has 
long been an encouraging voice without whom this thesis would not have been possible. My 
examiners, Christopher Coker and Andrew Hoskins, provided comments and insights I am 
fortunate to be able to incorporate into this work. I acknowledge the financial support of the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ES/H022678/1) and Charles Wolfson Townsley. I cannot 
thank my parents and family enough for their support and encouragement. To Lu, who makes 
all things possible, and Stanley, from whom I have already learnt more than he will ever know, 








For tribal man space was the uncontrollable mystery. 
For technological man it is time that occupies the same role.1 
 
Security is an inherently temporal proposition. In the modern political philosophical tradition, 
security is an essential bulwark against the exigencies of an unknowable future. For Thomas 
Hobbes, whose Leviathan (1651) is a foundation of Western political theory, security is the 
antidote to a situation in which man, ‘in the care of future time, hath his heart all day long, 
gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his 
anxiety, but in sleep’.2 Security arises as a central feature of the social contract between 
people and the state, in which the pursuit and practices of security are invoked to calm the 
jittery present by the imposition of order on times yet to come. As Hobbes states elsewhere, 
diligence is always required: ‘For we cannot tell the good and bad apart, hence even if there 
were fewer evil men than good men, good, decent people would still be saddled with the 
constant need to watch, distrust, anticipate and get the better of others, and to protect 
themselves by all possible means’.3 Security is always an exercise in futurity, a perpetual 
search for ways to mitigate uncertainty and the potentialities of fear, conflict and violence, 
even as each living moment fades immediately into the past. 
 
Security is always political, whether we believe security to be epiphenomenal to politics or 
foundational of politics.4 Like security, politics is perennially concerned with time. Every 
political act is always a ‘process in time’, oriented towards a particular end, the conception of 
                                                            
1 Marshall McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 
2002/1951), 85. 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck, rev. edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996/1651), XII.52. 
3 Thomas Hobbes, On the Citizen, eds. Richard Tuck and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998/1642), 11. 
4 Respectively, Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 




which ‘always implies a future reference, to a state which is either not yet in existence, and 
which would not come into existence if something were not done about it …. or, if already 
existent, would not remain unchanged’.5 Expressed through policy, politics ‘invariably 
functions in the future tense’, it is ‘hortatory, not historical …. it is designed to “get people to 
do things” and is therefore always future-oriented’.6 Even if the attainment of its material 
objectives can only lie ahead of it, politics is also concerned with the past through its constant 
appeals to history and memory. As a political practice, security is similarly retrospective, 
mining the past to frame the narratives of identity and destiny that legitimise and justify its 
interventions. The tenses of time are both the friend and enemy of security: the threat of time 
and the ungoverned processes of change are the reasons provided for the necessary 
enactments of security whilst the imagined times of past and future are cultural resources 
mobilised in support of these practices. 
 
To note that security and politics are concerned with shaping the future in order to effect 
particular ends is unremarkable and perhaps banal, as they are always so oriented. The more 
important issue is how security intervenes in the structures of time in order to achieve these 
outcomes. How does security attempt to regulate the future? What resources are mobilised in 
support of this objective? By what logics does security operate and what worldviews propel 
security itself, like the objects of its enduring gaze, into the unknowable future? This thesis 
addresses these questions through an examination of a particular form of security that has 
emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, that of cyber security. Cyber security is a 
response to the perceived risks and threats arising from the modern, global information-
technological infrastructure most commonly glossed as ‘the Internet’ and is concerned with 
anyone or anything that communicates through digital, electronic means. The aim of this 
thesis is to establish how cyber security communities produce a ‘politics of time’, in which their 
                                                            
5 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, 2nd. edn. (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1949/1937), 45. 
6 Philip Graham, ‘Space: Irrealis Objects in Technology Policy and Their Role in a New Political Economy’, 
Discourse & Society 12, no. 6 (2001): 765. 
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temporal perspectives are fundamentally constitutive of the political behaviours that enable 
the policies and practices of cyber security. 
 
For instance, cyber security self-identifies with a particular periodization of the world. The 
concept of the ‘Information Age’ is not unique to cyber security but how does this inform 
cyber security and what political work does this concept perform? In what ways do cyber 
security actors mobilise history in order to justify cyber security policy? How do they imagine 
the future and what practices are implemented in attempts to regulate it? The answers to 
each of these questions reveals multiple temporalities at work in cyber security―some 
intentional, others not―which interact and combine to form a chronopolitical matrix, a 
‘politics of time’ generated by the collective sociotemporal imaginings of cyber security 
communities. The task of this thesis is to describe, analyse and theorise this chronopolitical 
manifold and to locate it within the broader politics of cyber security. The chronopolitical lens 
is not the only one through which to view cyber security, however, and the pluralist instincts of 
this enquiry respect the importance of space, place, information, matter, energy and time in 
studies of the political. However, in a world that makes serious political claims upon the nature 
of time and temporality, reflected in cyber security’s open seduction by speed and 
acceleration, for example, it is timely—deliberately and politically timely—that time and 
temporality are made explicit in such a fashion. By doing so, we may better understand not 
only cyber security but also the nature and character of security and politics in the 
contemporary world. 
 
1.1 Cyber Security 
 
Security has attained an unprecedented constitutive role in contemporary life. In the 
immediate aftermath of World War II, ‘security’ in political discourse was effectively identical 
with ‘national security’ and reducible to the concerns of securing the sovereign state within an 
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anarchic world order.7 Over the intervening decades and, particularly, since the end of the 
Cold War, conceptions of security have been ‘widened’ and ‘deepened’ commensurate with a 
range of worldviews and theoretical orientations.8 Widening involves the application of 
security logics beyond military conflicts and the security of states and nations to a plurality of 
securities: human, energy, food, environment, water, to name but a few. Deepening shifts 
emphasis from the state ‘down’ to the level of the person and the citizen and ‘up’ to the 
international and the global. In this double move, security has been ‘defined and redefined …. 
revisioned, re-mapped, gendered, refused’, but the logic of security itself exerts a firm grip on 
the ‘contemporary social and political imagination’, which is ‘dominated by the lexicon of 
security and the related idea that we are living in an increasingly insecure world’.9 
 
The study of security is complicated by, but not always mindful of, a fundamental distinction 
between the different meanings of the word ‘security’ itself, which combine and cross-
pollinate so that ‘security’ in the world is always a manifold rather than a discrete entity or 
idea. Security is both a condition to be attained and a process by which to achieve that 
condition. As Nils Bubandt states, security ‘deals with the problem of order and disorder, being 
both the ontological condition of order, in the sense of an absence of doubt, danger, risk and 
anxiety, and the political means of ensuring that order’.10 Security is not merely a condition to 
be achieved but has a performative function, in that it serves to order the social world rather 
than merely being an accurate description of any external or objective reality: security 
transforms social relations into ‘security relations’.11 For some scholars, the infiltration of 
                                                            
7 Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1993), 1-8. 
8 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Steve Smith, ‘The Increasing Insecurity of Security 
Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years’, Contemporary Security Policy 20, no. 3 
(1999): 72-101; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 187-225. 
9 Mark Neocleous, Critique of Security (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 2-3. 
10 Nils Bubandt, ‘Vernacular Security: The Politics of Feeling Safe in Global, National and Local Worlds’, 
Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (2005): 278. 
11 Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of 
International Relations 4, no. 2 (1996): 226-255. 
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security logic and practice into contemporary life is so pervasive that, as Michael Dillon 
suggests, security is not only a pillar of modern politics and society but a key signifier of 
modernity itself.12 The intensification of the imprint of security upon society has become even 
more apparent in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks upon the United States in September 
2001. In noting the deleterious effects of post-9/11 counterterrorism policy on the same 
publics it professes to protect, Langdon Winner writes that the present ‘obsession with 
security now casts a chill upon public life and the only question is “How cold will it get?”’13   
 
In the contemporary Western experience, the promise of security pervades the marketplace 
and consumers are sold ‘security’ panaceas to a range of quotidian problems that would not 
have borne that moniker only a few years ago, from domestic child safety to pensions in 
retirement.14 The logic of security extends to architecture, with security ‘designed in’ to 
everything from airports and sports stadia to nightclubs and shopping centres.15 No major 
public event can be undertaken without planners demonstrating their commitment to both 
visible and invisible security measures,16 for which costs escalate as much in line with clients’ 
fears and consultants’ imaginations as they do with the existence of any credible threat. Fawaz 
and Bou Akar write that security in the city has been normalised, ‘stripped of its political 
significance’: ‘threats are taken at face value and generalized in the name of an hypothesized 
common good, without much recognition of their historical, geographical and social 
                                                            
12 Dillon, Politics of Security. 
13 Langdon Winner, ‘Trust and Terror: The Vulnerability of Complex Socio-Technical Systems’, Science as 
Culture 13, no. 2 (2004): 162. 
14 This is a process through which the ‘security industry aims to turn the feelings associated with 
(in)security into the consumption of commodities’; Neocleous, Critique of Security, 154. Aso, Elke 
Krahmann, ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’, European Journal of International Relations 14, 
no. 3 (2008): 379-404. 
15 Jon Coaffee, Paul O’Hare and Marian Hawkesworth, ‘The Visibility of (In)Security: The Aesthetics of 
Planning Urban Defences Against Terrorism’, Security Dialogue 40, nos. 4-5 (2009): 489-511; Jon 
Coaffee, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Cities: The UK’s Resilience Response to Defending Everyday Urban 
Infrastructure’, International Affairs 84, no. 4 (2010): 939-954.  
16 Philip Boyle and Kevin D. Haggerty, ‘Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex’, 
International Political Sociology 3, no. 3 (2009): 257-274; Philip Boyle and Kevin D. Haggerty, ‘Planning 




contexts’.17 Security is notable in that its claims ‘have long thrived on a denotative imprecision 
that has been carefully calibrated’, in which there is ‘simultaneous appeal to the hard and the 
vacuous, the precise and the imprecise’.18 If security is a signifier, it can sometimes seem as if it 
has cast off its semiotic moorings and taken on a free-floating life of its own.   
 
In the last two decades, the logic of security has found a novel mode of expression, whose 
material ubiquity and conceptual totalitarianism makes singular claims upon the nature of the 
modern world and challenges the extent of any previous regime of security. ‘Cyber security’ is 
the first attempt to foster an holistic approach to the security issues raised by information 
technologies, in particular the digital, electronic and networked information technologies of 
the Internet and related sociotechnical phenomena of the ‘Information Age’. Cyber security is 
predicated upon narratives referencing the characteristics of this historical period in the 
embrace of which we are commonly supposed to be. These narratives stress the speed and 
acceleration of the contemporary world, in which information technologies allow for 
instantaneous global communications, collapse traditional fixities of time and space and 
catalyse risks and threats that may materialise anywhere and everywhere at any moment. This 
sociotechnical environment—often, and somewhat anachronistically, termed ‘cyberspace’—is 
constructed as ‘ungovernable, unknowable, a cause of vulnerability, inevitably threatening, 
and a home to threatening actors’.19 It is frequently presented as a space apart from normal 
and healthy social existence, an exceptional environment over which governance must be 
extended. Cyber security becomes the security of ‘cyberspace’ sensu lato. 
 
Cyber security has proven itself a concept elastic in definition and elusive in practice. Given its 
concerns with almost anything that communicates digitally and electronically, whether these 
                                                            
17 Mona Fawaz and Hiba Bou Akar, ‘Practicing (In)Security in the City’, City & Society 24, no. 2 (2012): 
105. 
18 R.B.J. Walker, ‘The Subject of Security’, in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith 
Krause and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 1997), 63. 
19 David Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, ‘Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk’, 
Space & Culture 15, no. 2 (2012): 110-123. 
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be people, companies, governments, militaries, intelligence agencies, machines or algorithms, 
cyber security affects the world in many ways not captured by its more formal definitions. 
These tend to overlook the offensive use of information technologies—currently fuelling 
substantial growth in the defence industrial base and demanding reorientations in military 
force posture and structure—and accusations of adversarial ‘cyber espionage’ are often blind 
to friendly states’ uses of identical tactics in pursuit of economic and national security ends.20 
Both ‘cyber war’ and ‘cyber espionage’ are facets of cyber security, if not always presented in 
such stark and obvious terms. Critics of this position might argue that this is painting cyber 
security with too broad a brush: cyber security really is just about defending or protecting 
information and the critical infrastructures that depend upon it. One classical definition, for 
instance, holds that cyber security is ‘the defense or protection of the integrity, operations and 
confidentiality of computers and computer networks’.21 
 
However, this is a naïve misreading that is as outdated as it is incomplete because of its 
myopic divergence from the statements of governments and international bodies, which 
disclose that cyber security is a much broader suite of policies, perspectives, practices and 
processes than many analyses suggest.22 Cyber security, as defined by two leading scholars in 
the field, is ‘the absence of a threat either via or to information and communication 
technologies and networks. Simply put, this means that cybersecurity is the security one 
enjoys in and from cyberspace’.23 Cyber security is no longer just about the ‘security of cyber’, 
                                                            
20 One of the most robust expressions of this argument is provided by Glenn Greenwald, ‘Pentagon’s 
New Massive Expansion of “Cyber-Security” Unit is About Everything Except Defense’, The Guardian, 28 
January 2013.  
21 James A. Lewis, ‘Aux Armes, Citoyens: Cyber Security and Regulation in the United States’, 
Telecommunications Policy 29, no. 11 (2005): 821. 
22 For a similar perspective, see Myriam Dunn, ‘Securing the Digital Age: The Challenges of Complexity 
for Critical Infrastructure Protection and IR Theory’, in International Relations and Security in the Digital 
Age, eds. Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello (London: Routledge, 2007), 85. 
23 Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Manuel Suter, ‘The Art of CIIP Strategy: Taking Stock of Content and 
Processes’, in Critical Information Infrastructure Protection, eds. Javier Lopez, Robert Setola and 
Stephen D. Wolthusen (Berlin: Springer-Verlag), 19.  
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as it were, but is also ‘security through cyber’.24 From this perspective, information 
technologies are the material substrate ‘upon which all security sectors are destined to 
converge’.25 Cyber security is not restricted to the security of information and information 
technologies, therefore, but is the means through which other forms of security might be 
pursued and a condition of that greater security. 
 
Cyber security is not just an object, however, a unitary and unified body possessing its own 
agency, capable of its own expressions and decisions without reference to any other. It is 
rather an aggregate of many parts and their inter-relations: the information infrastructures 
and their users and dependencies that are the ostensible referents of cyber security and the 
political, ethical, legal, normative and ideational factors that sustain cyber security at all levels 
from the local to the global. Cyber security is a sociotechnical ‘assemblage’, understood in its 
dictionary sense as a collection of people or things but also in its academic theoretical sense as 
a web of actors and artefacts and their contingent and dynamic relations. As an analytical tool, 
‘assemblage’ has been used in social theory, sociology, urban studies, human geography and 
other fields to conceptualise the heterogeneity of social phenomena and to trace the relations 
between their social and technical components.26 It also provides an opportunity to link the 
‘high’ politics of the (inter)national with the more mundane aspects of life with which these 
are intertwined, if not always obviously.27 
 
No assemblage is either whole and imperturbable nor entirely reducible to its parts but is 
simultaneously an accumulation of smaller assemblages and a member of larger ones. This 
                                                            
24 Rid admonishes those who treat ‘cyber’ as a ‘noun’, a warning heeded in this document wherever 
possible. ‘Cyber’ is certainly ambiguous and unsatisfactory but, unfortunately, we have no ready 
substitute. Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), ix. 
25 Rachel E.D. Yould, ‘Beyond the American Fortress: Understanding Homeland Security in the 
Information Age’, in Bombs and Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship Between Information 
Technology and Society, ed. Robert Latham (New York: The New Press, 2003), 78. 
26 Colin McFarlane and Ben Anderson, ‘Thinking with Assemblage’, Area 43, no. 2 (2011): 162-164. 
27 Stephen J. Collier and Aihwa Ong, ‘Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems’, in Global 
Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems, eds. Aihwa Ong and Stephen 
J. Collier (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 3-21; Cynthia Enloe, ‘The Mundane Matters’, International 
Political Sociology 5, no. 4 (2011): 447-450. 
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holds if we talk of a personal computer or the international community, or of entities at any 
scale from the sub-atomic to the cosmic. An actor may also be part of more than one 
assemblage simultaneously, performing several functions at once, and can be temporarily 
removed from one and ‘plugged’ into another without losing its identity.28 Ephemeral though 
they often are, assemblages retain their identity when translated across space and time if they 
are able to ‘enrol’ and ‘enlist’ actors―human and nonhuman―into their networks in order to 
reproduce and extend themselves.29 In this way, the cyber security assemblage of material and 
immaterial entities is not static but a web of social and material actors that requires constant 
negotiation and performance. Any analysis that attempts to characterise a postulated entity 
like ‘cyber security’ as a singular artefact or unitary actor is doomed to misrepresent empirical 
reality unless it recognises its internal heterogeneity and the mechanisms and processes that 
enable its continued existence.  
 
We might dispute whether ‘society’ exists but we can identify and name other relatively stable 
assemblages as units of analysis through which to describe their composition, function and 
interactions with others. Although their definition and theorisation remain contested, we 
speak of human groups and institutions in terms that allow us to approach them analytically, 
even if only as convenient heuristics: family, school, faith group, tribe, government, state, 
market, the international, and so on. Were this not so, social enquiry would be a truly 
Sisyphean labour, ‘in which the whole being is exerted toward accomplishing nothing’.30 In its 
complexity, non-linearity and variety, society is already a more daunting object of analysis than 
the linearities of engineering and ballistics and students of the social contend that it is not the 
                                                            
28 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: 
Continuum, 2006), 10. 
29 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). In actor-network theories, nonhumans are often termed ‘actants’, rather than 
‘actors’, and have agency in the sense that they modify the actions of others but without necessarily 
‘intending’ to do so; ibid., 71-72. 
30 Albert Camus, ‘The Myth of Sisyphus’, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays (New York: Vintage 
International, 1991/1955), 120.  
15 
 
proverbial rocket science that is difficult but social science.31 In this state of permanent change 
and renegotiation, assemblages must have cause both to become and to stabilise and in order 
to maintain their identities must have commonalities through which cohesion is mediated and 
coherence achieved. This is reflected in Bruno Latour’s assertion that there are ‘no groups, 
only group formation’: groups ‘are not silent things, but rather the provisional product of a 
constant uproar made by the millions of contradictory voices about what is a group and who 
pertains to what’.32 The taming and constraining of this multivocality enables cyber security to 
cohere as an assemblage, mediated through communities of knowledge and practice that 
enable and instantiate the processes of cyber security.  
 
1.2 Imagination and Community 
 
Studies of ‘digital-age security’ have tended to be ‘idiosyncratic and policy-oriented, with little 
or no effort to apply or develop theory’.33 This is not to say that existing work on cyber security 
is not informed by theoretical considerations but that the majority of extant research 
emphasises policy and technical implementation at the expense of theoretical application and 
development. This is undoubtedly in part a function of the relative novelty of cyber security as 
an identifiable field of practice and policy, even if its roots lie in cognate forms of security such 
as critical infrastructure protection and information security.34 It is only recently that computer 
science professionals, for example, have felt it necessary or possible to self-identify as 
practitioners of cyber security.35 However, most work on cyber security attempts to be 
                                                            
31 Tony Reichhardt, ‘Harder Than Rocket Science’, Nature 435, no. 7045 (2005): 1024-1025. 
32 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 31. These voices include those who study these groups, for whom the 
characterisation of assemblages as X or Y allows for analysis but obscures the inherently ‘fuzzy’ 
boundaries of assemblages so circumscribed.   
33 Johan Eriksson, Johan and Giampiero Giacomello, ‘Introduction: Closing the Gap between 
International Relations Theory and Studies of Digital-Age Security’, in Eriksson and Giacomello, 
International Relations, 2. 
34 The earliest reference to cyber security is probably Stephen B. Furber, VLSI RISC Architecture and 
Organization (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1989), 298. 
35 Peter J. Denning, ‘Who Are We?’, Communications of the ACM 44, no. 2 (2001): 15-19; Peter J. 




‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘critical’. It accepts and attempts to perpetuate the status quo by 
solving problems within the existing social order, rather than interrogating the assumptions 
that this problem-solving takes as its parameters and conceptual bounds.36   
 
This perspective dominates security studies in general—a managerial approach informed by 
‘the desire to “do” security better’.37 Didier Bigo has observed that despite the intra-
disciplinary disagreements between security scholars of diverse epistemological and 
methodological persuasions, it is not always apparent that they are so different when, in their 
mutual and exclusive discourses, ‘the maximization of security becomes the horizon of 
discussion’.38 Michael Dillon concludes of the security studies literature in general that it 
‘invokes security as a ground and seeks largely to specify what security is; how security might 
be attained; and which are the most basic, effective, or cost-effective means of doing so’.39 The 
current enquiry finds affinity with work on cyber security that problematizes security itself 
rather than leaving its ontological and epistemological foundations unexamined.  
 
Scholars working in the constructivist vein constitute the most developed body of small-‘c’ 
critical analyses of cyber security.40 Constructivism, as one of its earliest proponents in 
disciplinary International Relations (IR) states, ‘complements the Enlightenment belief in the 
power of language to instantiate reason and qualifies the belief in the power of language to 
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represent the world as it is’.41 In this broadly Kantian tradition, constructivism holds that ‘the 
manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction 
depends on dynamic and epistemic interpretations of the material world’.42 That is, knowledge 
of the world is socially constructed through collective and intersubjective understandings that 
manifest as ideas, identities, norms, rights and culture which, in turn, shape how states 
interact and politics is enacted. There exists a material reality to which we have partial access 
through human senses and reason but it is consensus about this reality that shapes social 
phenomena rather than any decisive causality on the part of material reality itself. In this 
sense, intersubjective epistemology takes on ontological importance in social reality whilst not 
denying the ontology of material reality.43 This post-Kantian distinction between human and 
world might be unsuitable as a basis for categorical metaphysics44 but it has proven valuable 
and influential in IR theory and in security studies.45   
 
Constructivist studies of cyber security have drawn upon securitisation theory and related 
approaches that privilege the constitutive role of language to show how cyber threats are 
                                                            
41 Nicholas Onuf, ‘The Constitution of International Society’, European Journal of International Law 5, 
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42 Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of 
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44 Graham Harman, ‘I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must Be Destroyed’, Environment & 
Planning D: Society & Space 28, no. 5 (2010): 773. 
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constructed through cyber security discourses.46 Securitisation theory emphasises the 
sociolinguistic construction of security and is constructivist in its emphasis on identifying ‘the 
processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is considered and collectively 
responded to as a threat’.47 Myriam Dunn Cavelty’s book, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics 
(2008) has been particularly influential and instructive in showing how the framing of cyber 
threats in the US has changed since the 1980s, from concerns over technical information 
security and encryption to more expansive attempts to secure critical infrastructures within a 
‘homeland security’ framework.48 It has also served as a valuable historically minded addition 
to a field compromised by ahistoricism.49  
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Dunn Cavelty draws attention to the important role of collective knowledge in shaping political 
outcomes, an approach which draws on the concept of ‘epistemic communities’.50 Grounded 
in Michel Foucault’s formulation of episteme,51 which John Ruggie describes as ‘a dominant 
way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual expectations 
and a mutual predictability of intention’, epistemic communities consist of ‘interrelated roles 
which grow up around an episteme; they delimit, for their members, the proper construction 
of social reality’.52 In IR, the concept of epistemic communities has narrowed from Foucault’s 
original conception of a form of social knowledge specific to a particular epoch to ‘a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’.53 This has 
clear relevance to cyber security, in which computer scientists and computer security 
professionals are brought into the policy arena to advise on technical issues. The concept of 
epistemic community has ordinarily been applied to scientific communities but there is a 
strong case that ‘non-scientific knowledge is just as—if not more—influential as scientific 
knowledge in influencing policy goals’.54 We can therefore identify other relevant epistemic 
communities—political, military, intelligence, media—within the national context and other 
collectivities organised and acting transnationally.  
 
Together, the epistemic communities of cyber security contribute to an identifiable 
‘community of practice’. Communities of practice are ‘simultaneously “objectified” meanings 
and discourse that congeal in physical matter’ and connote ‘activity, as in a state of permanent 
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becoming; stability within change’.55 The spread of these communities of security practice is 
enabled by ‘creating alliances, competing for and mobilizing resources and allegiances, and 
devising interpretations that align interests with negotiated identities—and by the reification 
of the background knowledge on which practice is based’.56 As Adler and Pouliot note, these 
practices in turn structure world politics and security.57 These communities of practice need 
not correspond to existing institutional boundaries, an observation also made of ‘global 
security assemblages’, in which ‘actors, technologies, norms and discourses’ are ‘embedded in 
a complex transnational architecture that defies the conventional distinctions of public-private 
and global-local’.58 These aggregate entities are ‘systems that mix technology, politics, actors 
in diverse configurations that do not follow given scales or political mappings’, identified 
elsewhere in studies of international politics.59 
 
In respect of actors and discourses embedded in and constitutive of assemblages, we cannot 
neglect the broader Foucauldian conception of the social episteme, the configuration of 
semiotic and structural elements constitutive of society that allow for the self-imagining of 
community and society.60 That is, ‘the web of beliefs into which a people are acculturated and 
through which they perceive the world around them’.61 Beliefs are often manifest in the ways 
in which communities imagine themselves and the notion of self-imagination as an essential 
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component of communal identity politics is well-established in international studies.62 The 
present study retains this sense but also extends Ruggie’s ‘mutual predictability of intention’ 
into the related concept of the ‘security imaginary’.63 The self-imagining of identity is 
predominantly an internalised self-constitution with respect to variously-defined ‘others’ but 
the security imaginary is the means through which the intentions of the assembled epistemic 
community may be internally negotiated and, ultimately, externalised. A social imaginary, 
according to Charles Taylor, is how people ‘imagine their social existence, how they fit 
together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that 
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations …. that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a 
widely shared sense of legitimacy’.64 For Joelien Pretorius, a security imaginary is not an 
extension of the social imaginary to the study of security but that part of the social imaginary 
‘specific to society’s common understanding and expectations about security and [which] 
makes practices related to security possible’.65   
 
We may postulate the existence, if only as a useful heuristic, of cyber security imaginaries that 
speak to the understanding and expectations of cyber security within the community of cyber 
security practice and within society as a whole. As Pretorius demonstrates, this cultural 
dimension to security plays an important role in spreading practices and norms of security, 
such as may be discerned in current attempts to foster a ‘global culture of cyber security’.66 In 
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common with the social episteme—by virtue of being part of it—any security imaginary will 
incorporate ‘an interwoven set of historically contingent intersubjective mental 
characteristics’, which includes spatial and temporal cognitive biases.67 These temporal biases 
are the empirical focus of this thesis.   
 
1.3 Time in International Relations 
 
Explicit attention to time and temporality is rare in International Relations and security studies. 
It is often remarked, for instance, that dominant IR theories are ahistorical, that they fail to 
account for change in time and ignore the temporal contingency of political phenomena, both 
in their historical development and in their constant dynamism and renegotiation.68 These 
theories have prioritised the spatial over the temporal and reified the state as a fixed territorial 
entity that has somehow fortuitously come into ‘being’, rather than as a polity undergoing a 
perpetual process of ‘becoming’.69 This apparent blindness to history and its philosophy 
inevitably shapes how we understand contemporary politics, particularly in assumptions about 
progress, destiny and the teleology of nationhood.70 Even authors who affirm the role of 
history as a ‘core discipline’ of IR acknowledge the distinction between viewing history as a 
resource for explaining the world rather than seeing the world as an historical phenomenon in 
itself.71 A putative ‘historical turn’ in IR has prompted more historical reflection but rather than 
embracing the ‘radical uncertainty of historical meaning’ or the problematic meaning of 
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history itself has preferred instead to impose its own ‘interpretive closure’ on the historical 
record in order to suppress ambiguity and prevent interpretive superabundance.72   
 
Important though the renewed emphasis on history is in IR, it is a limited perspective on time, 
concerned principally with remaking the past in the present, and other aspects of time should 
also be of interest in international studies. The elision of time by space in IR may be 
symptomatic of a related tendency elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities to 
prioritise the study of space.73 This perhaps reflects Foucault’s 1967 assertion that the ‘anxiety 
of our era has to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time’.74 
One leading sociologist of time has argued that this ‘era’ was a period during which time was 
‘consistently theorised out of existence’.75 Although the subsequent emergence of a ‘temporal 
turn’ is questioned,76 there have been conscious efforts to make time visible in analyses of the 
contemporary world because time has a ‘pervasive role’ in modernity that is often left 
unquestioned, or is predicated upon simplistic and totalising conceptions of time.77   
 
This attention to time and temporality has begun to present itself in IR, exemplified by 
Kimberly Hutchings’ analyses of dominant theories of contemporary world politics, which finds 
them in thrall to temporal assumptions grounded in Western political thought and 
philosophies of history.78 Hutchings provides a counter-balance through her advocacy of 
postcolonial and feminist theories that better reflect the ‘heterotemporality’ of international 
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life. Andrew Hom also examines the issue of Western temporal ‘hegemony’ and its constitutive 
role in international relations and IR theory.79 Notable too is Ian Klinke’s work on the politics of 
time as a key constituent of critical geopolitics.80 Klinke’s project is a conscious extension and 
critique of well-known studies in IR and critical geopolitics, including James Der Derian’s work 
on war, information technology, surveillance and the politics of speed.81 In turn, Der Derian 
owes much to the voluminous and provocative oeuvre of the French ‘philosopher of speed’ 
Paul Virilio.82 As Klinke notes, analyses of speed do not exhaust the concepts of time and 
temporality and may fall prey to totalising conceptions of time that should be challenged 
through more nuanced political and temporal frameworks, the further development of which 
is a key ambition of this thesis.  
 
In security studies and allied fields, particularly human geography, a vibrant body of critical 
and interdisciplinary work has emerged that is concerned with the technologies of risk 
governance, most noticeably in post-9/11 counterterrorism and resilience policies and 
practices. The concepts of ‘pre-emption’, ‘precaution’ and ‘prevention’ figure large in political 
discourses on counterterrorism and resilience and this emphasis on futurity has formed a 
mostly implicit backdrop of temporality to the large number of analyses of these 
contemporary security issues. Temporality, however, is foregrounded in examinations of how 
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violent acts like 9/11 ruptured historical consciousness83 and in analyses of how conceptions of 
time and temporality have informed the prosecution of the subsequent ‘war on terror’.84 
Temporality is central to studies of anticipatory governance of the future85 and in 
understanding how a paradoxical ‘knowledge of the future’ is developed in and through 
security discourses.86 Of particular interest is how unknown catastrophic futures are imagined 
and ‘inhabited’ through security practices like emergency planning, disaster preparedness 
exercises, simulations and other ways of rendering the future aesthetically present.87 This sub-
field of security studies has not yet turned to cyber security as a topic of interest. Accordingly, 
the present enquiry is also an attempt to intervene in these discussions of security and 
temporality. 
 
1.4 Approach and Methods 
 
The conceptual framework developed in this enquiry is constructivist in orientation, dealing 
principally as it does with the relations between cyber security and the politics of time 
(chronopolitics) as socially constructed fields of knowledge. Specifically, it asks what social 
conceptions of time inform the security imaginaries that shape cyber security as a political 
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phenomenon. It proposes that social attitudes to time inform political behaviours and 
examines cyber security as a lens through which to explore this proposition. Unlike the study 
of space, for which academic geography may make a claim to seniority, the study of time has 
no central disciplinary core but is the object of interdisciplinary studies across the natural and 
social sciences, humanities and the arts. The analytical framework reflects this 
interdisciplinarity, drawing upon a range of theoretical and conceptual resources to develop an 
understanding of chronopolitics.  
 
This orientation is further justified by the increasing interdisciplinarity of security studies, 
which, whilst readily identifiable as a sub-discipline of IR or as a parallel field of enquiry, is also 
a sub-field of social science more generally.88 Given its complexity, it is perhaps no longer 
possible to analyse contemporary security fully from within inherited disciplinary bounds, a 
situation that suggests a presumption to interdisciplinarity.89 In historical terms, security 
studies has always been ‘a kind of hybrid, interstitial intellectual space’ located ‘on the 
borderlands’ between diverse disciplines.90 What has changed is the diversity of disciplines 
that now take security as a valid object of enquiry, a shift away from fields characterised by 
positivist epistemologies to those with more interpretivist and post-positivist perspectives on 
international politics. Attention to the cultural aspects of international relations is an especially 
fecund development in this intellectual space and the current enquiry finds affinity with this 
body of work in IR and security studies. 
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The approach taken in this study is neither amenable to a quantitative treatment nor to the 
application of a positivist methodology.91 A qualitative perspective on cyber security is adopted 
that can best be summarised as a constructivist approach with an historical sensibility. Given 
its prioritisation of historical contingency and the uniqueness of historical context over grand 
and timeless theory, constructivism is already inherently ‘about how the past shapes the ways 
actors understand their present situation’.92 These actors include academics as well as the 
people and collectivities they study and the historical approach employed here is not an 
attempt to stabilise truth or meaning, except in the sense of making accessible a particular 
view of the issues under discussion at this particular time. The history of security is always ‘a 
history of the changing problematization of what it is to be a political subject and to be 
politically subject’, and the present enquiry fits within this characterisation of security analysis 
as ‘the critical analysis of the discursive conditions of emergence of contemporary security 
regimes’.93 
 
Even if an authoritative historical account of these issues were desirable, it would not be 
possible under current conditions. As Stephen Budiansky has remarked of the closely related 
topic of signals intelligence, the ‘practice and craft of history is a document-driven business, 
and the documents are not available’.94 The practices of bureaucratic secrecy, document 
suppression and textual redaction severely impede the ability of historians to reconstruct key 
periods and processes in the historical development of national security. In the UK, the ‘thirty-
year rule’ effectively embargoes release of many government documents into the public 
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domain until three decades after their creation.95 Although accessibility to released records 
has substantially improved under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), the 
exemptions afforded under the Act to the intelligence services (Section 23) and information 
‘required for the purposes of safeguarding national security’ (Section 24) mean that 
information about state security from the crucial period of the 1980s onwards is limited for the 
purposes of public scrutiny and academic study.96 Often, even documents statutorily made 
available to the public are selectively redacted, like the annual reports of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC).97 
 
Historians are often left to concentrate on narrowly defined case studies or classes of non-
governmental documents.98 Alternatively, they may seek official sponsorship to access 
restricted archives and publish authorised histories.99 Retired officials draw upon their 
personal experiences to illustrate key dynamics in recent military and intelligence history, 
although they are also bound by legal restraint.100 Those without such an imprimatur must 
mould sparse evidence into credible narratives whose veracity can often only be vouchsafed 
by those who are unable to speak or refuse to do so.101 Given the classified nature of many 
cyber security documents that might be of interest to the historically minded researcher, the 
                                                            
95 This position is articulated in the provisions of the Public Records Act (1958), as amended in 1967. A 
phased programme beginning in early 2013 will eventually reduce this period to 20 years.  
96 Freedom of Information Act (2000). 
97 On the ISC, see Peter Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence & National Security 22, no. 1 (2007): 14-37; 
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British Intelligence History (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). 
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(London: Hurst & Company, 2010). 
101 An engrossing example of which is Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most 
Secret Intelligence Agency (London: HarperCollins, 2010). 
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best available course of action is to attempt to construct historical narratives, rather than 
authoritative histories, of the topics we find of interest.   
 
The current enquiry follows ‘the practice of telling stories about connected sequences of 
human action’, in order that we might help explain the actions in question and ‘enhance and 
extend understanding, comprehension and experience’.102 In this sense, narration is the 
‘syntax of commonsense explanation’,103 although theoretical insights from a variety of 
disciplines will expand and clarify the comprehension of particular issues. This is a pragmatic 
approach to theory, as outlined in Ken Booth’s discussion of Hannah Arendt’s Perlenfischerei 
(pearl-fishing), in which she delved ‘beneath the historical surface’ for ideas that were ‘sea-
changed, rich, and strange’.104 This need not be an excuse for theoretical incoherence, nor for 
‘epistemological anarchy’.105 It is instead a method of generating interesting and productive 
ideas from one’s own empirical investigations.106 The purpose of this theoretically inflected 
historical approach is to develop a ‘synoptic judgment’ of the phenomena under examination, 
‘how it came to be, what it means, and what understanding of it best integrates the available 
evidence’.107   
 
We are fortunate that cyber security is not restricted to secret military and intelligence 
operations and the proliferation of cyber security texts is remarkable and reflects its multi-
faceted character. A substantial corpus is developing of government cyber security policies, 
national strategies, diplomatic memoranda, military doctrine, commercial reports, trade 
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journals, media articles, op-eds, multimedia resources, think-tank reports, technical 
documents, conference proceedings and academic articles and books. Cyber security has rich 
and complex historical and conceptual relations with a wide range of practices, disciplines and 
communities, all of which have generated valuable archival resources. Given the diverse range 
and volume of available sources, both primary and secondary, an historical approach must 
inevitably concentrate on those texts in which ‘something happens’.108 These should be 
‘discourse events’, ‘documents or statements that are reflective of or have the power to shape 
the overall public policy debate about cybersecurity’.109 Their selection allows us to 
concentrate on the narrative, rather than become diverted by material that might be 
interesting but offers little to understanding the chronopolitical dynamics of cyber security. 
One additional selection bias is a function of the linguistic deficiencies of the author: only 
English sources were consulted and the analysis is inevitably oriented to Anglophone cyber 
security communities, principally in the United Kingdom and United States. 
 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
The next chapter, Chapter Two, ‘Towards a Politics of Time’, sets out the conceptual and 
theoretical foundations of the thesis. It shows how conceptions of time emerge from the 
physical universe and stresses the importance of sociotemporality as a form of social 
knowledge about time. This knowledge is not constrained merely to the subjective experience 
of human time but extends through reason and technology to incorporate the temporalities of 
nonhuman others like machines and electromagnetism. All social imaginaries are 
intersubjectively negotiated fields of knowledge that incorporate conceptions of time and 
space (chronotopes) in their narrative interpretations of reality. With respect to security 
imaginaries, many different temporal cognitive biases (chronotypes) co-exist within and across 
                                                            
108 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 133. 
109 Sean Lawson, ‘Motivating Cybersecurity: Assessing the Status of Critical Infrastructure as an Object of 
Cyber Threats’, in Securing Critical Infrastructures and Industrial Control Systems: Approaches for Threat 
Protection, eds. Christopher Laing, Atta Badii and Paul Vickers (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2013), 169. 
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different communities and inform the narratives through which these communities 
understand their social existence, their role in the world, and through which their political 
behaviours are shaped. Different conceptions of time give rise to different political behaviours, 
a concept that underpins the idea of the politics of time (chronopolitics). It is the task of the 
remainder of the thesis to show how chronopolitics manifests with respect to the practices of 
cyber security. 
 
Chapter Three, ‘Diagnosing the Present’, examines how cyber security discourses identify 
cyber security with a particular reading of the contemporary ‘information age’. Cyber security 
interlocutors frequently cite the characteristics of this periodization of (post)modernity—
speed, acceleration, instantaneity—which are dominant modes of framing the threats and 
opportunities catalysed by global information technologies like the Internet. Whilst not 
entirely inaccurate representations of the modern world, the reliance upon narratives of speed 
and acceleration has its roots in theories of modernity and postmodernity that serve as 
totalising and exclusive conceptions of the world, particularly in their insistence on the 
obliterative temporalities of global capitalism and Western temporal hegemony. In their 
chronopolitical dimensions, these narratives—fostered by political and intellectual elites 
alike—perform crucial cognitive and political work that serves to mask the empirical 
heterogeneity of social time and constrain the possibilities of political resistance. Cyber 
security is peculiarly prone, it seems, to such overemphasis on speed and acceleration, 
appropriating as it does not only the times of human others but the times of machines, the 
computing technologies that work at substantial fractions of the speed of light. The cyber 
security practices enabled by the appropriation of machine temporalities disclose the potential 





Chapter Four, ‘Imagining the Future’, explores how cyber security communities imagine the 
future. Cyber security imaginaries are dominated by dystopian visions of the future that 
prioritise the disastrous and the catastrophic. These ‘cyber doom’ scenarios can be understood 
as a form of apocalyptic thinking, not merely as so many make direct reference to end-times 
scenarios, but because they disclose an ‘apocalyptic temporality’. Historical events of ‘cyber 
insecurity’, of which Stuxnet is perhaps the best known example, are interpreted as ‘signs’ of 
impending catastrophe, which serve in turn to corroborate pre-determined apocalyptic scripts 
of imminent catastrophe. Not only are these future events imminent, such narratives stress, 
but they are also immanent: they are bound to happen due to the inherent insecurity of the 
information-technological systems of the contemporary world. This chapter links this mode of 
thought to theories of the ‘technological accident’ immanent in complex sociotechnical 
systems, suggesting that cyber security in its ‘resilience’ mode is a response to this particular 
aspect of apocalyptic thought. Apocalypse is, in its primary sense, revelatory and 
transformative, characteristics that run through cyber security in, respectively, its concerns 
with identifying the present political ‘failure to secure’, and the desire to rectify these mistakes 
and usher in ‘cyber secure’ futures.   
  
Chapter Five, ‘Arguing Through the Past’, examines how political narratives of cyber security 
use the past as a resource, most obviously through historical analogies. Previous work on 
historical analogies and cyber security has tended to concentrate on the failures of analogies 
rather than on what political work these forms of reasoning perform. This chapter discusses 
how historical events like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 are used to provoke political action in the 
present by analogizing the nature of future catastrophes identified in concepts like ‘electronic 
Pearl Harbor’ and ‘digital 9/11’. These narratives tap into existing constructions of national 
memory and identity in order to evoke emotional identification with the aims of cyber security 
and to assist in eliciting political support for its furtherance. The past is a fluid resource readily 
remade in the image of the contemporary politics of cyber security, consistent with a general 
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understanding that the past is not a frozen entity but exists only in its continual 
reinterpretation and representation in the present. Cyber security actors’ appeals to history 
are also a search for foundations: in the absence of an Hiroshima, cyber security looks to 
signature events like Pearl Harbor and Cold War to ground itself in established historical 
narratives of national security. History serves not only as a resource through which to 
analogise a future that may never happen but helps shape the identities of cyber security 
communities themselves. 
 
Chapter Six, ‘Inhabiting the Future’, draws attention to the ways in which cyber security 
communities attempt to ‘inhabit’ the future through exercises, simulations, recruitment and 
education. Inhabitation is meant both in the sense of occupying future scenarios as active 
participants and as a way to populate the future with young people and cyber security 
professionals. These forms of anticipatory security practice prepare us for cyber security 
catastrophes and crises through training and preparation and are a way of knowing the future 
in order to mitigate surprise and uncertainty. These practices rely upon the creation of an 
aesthetic of anticipation which translates the often abstract notions of information security 
into physical and sensory modalities through which the ‘virtual’ can be made more intelligible. 
These efforts extend from the closed spaces of national security into the mediated public 
domain and even into the early stages of education and disclose intentions to raise awareness 
of cyber security issues and to recruit ever younger people into cyber security communities. In 
chronopolitical terms, these practices of inhabiting the future attempt to bring the future into 
the present by making it comprehensible and also project the present into the future through 
the literal population of the future with the ‘next generation’ of cyber security professionals 
and others aligned with national cyber security efforts. By channelling their energies in the 
present, we exert some minimal influence over the future, albeit one that reflects our own 




Chapter Seven, ‘Cyber Security and the Politics of Time’, extracts from the previous chapters 
four principal chronopolitical logics at work in cyber security. Understood not as universal 
principles but as tendencies that emerge from historical practices and assemblages, these 
logics are, respectively, the logics of assemblage, real time, event and eschaton. The logic of 
assemblage stresses the dual nature of sociomaterial assemblages in the mutual contingency 
of change and continuity, which implies that the cyber security assemblage must always find 
ways to extend itself in order to maintain its identity. The logic of real time appropriates but is 
also seduced by the temporalities of information technologies; it internalises and reproduces 
speed and acceleration to the potential exclusion of human politics. The logic of event propels 
processes of premediation and the development of an aesthetic that works to develop an 
affective regime of political utility in security politics. Apocalyptic anxiety is one example of this 
and is further located within the logic of eschaton, which discusses how political theology 
illuminates aspects of the chronopolitics of cyber security, in its concerns with the end of 
history and the ends of security itself. These logics are shown to constitute a provisional 
chronopolitical manifold of cyber security, in which they complement and contest one 
another. The chapter ends with a call to challenge dominant political conceptions of time and 
temporality as a way to approach the future and avoid foreclosing political possibilities. The 
concluding Chapter Eight summarises the contributions of the thesis to the academy and 





2 TOWARDS A POLITICS OF TIME 
 
Time and power are close, and must be, 
for what is power but the attempt to control time, buy time, bide time.1 
 
2.1 Introduction: From Time to Temporality 
 
Time is mysterious. It is at once familiar and exotic, both quotidian and extraordinary. We are 
aware of its ubiquity, its structuring role in our lives and in our relations with the world, but 
beyond the pressures of the clock and the seasons, the constraints of day and night, and the 
memorialising of the passing of time so emblematic of human consciousness, most of us give 
time little serious thought. It is so integral to our lives that we rarely interrogate its presence or 
its nature, except most poignantly as something that passes and of which we have too little. 
That we give a name to an entity or phenomenon that we can distinguish as qualitatively 
different from other aspects of reality suggests its peculiarity and uniqueness, even as we 
consistently fail to define quite what time is or may be.  
 
This uncertainty as to the nature of time has long been recognised. In third-century Rome, 
Plotinus observed that although we might intuit the nature of time, when ‘we make the effort 
to clarify our ideas and close into the heart of the matter we are at once unsettled’.2 A century 
later, Saint Augustine of Hippo would declare, ‘What then is time? Provided that no one asks 
me, I know. If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not know’.3 In our own time, the 
philosopher Alfred North Whitehead would remark: ‘It is impossible to meditate on time and 
the mystery of the creative passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion at the limits 
of human intelligence’.4 These limits are keenly felt by all who would engage with the problem 
                                                            
1 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, ‘Aesthetics of Power: Time and Body Politics’, Third Text 7, no. 22 (1999): 33. 
2 Plotinus, The Enneads (Burdett, NY: Larson Publications, 1992), III.vii.1. 
3 Augustine, Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), XI.xiv (17). 
4 Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 73. 
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of time in physics, philosophy or, as in the current enquiry, as a key aspect of contemporary 
politics and security.  
 
It is remarkable that at the beginning of the 21st century, as we develop ever more 
sophisticated ways of exploring the cosmos and understanding our place within it, neither 
philosophy nor science can determine conclusively if time is even real.5 In 2013, scientists 
running the most ambitious scientific experiment in history, conducted at the Large Hadron 
Collider on the Franco-Swiss border, announced the existence of a subatomic particle―the 
Higgs Boson―hitherto only predicted in theory, thereby validating decades of physical 
research and experiment.6 Despite the intellectual, financial, political and material resources 
harnessed in the search for the Higgs, no scientist working on this quintessentially ‘big science’ 
project would be able to tell you definitively if time—as an ontological constituent of reality—
exists or not.7 Indeed, no one has ever carried out or imagined an experiment that would allow 
us to decide either way. It may even be that time—expressed as the physicists’ t—has no 
ontological reality at all, yet the language of time remains rooted firmly in almost all cultures 
and societies.8 In English, ‘time’ is the most common noun, even above ‘person’, ‘thing’, 
‘world’ and ‘life’.9 What we perceive as time is clearly something of fundamental importance 
to the human mind and to human culture. 
 
At its most elementary, human culture is itself an expression of the awareness of time 
manifest as inevitable death. Hundreds of millennia before cities, agriculture and the other 
civilizational trappings with which we presently identify the human, Palaeolithic man ‘awoke to 
                                                            
5 Paul S. Wesson, ‘Time as an Illusion’, in Minkowski Spacetime: A Hundred Years Later, ed. Vesselin 
Petkov (New York: Springer, 2010), 307-318. 
6 CERN, ‘New Results Indicate That New Particle is a Higgs Boson’, press release, 14 March 2013.  
7 On post-World War II ‘big science’, see Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of 
Large-Scale Research (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
8 Dennett argues that language is a prosthesis ‘that permits us to play such glorious tricks with time’; 
Daniel Dennett, ‘Making Tools for Thinking’, in Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, ed. 
Dan Sperber (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 24.  
9 ‘The OEC: Facts About the Language’, http://oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-
language. ‘Time’ is the 55th most common word in the Oxford English Corpus of over two billion words. 
37 
 
the predicament of ourselves in time’.10 Regardless of what we do in life, death marks the 
finitude of earthly existence and our inherent ‘being-towards-death’―in Heidegger’s 
terminology―is the context of all human action.11 In the words of the religious historian John 
McManners,  
 
The knowledge that we must die gives us our perspective for living, our sense of 
finitude, our conviction of the value of every moment, our determination to live in 
such a fashion that we transcend our tragic limitation.12 
 
As Ovid reminds us in Metamorphoses: ‘O Time, thou great devourer, and thou, envious Age, 
together you destroy all things; and, slowly gnawing with your teeth, you finally consume all 
things in lingering death!’13 From our perspective, this most certainly includes humans of mind, 
flesh and bone. This sense of the inexorable passing of time leads us to perceive time as the 
dimension of change, in which we witness the perpetual rhythm of days and nights, the 
turning of leaves on the trees, the extraordinary physical and mental growth of our offspring , 
and the melancholia of senescence and death. Through these observations, we identify 
temporal variation in the lives of things, people and places, over which we have little or no 
control: time passes, irrespective of human desires and interventions. We induce from 
commonplace observation and the application of no greatly sophisticated reason the greater 
and uncontroversial truth that time is a fundamental constituent of reality: ontologically, it just 
is. 
 
                                                            
10 Adam Frank, About Time (Oxford: Oneworld, 2011), xviii. 
11 Mike Parker Pearson, The Archaeology of Death and Burial (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 142. 
12 John McManners, Death and the Enlightenment: Changing Attitudes to Death Among Christians and 
Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 2, quoted in ibid., 
xviii. 
13 Ovid, Metamorphoses, vol. 2 (London: William Heinemann, 1916), 234-236. 
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Yet this is not a philosophically sustainable position. There is a key distinction between ‘time 
felt’ and ‘time understood’, an unresolvable conflict arising from the emergent nature of 
reality itself: 
 
Time felt is the temporal reality of the world interpreted by the older regions of the 
mind; time understood is articulated by the newer levels of the brain.14 
 
At its most ordinary, we may discern a difference between the objective (‘understood’) time of 
the clocks and calendars by which we reckon time and order contemporary societies, and the 
subjective (‘felt’) time of human experience ancient and modern, in which tempus fugit but a 
minute may seem like an age. There is an ‘asymmetry between the obviousness of the 
experience of time, and the unobviousness of the idea of time’, which introduces a 
considerable ‘perplexity to reflective thought’ on the nature of time.15   
 
Small wonder that our knowledge of time should be contested and subject to continual 
negotiation, or that it constitutes a central facet of political behaviour, as is the premise of this 
thesis. The time of humans does not exist a priori but must be constructed intersubjectively as 
a field of social knowledge. Whether time is a dimension of the fabric of the universe or not is 
mostly irrelevant to our everyday conception of what time is or might be. This is not 
unimportant in cosmological terms but to discover the reality or otherwise of time as a 
component of physical reality would not materially change the social existence of the human 
animal. To believe in the (non-) existence of physical time is itself to speculate as to the nature 
of reality; it is an epistemological statement about reality that is open to challenge. 
Philosophical realists are as likely to fight one another about the issue of time as much as 
postmodernist relativists might reject any realist or materialist position on the scientific 
existence of time. To speak of time is, potentially, to mean many things, ‘many species’ of 
                                                            
14 J.T. Fraser, Time, Conflict, and Human Values (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 40. 
15 J.T. Fraser, ‘Time Felt, Time Understood’, KronoScope 3, no. 1 (2003): 15. 
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time.16 In all cases, how we perceive time is part of the way in which we understand, interpret 
and communicate our world to others, not least in the realm of politics. 
 
This chapter proposes an initial understanding of the politics of time (chronopolitics) as a social 
construct, in which the temporal perspectives of human groups are fundamentally constitutive 
of political behaviours, including security as an inherently political practice and orientation. 
The key insight is that chronopolitics, even though socially constructed, is not merely 
concerned with the time of the human. Like time itself, the politics of time is informed by and 
concerned with multiple temporalities at many levels of reality and the theoretical innovation 
of this chapter is to bring these other forms of nonhuman temporality into chronopolitics. This 
provides the basis for understanding cyber security in its chronopolitical dimensions as 
concerned with both human and nonhuman temporalities, befitting a form of security 
intending to regulate and control the human and nonhuman entities enmeshed in vast 
sociotechnical assemblages like the Internet. 
 
This chapter develops the argument in six stages. The first section details how human 
conceptions of time emerge from the physical universe, with reference to J.T. Fraser’s model 
of emergent temporality. This demonstrates how different forms of temporality correspond to 
different levels of complexity in the physical universe, including the collective sociotemporality 
of human groups that shape political behaviours. The second section examines how we can 
know the different temporalities of nonhuman entities and through reason and technology 
construct a holistic conception of the temporality of the universe. This is an essential step to 
addressing the temporalities of information technologies, entities with which we cannot 
directly communicate but the times of which are so important to contemporary politics. Even if 
oriented to the future, politics is enacted in the present and the third section examines in 
detail the concepts of ‘nowness’ and ‘presentness’, suggesting, in common with 
                                                            
16 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Time and Creation’, in Chronotypes: The Construction of Time, eds. John 
Bender and David E. Wellbery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 38-64. 
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phenomenological theories of subjective experience, that we collectively inhabit a ‘social 
present’ in which past, present and future are intertwined. Further entanglements are 
discussed in the fourth section, as time cannot be wholly abstracted from considerations of 
space, matter, energy, and other constituents of physical reality. How we perceive these 
interactions helps shape the stories we tell about social reality, the ‘chronotopes’ that inform 
the narrative foundations of politics. Within this complex ideational manifold we can further 
identify specific ‘chronotypes’ that express particular temporal biases and through which time 
becomes conceptually and practically significant. The fifth section prepares the ground for 
chronopolitics by discussing politics as expression of the ‘temporal’, differentiated from 
scientific and spiritual representations of eternity and cosmos. The chapter concludes by 
drawing together the preceding discussions, offering some preliminary thoughts as to how 
conceptions of time and temporality shape political behaviours in the social present. 
 
2.2 Emergent Sociotemporality 
 
Since we wish to understand how collective perceptions of time affect and shape political 
behaviours, it is important to establish how collective temporalities come into being. The 
following discussion draws upon J.T. Fraser’s hierarchical model of emergent temporality, 
which provides a framework for considering how collective time (sociotemporality) relates 
ontologically and epistemologically to reality. In an interdisciplinary project to understand time 
extending across decades and presented most accessibly in his penultimate book, Time, 
Conflict, and Human Values (1999), Fraser developed an epistemic framework that ‘admits and 
correlates qualitatively different causations and times across the organizational levels of 
nature [as] revealed by contemporary science’.17 Despite its grounding in scientific realism, 
Fraser recognised that science alone would be insufficient to attempt this task. This is not 
because science is incapable of answering questions about time satisfactorily (if not 
                                                            
17 Fraser, Time, 35. 
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conclusively, as discussed previously) but that its theories and methods have not yet been, or 
perhaps cannot yet be, extended to all the forms of time which we can identify and in which 
we might be interested. Many ideas about time—particularly its ‘flow’ or ‘passage’, the 
problem of ‘nowness’, and subjective temporality—must be imported from domains of 
disciplinary knowledge outside science, including philosophy.18 At the same time, ‘let us listen 
to philosophy but not anchor our enquiry there’.19 Fraser’s work is self-consciously and 
necessarily interdisciplinary and represents a general epistemological position that philosophy 
without science is ‘immature’ and science without philosophy is ‘impossible’.20 
 
Fraser’s model is a cultural-cosmological model of time that draws on the sciences (including 
scientific cosmology) to establish its foundations and its levels of analysis. Fraser pluralises 
‘time’ by disaggregating the term according to what he perceives as the six evolutionary levels 
of nature, each of which corresponds to a particular temporality. ‘The proposition’, writes 
Fraser, ‘is that time had its genesis at the birth of the universe, has been evolving along a scale 
of qualitative changes appropriate to the complexity of the distinct integrative levels of natural 
processes, and remains evolutionarily open-ended.21 Each temporality is emergent from the 
last and together they comprise a ‘nested hierarchy of presents’, which are ‘the canonical 
forms of time’. These presents exist simultaneously because, rather than the temporality 
emerging later replacing that already existing, it subsumes the earlier within itself. If this were 
not the case, human perceptions of time, which have emerged relatively recently in cosmic 
evolution, would not be able to comprehend even in the most superficial way the extant forms 
of cosmic and biological time.   
 
                                                            
18 J.T. Fraser, ‘Space-Time in the Study of Time: An Exercise in Critical Interdisciplinarity’, KronoScope 5, 
no. 2 (2005): 151-175. 
19 Fraser, ‘Time Felt’, 16. 
20 Derek Gjertsen, Science and Philosophy: Past and Present (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 69. 
21 Fraser, Time, 38. 
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Atemporality, as the name suggests, is the time of no time and consequently of no causation.22 
This is not to equate atemporality with non-existence but rather with a particular mode of 
existence exemplified by electromagnetic radiation (i.e. photons, electromagnetic waves). 
Since Einstein formulated the theory of special relativity at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, we have known that due to the relativistic effects of time dilation, clocks moving away 
from one another at a constant velocity will each appear (to the other) to run slower than their 
counterpart. At the speed of light, time slows down completely and ceases to have any 
meaning in human terms. From the perspective of a massless photon brought into being in the 
early years of the universe (it must be massless or it could not travel at light speed), no time 
has passed in the nearly 14 billion years since its apparent creation.23 More accurately still, if 
we consider time as the dimension of change rather than a fixed dimension, everything (from 
the photonic observer’s perspective) has happened at once. Atemporality describes a world of 
electromagnetic chaos that has no time and no causation. 
 
Prototemporality is the time of non-photonic waves and particles with non-zero rest mass.24 As 
these entities have mass, they cannot travel at the absolute speed of light and must possess 
temporality, however rudimentary. Prototemporality is the time of events or instants that may 
be identified statistically but which are not ordered with respect to anything we might identify 
as the passage of time. Causation is therefore not deterministic but probabilistic, as is the case 
with certain quantum mechanical processes and as the early universe must have been. 
Deterministic causation only emerges with eotemporality, the time of the observable physical 
universe in which matter is ordered into visible objects like stars and galaxies and in which 
events are ‘countable and orderable’.25 Fraser’s example of the natural numbers {0, 1, 2, 3, …} 
illustrates that although eotemporal events (like natural numbers) are successive they do not 
                                                            
22 Ibid., 38. 
23 Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate 
Theory (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), 51. 
24 Fraser, Time, 37. 
25 Ibid., 36. 
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demonstrate a temporal direction.26 Rather, they are time-reversible, like most known physical 
laws, and deterministic in that certain outcomes must follow from their premises and initial 
conditions. 
 
By contrast, biotemporality is the directed time of life.27 Time proceeds in one direction for 
living organisms, whose automatic activities are directed towards the ends necessary for the 
maintenance of individual and species existence. Biotemporality is tensed, in that the past may 
be distinguished from the present and the future. The unwitting biological operations of 
humans exist in this biotemporal matrix of necessity, yet their higher cognitive functions 
operate in the realm of nootemporality, in which there is conscious awareness of the passing 
of time and the extrapolation of temporal boundaries into the past and the future. In the 
nootemporal world, intra-species subjectivity emerges in the distinction between self and 
other, and actions are directed to the attainment of symbolic ends as well as the more tangible 
goals of subsistence. Causality lies in the ability of humans—or, hypothetically, any other 
sentient beings— to determine the character of their actions, even if the course of future 
events cannot be known (and assuming we believe in the freedom of will in a quantum 
universe). It is this human ‘experience and idea of time’s passage [that] must be brought to 
physics; they cannot be derived from it’.28 
 
The highest proposed level of time is that of sociotemporality, the ‘postulated level-specific 
temporality of a society …. a social consensus necessary for the survival of a society, a 
definition of that society’s way of being’.29 Fraser enlists the assistance of Anne Shullenbeger 
Lévy’s luminous description of sociotemporality to illustrate what this consensus might look 
like: 
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ordering. 
27 Fraser, Time, 36. 
28 Ibid., 35. 




On the one hand [sociotemporality] creates a sense of significant order in the present 
(which can be either liberating or constraining). On the other hand, it provides 
protection from oblivion by building historical constructs and chases away the finality 
of death by conjuring ladders to eternity.30 
 
Fraser admits of a certain difficulty in further defining sociotemporality, due to the lack of a 
higher-level language that could describe the collective in terms other than those derived—as 
our language must be—from the individual. In this ‘open-ended’ schema, there may be a 
‘higher’ level of temporality to which we presently have no access to or knowledge of but 
which may yet come to exist. Similarly, there is no logical reason why there should not exist a 
more fundamental level of reality and temporality than the atemporal.31 We might also 
question the omission of a chemical or geological temporality, a ‘mesotemporality’ between 
eotemporality and biotemporality.32 Nevertheless, Fraser provides an intelligible framework 
for the consideration of coeval temporalities that correspond to different levels of complex 
reality, a schema that does not rely on a strictly linear narrative of the cosmos evolving in time 
but on the emergence of time from reality itself.33   
 
Fraser moves away from Newtonian absolute time as a receptacle of knowable reality into a 
scientific and philosophical milieu informed by the 20th-century revelations of relativity and 
quantum mechanics, in which time is relative and mutable and the only constant is the speed 
of light. This avoids an historical tendency to relegate the times of the non-present to an 
                                                            
30 Anne Shullenberger Lévy, ‘America Discovered a Second Time: French Perceptions of American 
Notions of Time from Tocqueville to Laboulaye’, PhD thesis, Yale University, 1995, quoted in ibid., 38. 
31 See, Jonathan Schaffer, ‘Is There a Fundamental Level?’, Noûs 37, no. 3 (2003): 498-517. Physical 
theories of temporal micro-finitism, however, propose various fundamental quanta of time, the 
existence of which would rather damage this claim. 
32 Bertrand P. Helm, ‘Review: J.T. Fraser, Time, Conflict, and Human Values’, The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy 15, no. 1 (2001): 50-56. 
33 Paul A. Harris, ‘Time and Emergence in the Evolutionary Epic, Naturalistic Theology, and J.T. Fraser’s 
Hierarchical Theory of Time’, KronoScope 12, no. 2 (2012): 147-158. 
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unknowable and largely irrelevant prehistory—‘a mere run-up to the real thing’.34 Crucially, 
Fraser develops the notion of sociotemporality as a form of knowledge, an intersubjectively 
constructed knowledge about time at all levels of reality. As Adrian Mackenzie states, time is 
not simply an ‘entity or substance which would simply have a past, present and future as its 
attributes …. temporality is an openness or disjunction affecting every level of what exists’.35 
This includes the temporalities of the nonhuman, whether these derive from atomic or organic 
entities, the inanimate or the animate. Fraser’s model, although grounded in a distinctly realist 
view of the cosmos, is social constructivist in the sense prescribed by Ian Hacking, in which the 
construction metaphor retains ‘one element of its literal meaning, that of building, or 
assembling from parts’.36 Sociotemporality is therefore a constructed temporality—a temporal 
assemblage—and an assembled form of knowledge.37 The next section considers in more 
detail how, if sociotemporality is a form of knowledge, we humans can know these other 
temporalities, each peculiar to the entities existing at the six organisational levels of nature.  
 
2.3 Knowing Nonhuman Temporalities 
 
There is a strong case for attempting to know and understand the temporalities of the 
nonhuman, although the reasons are perhaps not immediately obvious. If we propose that 
human temporalities are constitutive of political behaviours, why do we need to consider 
nonhuman temporalities at all? With respect to cyber security—and, arguably, to all forms of 
security and political phenomena—the answer lies in understanding the environment in which 
cyber security operates and which it intends to regulate. Most cyber security discourses are 
                                                            
34 Robin Fox, ‘Time Out of Mind: Anthropological Reflections on Temporality’, KronoScope 1, nos. 1-2 
(2001): 129. 
35 Adrian Mackenzie, Transductions: Bodies and Machines at Speed (London: Continuum, 2002), 9. 
36 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 49. 
37 Given the common identification of ‘assemblage’ with ‘postmodern’ theory, the affinity between 
Fraser’s distinctly modern approach and assemblage theory supports the thesis that assemblage theory 
‘evokes conditions under modernist theoretical influences with structural allusions’, not a 
characterisation it often admits of itself; George E. Marcus and Erkan Saka, ‘Assemblage’, Theory, 
Culture & Society 23, nos. 2-3 (2006): 106.  
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highly technologically deterministic: narratives rely upon conceptions of computing machines 
and the networks in which they are arrayed and the electromagnetic content that passes 
through them. Moreover, the temporalities of these nonhuman entities—particularly those 
associated with speed and acceleration—are used to understand the impact of these 
technologies upon the human and justify political responses and technical counter-measures, 
which themselves attempt to intervene in the temporal structures of the nonhuman. More 
accurately, these networks are sociomaterial assemblages in which humans and nonhumans 
are enmeshed in dynamic and complex fashion. Cyber security has many parts operating in 
many modalities, each of which may offer up distinct temporalities for identification and 
exploration. Cyber security is not merely an assemblage of things but an assemblage of the 
dynamic temporalities of those things, temporalities that interact and intermingle in multiple 
ways; time, too, is assembled. Fraser’s hierarchical model of emergent temporality suggests 
that nonhuman temporalities are inherently subsumed within the temporalities of politics, 
which provides a fresh opportunity to understand the political linkages between human and 
machine.   
 
It is inadequate to assert that man and machine are so entangled without examining further 
how we can know these forms of nonhuman temporality. Fraser’s model interprets reality as a 
form of knowledge, constructed in the senses and bounded by communicative interaction with 
the reality in which an entity is embedded. Fraser develops this proposition with reference to 
the concept of ‘umwelt’, as theorised by biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944). Although 
von Uexküll did not invent the term Umwelt, he redefined its modern connotation of an 
animal’s perceptual life-world.38 For Uexküll, the umwelt is the subjective spatio-temporal 
world particular to living creatures as diverse as the burrowing worm, the butterfly and the 
                                                            
38 Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, ‘Afterword: Bubbles and Webs: A Backdoor Stroll Through the Readings of 
Uexküll’, in Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of 
Meaning (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 215. On account of its naturalisation 
into English, the German capitalisation is dispensed with and lower case is used hereon.  
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field mouse.39 All animals inhabit their individual phenomenological sense-worlds in which 
meaning and significance are derived subjectively by that animal alone. Significantly, the 
animal umwelt is ‘the world as it appears to the animals themselves, not as it appears to us’.40 
Although Uexküll was influenced by a Kantian understanding of reality as a phenomenon 
revealed through the human mind, he expanded this to include reality revealed through the 
body and to the nonhuman animal.41 He refused to privilege the human umwelt over any other 
and is notable for his ‘unreserved abandonment of every anthropocentric perspective in the 
life sciences and the radical dehumanization of the image of nature’.42   
 
Uexküll held to a strong form of vitalism, a doctrine usually rejected by contemporary science 
due to its insistence on the existence of a ‘life force’ which marks living organisms apart from 
the non-living: ‘a life-principle that animates matter, exists only when in a relationship with 
matter, but is not itself of a material nature’.43 Fraser implicitly rejects the Uexküllian vitalist 
presumption that time exists only for living beings and generalises the umwelt principle to 
include those worlds not ordinarily sensible to living beings. Although we cannot directly 
experience the umwelts of photons or celestial bodies, we can begin to know the worlds of 
other species and material bodies such that they become part of our own ‘noetic umwelt’, in 
which ‘noetic’ pertains to the human mind or nous.44 This is achievable through the double 
extension of human senses: first, by dint of our cognitive abilities and the application of reason 
and theory and, second, through indirect interrogation by technological instrumentation and 
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40 Ibid., 5. 
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other material tools.45 This second category we may understand as technical orthoses, 
artefacts that supplement or extend human capabilities.46 In the modern context, we may 
additionally read this orthotic extension as symptomatic of the gradual yet persistent 
‘cyborgisation’ of the human species, in which we all become ‘chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism’, which produce new forms of knowledge and new 
sites of political contestation.47  
 
Of this extensibility of the human experience, Martin Heidegger, also influenced by Uexküll,48 
wrote: 
 
… the world of man is a rich one, greater in range, far more extensive in its 
penetrability, constantly extendable not only in its range …. but also in respect to the 
manner in which we can penetrate ever more deeply in this penetrability.49 
 
Heidegger thereby characterised man as ‘world-forming’ (weltbildend), against the animal that 
is ‘poor in world’ (weltarm) and the material object such as the stone, that is ‘worldless’ 
(weltlos). Heidegger defines ‘world’ as having access to beings outside the subject. The stone 
has no world as it has no way of accessing external beings, unlike the animal, which, as Uexküll 
showed, has access to external beings although it remains ‘immured as it were within a fixed 
sphere that is incapable of further expansion or contraction’.50 As the novelist J.M. Coetzee 
writes, for animals, ‘their whole being is in the living flesh’.51 In this Heideggerian formulation, 
the animal is deprived of aspects of the world and is therefore ‘poor in world’. The human 
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ability to access other beings through the extension of the senses allows for the formation of 
an ever-expanding world, even if, with respect to other umwelts, we can never truly know 
them. This lack of phenomenological conjunction means, as Coetzee notes, ‘You can be friends 
neither with a Martian nor with a bat, for the simple reason that you have too little in common 
with them’.52  
 
The influence of Heidegger on Fraser is unclear. Fraser qualifies the Heideggerian insistence on 
the unchanging nature of the animal umwelt by observing that animal umwelts change as they 
evolve,53 an admittedly slow process that does little to diminish Heidegger’s original argument 
that animals are poor in world. Moreover, Fraser does appear to break with Heidegger’s 
concept of world in his extension of the umwelt principle itself, definitively including umwelts 
not belonging to the human or the animal. On a superficial level, this denies the worldlessness 
of material objects like Heidegger’s stone, but this would miss Fraser’s key argument that it is 
the human umwelt that is under discussion, rather than any attempt to establish a categorical 
metaphysics of reality: 
 
For our purpose all that is necessary and sufficient is to have established a working 
concept of reality—the extended umwelt principle—and to note that as our 
knowledge of the world expands, so does our reality. This amounts to equating 
epistemology with ontology; the world is the way we find it to be through the many 
forms of human knowledge54  
 
Although left unstated, this is a constructivist perspective in which intersubjective 
epistemology assumes ontological importance in social reality. Knowledge is not 
communicated to the senses in unmediated fashion but must be actively constructed by the 
cognising subject. Fraser maintains the Kantian precept that the subject has no direct access to 
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external reality, whilst not denying the probable existence of that reality or the material origins 
of the human mind.55 Although we cannot know directly the temporalities of neutrons or 
narwhals, through reason and technical extension we can model those temporal umwelts so 
that our models correspond well enough with prospective unknowable realities that they can 
serve as the basis for our conception of time in general. Noetic time—in its totality as the sum 
of human knowledge of time—is the nested hierarchy of all these temporalities, from the 
atemporality of electromagnetic chaos to the collective sociotemporality of the social group.56 
In this way, we can begin to understand the temporalities of sociotechnical assemblages like 
the Internet, in which cyber security intends to make its mark.  
 
Security qua politics may be oriented towards the future but those who desire and enact 
security are situated firmly in the present and their actions and utterances occur now. Fraser’s 
model is explicit that temporalities are temporal ‘presents’ happening ‘now’ across all levels of 
reality but neither ‘presentness’ or ‘nowness’ are unproblematic categories. The following 
section explores these concepts further in order to provide additional means to understand 
sociotemporality. 
 
2.4 Now and the Present 
 
In order to comprehend something of the nature of time, we often turn to metaphors 
informed by other aspects of our worldly experience, and describe time in terms drawn from 
the spatiality of nature. We encounter the Newtonian flux aequabilis, the uniform ‘flow of 
time’ that appears to describe our sensory perception as to its inexorable passing. The 
metaphor of temporal fluidity is an ancient one. In Plato’s Cratylus, Socrates tells Hermogenes: 
 
                                                            
55 The extent to which Kant is constructivist or not is moot. See, Paul Formosa, ‘Is Kant a Moral 
Constructivist or a Moral Realist?’, European Journal of Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2013): 170-196. 
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Heraclitus says, I think, that ‘All things move and nothing is at rest’, and, likening the 
beings to the stream of a river, that ‘You could not step twice into the same river’.57 
 
Heraclitus’ emphasis on the perpetual Becoming of the cosmos has been glossed through the 
centuries as ‘everything flows’ (Gr. panta rhei)58 and has greatly influenced subsequent 
thinkers.59 Marcus Aurelius would write in the second century AD: 
 
There is a river of creation, and time is a violent stream. As soon as one thing comes 
into sight, it is swept past and another is carried down: it too will be taken on its way.60 
 
Philosophers have long recognised the problems of using metaphors of spatial mobility to 
describe time.61 As Arthur Prior notes: ‘Time may be […] like an ever-rolling stream, but it isn’t 
really and literally an ever-rolling stream’.62 Our tendency to deploy metaphor is explicable 
with reference to our perception of the passing of time: ‘some future event to which we have 
been looking forward with hope or dread is now at last occurring, and soon will have occurred, 
and will have occurred a longer and longer time ago’.63 Time, like the language that expresses 
it, is ‘tensed’ and events and processes have locations—past, present, future—in time.64 
Moreover, these tenses portend the deeper apparent truth that time passes in one direction 
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only. According to the astronomer Arthur Eddington, who coined the phrase in 1928, this one-
way property is ‘time’s arrow’, a projectile flying through reality with its tip always pointing 
towards the future.65 Time’s arrow flies from the unchangeable past to unknowable futures, 
passing through a transient now that itself always fades into memory. 
 
The question of tense has acquired the status of an intractable metaphysical problem. If events 
that happen in the present must in the future be considered past, or any other permutation of 
the tenses expressed in such terms, tense cannot be an essential property of an event. If 
everything is situated within time as the dimension of change, everything must be changing 
and must possess all tenses at once. This has not escaped the attention of poets, T.S. Eliot 
writing, 
 
Time present and time past 
Are both perhaps present in time future, 
And time future contained in time past. 
If all time is eternally present 
All time is unredeemable.66   
 
All moments are therefore supposed to possess all temporal properties (pastness, 
presentness, futurity) but no moment can actually co-instantiate all these mutually exclusive 
properties, leading to the philosophical conclusion that this is an absurd proposition and 
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tenses are unreal.67 The problem of tense is the foundation for J.M.E. McTaggart’s famous 
deduction from logical principles that time too must be unreal.68   
 
Metaphysical discussions over the unreality of tense and time aside, the nature of the present 
and what constitutes the now are key concerns for both the science and philosophy of time. 
Einsteinian relativity, for instance, proposes that there is no ‘now’ that can be experienced 
simultaneously by two or more observers; the ‘presentness’ of an event can only be 
experienced locally, beyond which it is not generalizable. Moreover, ‘now’ is only 
comprehensible as a point on an imaginary plane existing where past and future meet; ‘the 
present’ has no clear ontological reality in a relativistic universe.69 This perturbed Einstein 
greatly, Rudolf Carnap reporting that, 
 
[Einstein] explained that the experience of the Now means something special for man, 
something essentially different from the past and the future, but that this important 
difference does not and cannot occur within physics. That this experience cannot be 
grasped by science seemed to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation … 
there is something essential about the Now which is just outside the realm of 
science.70 
 
It is unlikely that any scientific resolution to the issue of the nature of nowness is forthcoming. 
As the philosopher of physics Simon Saunders observes, ‘the meaning of time has become 
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terribly problematic … The situation has become so uncomfortable that by far the best thing is 
to declare oneself an agnostic’.71  
 
Modern philosophers have been less reticent in asserting the nature of nowness and in 
exploring it from multiple perspectives, a review of which is beyond the scope of the present 
enquiry. However, we can identify a difference between static and dynamic views of the 
universe, an ancient distinction that persists into contemporary metaphysics. Theories of 
dynamic time hold that the passage of time has an ontological reality independent of the 
conscious observer: 
 
Some dynamists hold that passage involves a special property of ‘presentness’ moving 
along the timeline. Others explain passage in terms of the non-existence of the future: 
only the past and present are real …. Others deny reality to both the past and the 
future: time consists of a succession of ephemeral presents.72 
 
The Heraclitean, presentist view of temporal passage and Becoming is rejected by eternalists, 
who subscribe to a static universe in which ‘all moments of time (and all events) are equally 
real, and there is no moving or changing present; nothing becomes present and then ceases to 
be present’.73 The fifth-century BC philosopher Parmenides, a contemporary of Heraclitus, 
proposed, in the surviving fragments of his poem, On Nature, that change is an illusion and 
that reality is unchanging and static: ‘uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, 
immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a 
continuous one’.74 Although the details of Parmenides’ argument—in which he denied the 
logical possibility of change and therefore of an ultimate cause of Creation—are often 
considered absurd, his proposition has become ‘the historical symbol of a negative emotional 
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attitude toward the flow of time’.75 This image of a ‘block universe’ holds that ‘the future is 
just as real, solid and immutable as the past’, and in its temporal determinism has serious 
consequences for the possibilities of free will.76   
 
Alfred North Whitehead, who subscribed to a dynamic view of time, asserted that the ‘passage 
of nature leaves nothing between the past and the future. What we perceive as present is the 
vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation’.77 Whitehead was concerned to deny the 
existence of an ‘instantaneous present’, postulating rather that what is ‘immediate for sense-
awareness [of time] is duration’, contained within which is both past and future: ‘the temporal 
breadths of the immediate durations of sense-awareness are very indeterminate and 
dependent on the individual percipient’.78 Henri Bergson, too, recognised the impossibility of 
identifying a present before it disappeared and concentrated instead on identifying the 
subjective qualities of ‘duration’ rather than theorising quantitative ‘time’ itself.79 Husserl 
would pursue a phenomenological account of ‘internal time-consciousness’ in which 
consciousness is the basis for the experience of time rather than the subjective experience of 
time being derivative of any external notions of universal, ‘objective’ time.80   
 
Like Bergson, Husserl dispensed with notions of a ‘specious present’ suspended precariously 
between past and future, in favour of a present with ‘its own thickness and temporal spread’, a 
continuum of ‘nows’ constructed in human consciousness.81 Deeply influenced by Husserl, 
Heidegger would reject the priority granted the present in ‘vulgar’ conceptions of time, 
                                                            
75 Hans Reichenbach and Maria Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1956), 6. 
76 Dainton, Time and Space, 9. 
77 Whitehead, Concept of Nature, 72-73. 
78 Ibid., 72. 
79 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 3rd. edn. 
(Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2001/1913). 
80 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. Martin Heidegger (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964/1928). 
81 Alfred Gell, The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images (Oxford: 
Berg, 1992), 223. On the conceptual origins of the ‘specious present’, see Holly K. Andersen and Rick 
Grush, ‘A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 47, no. 2 (2009): 277-307. 
56 
 
preferring instead a conception of phenomenological (and finite) time as a unity of past, 
present and future.82 Rather than experience being a succession of ‘nows’, we ‘actively draw 
upon our past and project ahead of ourselves into the future, to enable our present, and it is 
our being concerned with the present that constitutes our Being’.83 This unitary experience 
manifests in a ‘moment of vision’ (Augenblick), a singular and ecstatic temporality that 
constitutes and gives meaning to Being itself.84 These phenomenological explorations extend 
the concept of the present beyond physical theory and metaphysics and into the psychological 
realm of consciousness and subjectivity. They illuminate a conceptual shift from time to 
temporality as a mode of understanding what it means to speak of ‘now’ or the more 
extensive formulation of ‘the present’. Rather than a miniscule or possibly illusory punctum, 
the present is a textured phenomenon experienced through the human mind and constitutive 
of human experience.  
 
Fraser distinguishes between the ‘mental present’ of an individual, in which ‘ideas about 
future and past may acquire meaning and conduct organized in the service of distant, often 
abstract goals’, and the ‘social present’ through which ‘collective plans and memories are 
organized’.85 The concept of duration is maintained into the social present and connotes the 
‘amount of time needed for coordinating collective action’.86 The social present is more 
complexly textured in its totality than the mental presents of individuals alone but mental 
presents must converge in order for consensuses to emerge that enable collective action, 
political or otherwise. In this sense, the social present is characterised by a tendency to flatten 
difference in pursuit of common goals. From this stabilisation of the dynamic heterogeneity of 
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multitudinous presents emerges the sociotemporality through which the present is imagined 
and constructed.   
 
Like all knowledge, our collective knowledge of time is not static. Sociotemporality does not 
simply emerge from temporalities at lower levels of complexity and remain there, fixed and 
unchanging. As we have previously observed, what we collectively think of time is influenced 
by new scientific theories and discoveries, by continued attempts to understand the 
philosophy of time, and by social enquiry into how time is perceived and constructed. 
Sociotemporality is reflexive and recursive. Embedded within it is its own genealogy—the 
stories of science and philosophy, of myth and imagined histories—that gives our constructed 
time its own additional temporal dimension: its narratives of emergence and change. This 
narrative dimension of sociotemporality is crucial both to its imagining and to its 
communication as a means of its own construction. 
 
2.5 Temporality and Narrative 
 
In the 1930s, Mikhail Bakhtin introduced the concept of the ‘chronotope’ into literary criticism 
and the philosophy of language.87 Bakhtin argued that to create plausible worlds in literature, 
authors must draw upon how space and time are organised and understood in their own 
realities. Chronotope—literally, ‘time-space’, from the Greek chronos and topos—was to stand 
for ‘the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically 
expressed in literature’.88 Chronotopes fuse ‘temporal and spatial indicators’ into ‘one 
carefully thought-out, concrete whole’, so that time ‘thickens, takes on flesh, becomes 
artistically visible’, and space, in similar fashion, ‘becomes charged and responsive to the 
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movements of time, plot and history’.89 Bakhtin’s subsequent analysis shows how chronotopes 
infuse and structure diverse genres of the novel; indeed, Bakhtin proposes that chronotopes 
determine genre. Although many chronotopes may co-exist in any text, narratives tend to be 
dominated by single chronotopes, which act as ‘organizing centers’ around which ‘the knots of 
narrative are tied and untied’.90 Dominant chronotopes are stabilised and stabilising cognitive 
representations of spatiotemporal reality that construct meaning and shape narrative. 
 
Illustrating that it is not just the writer of fiction that may draw inspiration in such fashion, 
Bakhtin’s analysis is influenced by the notion of ‘spacetime’ developed in early 20th-century 
physics. In 1908, Hermann Minkowski asserted, ‘space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed 
to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an 
independent reality’.91 In what became known as Einstein-Minkowski spacetime, space and 
time were not separate constituents of reality but had equal ontological status within a four-
dimensional cosmic fabric—spacetime—in which time is a physical dimension of the universe. 
In spacetime, objects do not change in time but describe a physical path through four-
dimensional spacetime, described in geometric and mathematical terms.92   
 
Bakhtin was unconcerned with the technical definition of spacetime within physical theory, 
borrowing the concept instead ‘almost as a metaphor (almost, but not entirely) …. What 
counts for us is the fact that [spacetime] expresses the inseparability of space and time’.93 
Taking a direct cue from Kant’s notions of space and time as transcendental of human 
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experience,94 Bakhtin channelled the spirit if not the letter of the new physics in finding space 
and time—more properly, spacetime—as constituents of immediate rather than transcendent 
reality.95 Bakhtin left behind the Newtonian formulation of space and time as separate entities 
and adopted the Minkowksi-Einsteinian unitary yet relative universe as inspiration, seeing it as 
part of a wider development in modern thought along these lines.96 As Einstein himself would 
remark a few years later, ‘time and space are modes by which we think and not conditions in 
which we live’.97  
 
The Bakhtinian chronotope reminds us that there is a deep historical ‘circulation between a 
physical encounter with the world, the cultural forms engendered by that encounter and the 
shape of consciousness determining how we think and what we experience’.98 At its most 
fundamental, this is a radical entanglement of matter and meaning, in which neither is 
ontologically separate from the other but which emerge through their mutual constitution as 
‘agentially intra-acting components’ of reality.99 Adopting the frame of cosmology to illustrate 
this further, we can divine the primary sense of cosmology as the study of the cosmos, a 
scientific endeavour to reveal and explain the workings of the universe through theoretical 
exposition and empirical description. In a secondary but no less important sense, cosmology 
refers to a Weltanschauung (worldview) that may or may not have a scientific basis but which 
forms the cultural apprehension of the cosmos and humanity’s place within it.100   
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Cosmologies are conceptualisations of the universe that impose ontological order on reality. 
Historically, its two senses cannot be ‘cleanly separated’ and there is no reason to suppose 
they could be.101 The Bakhtinian chronotope expresses this entanglement as an inescapable 
fact of social existence and is the ‘bridge’ between two worlds, one of authorial reality and the 
other of the imagined time-spaces of the created text.102 The chronotope is a necessary 
component of the cosmological narratives through which we understand the world and by 
which knowledge, experience and action are enabled. The metaphor of entanglement can be 
extended further with respect to time. Time is integral to all cosmologies and, through 
processes that emerged in human prehistory, ‘a remarkable dialogue between mind and 
matter was begun—forever linking cosmic and human time together’, a symbiotic and 
cybernetic dynamic we might term an ‘enigmatic entanglement’.103 In the contemporary West, 
our cultural and scientific cosmologies are deeply entangled and our conceptions of 
temporality are heavily informed by and infused with scientific notions of time, as evinced by 
Fraser’s model of temporality outlined previously.   
 
Bakhtin’s analysis addressed the fictional narratives of the formal novel but chronotopes 
necessarily exist in all texts, including the source materials interrogated in the current 
investigation.104 Moreover, given the tension that exists between chronotopes within and 
between texts, Ian Klinke notes that through chronotopicity, ‘texts construct their ideological 
position; they transmit political choices, forge discursive alliances, imply different forms of 
social organisation’.105 Klinke affirms the utility of chronotopes for the analysis of geopolitics, 
in that the choice, unconscious or otherwise, of a particular conception of temporality ‘is 
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always already a political move’.106 It is also deeply interlaced with the politics of space, as 
Bakhtin’s original merging of chronos and topos suggests. Haraway summarises this complex 
relationship and the importance of Bakhtin’s insights to contemporary politics: 
 
Like both place and space, time is never ‘literal’, just there; chronos always intertwines 
with topos …. Time and space organize each other in variable relationships that show 
any claim to totality, be it the New World Order, Inc., the Second Millennium, or the 
modern world, to be an ideological gambit linked to struggles to impose 
bodily/spatial/temporal organization. Bakhtin’s concept requires us to enter the 
contingency, thickness, inequality, incommensurability, and dynamism of cultural 
systems of reference through which people enrol each other in their realities.107 
 
This reminds us that although we may concentrate on time in our enquiries, as we do here, 
time cannot simply be divorced from considerations of space, place and corporeality, or from 
other ontological categories like matter, energy and information.108 Our narratives of time are 
inextricably bound together with narratives of space and other fundamental concepts from 
which we draw inspiration and through which our politics are shaped in the sociotemporal 
present.109 Our discussion turns to the relations between politics and this sociotemporal 
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2.6 The Time of Politics 
 
Albert Einstein, who did more than most to destabilise entrenched ideas about time as the 
immutable backdrop to human existence, said in 1947: 
 
we now have to divide up our time […] between politics and our equations. But to me 
our equations are far more important, for politics are only a matter of present 
concern. A mathematical equation stands forever.110 
 
As might be expected of a physicist, Einstein articulated this position correctly with respect to 
the grand narrative of cosmic evolution. It is no coincidence that politics have always been 
equated with the temporal, not just in the sense of being somehow ‘of time’ but as temporary 
and transient. Politics are differentiated from the more profound realms of science and spirit 
and the enduring truths encountered therein. The members of the upper house of the British 
parliament are formally divided between two estates of the Realm: ‘Lords Spiritual’―the 26 
bishops and archbishops of the established Church of England―and ‘Lords Temporal’, life- and 
hereditary peers appointed for their services to state and sovereign across the centuries of 
political life.111 The ‘temporal’ power of the Roman Catholic popes indicates their secular and 
political activity in the world and within time, as distinct from their ‘eternal’ power, spiritual 
authority exercised in eternity, a nuance long maintained in Christian theology.112 For 
Augustine, the fall of man from Eden and God’s eternal grace brought into being the saeculum, 
‘the realm of temporal existence in which politics takes place’.113 In this tradition, the political 
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identifies with the temporal as the fleeting and sinful world of Man rather than the eternal 
realm of the Divine.   
 
The links between time and politics are as obvious as they are ancient. There exist many 
senses of ‘politics’: as the art of government; as the conduct and management of community 
and public affairs; as the resolution of conflict by compromise and consensus; as power and 
the production and allocation of resources in pursuit of social ends. In all senses, politics is ‘the 
activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they 
live’.114 Politics is about the imposition and maintenance of social order and is always oriented 
towards some future condition. Like all purposive human activities, politics has temporal 
dimensions: it exists in time; it connects the past and the future; and it is itself transient in the 
details, remembered as history if it is fortunate, forgotten like the majority of its human 
subjects if it is not.   
 
An early attempt to circumscribe what we might describe today as the ‘time of politics’ has its 
roots in ancient Greece. The early Western philosophers distinguished between chronos, the 
quantifiable and measurable time of the cosmos, and kairos, the qualitative time of lived 
human experience.115 Although Cornelius Castoriadis warns against adopting wholesale such 
‘old-fashioned and platitudinous’ dichotomies,116 the distinction between chronos and kairos 
does retain heuristic value and analytical utility due to its persistence in discussions of time 
and politics, justification enough for its inclusion here. The classical expression of chronos is 
found in Aristotle’s Physics, in which chronotic time is defined—perhaps rather circuitously—
as ‘a number of change in respect of before and after; and because it is a number of something 
continuous, it is continuous itself’.117 Before Aristotle, Plato conceived of chronos as the 
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universal clock, ‘not mere succession or duration but a standard by which duration can be 
measured’.118   
 
Since Newton in the late 17th century, the predominant conception of chronos has been of 
time as an intangible cosmic backcloth against which existence plays out. Newton abstracted 
time and space from the sensory world of experience, presenting them as divine realities 
independent of the world of man and measurement. Newton proposed an ‘absolute space’ 
independent of matter, which existed in uniform and unchanging fashion throughout Creation. 
Just as absolute space could be distinguished from the phenomenological space of humankind 
and the materiality of celestial bodies, so too time: ‘Absolute, True, and Mathematical Time, of 
itself, and from its own nature flows equably without regard to any thing external’.119 In the 
Newtonian universe, nothing in the material universe could alter or otherwise perturb the 
‘flow of time’. 
 
In contrast, Aristotelian kairos is ‘the time that gives value’, and other ancient Greek 
philosophers conferred upon kairos the qualities of ‘exact time, critical time, season, or 
opportunity’.120 Smith summarises the essential features of kairos as timing, tension and 
opportunity.121 In an initial sense, kairos is ‘the right time’ for something to happen, so that 
‘timing’ may be good or bad. It may also connote a time of tension or conflict demanding of a 
decision not applicable at any other time. The third meaning of kairos is as a time of 
opportunity precipitated by a problem or crisis and which allows for actions prohibited or not 
possible at another time. Kairos is the time of the sui generis exception, which interrupts and 
attempts to make subservient the ordinary time of chronos in the process of psychological, 
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social and political action and transformation. Returning briefly to Heidegger’s ecstatic 
temporality, the foundation of the Augenblick is kairos, the ‘decisive, critical point dependent 
on one who has the skill and wherewithal to act’.122 Kimberly Hutchings summarises well the 
fundamental difference between these concepts of time: 
 
The qualitative distinction is, essentially, one between time being understood as the 
medium (a common, reliable and regular, context in which and through which objects 
exist and events take place, but which is distinct from those objects and events) and 
time being understood as the message (a creative force in its own right, intervening in 
relation to objects and events, rather than operating as a neutral medium).123 
 
Chronos and kairos are not, however, ontologically exclusive temporalities, and the two are 
not easily divorced. Smith contends that ‘kairos presupposes chronos which is thus a necessary 
condition underlying qualitative times’.124 Similarly, Agamben observes that kairos must be 
immanent to chronos: kairos ‘does not have another time at its disposal; in other words, what 
we take hold of when we seize kairos is not another time, but a contracted and abridged 
chronos’.125 Like Newtonian time—the temporal dimension of the divine sensorium—chronos 
is the basis for the existence of kairos, indeed of all other times imaginable. Kairos emerges 
from chronos because of humanity’s emergence from earlier forms of life and, ultimately, from 
the physical (chronotic) cosmos itself. This reading of kairos is consistent with the model of 
emergent temporality previously outlined, and offers kairos as, in part, the time of human 
political action. The temporality of kairotic politics can be further disassembled through 
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considerations of duration, tempo, acceleration and timing, which allow for finer-grained 
analyses of how politics operates in this temporal register.126  
 
Time is not merely the cosmic vessel within which we recognise tense and measure the passing 
of human lives and societies. The 20th-century revelations of Einsteinian relativity and 
quantum mechanics have taught us that time is a far stranger creature than we ever thought 
possible. It is not an absolute ‘clock in the sky’ by which all things are measurable, a concept 
dismissed in 1883 as ‘idle metaphysical speculation’ by the physicist Ernst Mach.127 As the 
narrator of a Marcel Aymé 1943 short story suggests, it ‘became obvious that the notion of 
time, as our ancestors had transmitted it down the millennia, was in fact absurd claptrap’.128 
Rather, time is a local, relative, subjective and emergent property of the physical universe that 
differs from one place and observer to another, even if it exists at all.129 A scientific framework 
in which the reality behind the appearance of the universe is one of dynamic relations rather 
than fixed entities has replaced absolute theological and cosmic time, encountered as the 
ancient Greek chronos and in the divine sensorium of Newton. The work of Einstein and others 
marked the beginning of the ‘radical secularization’ of time, in which metaphysical time, 
philosophical time and technological time converged.130 Modern science has irrevocably 
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altered how we must view time, even as we should be cautious of attempting to impose 
scientific ontologies on the social world.131    
 
In this mode of thinking, time became pliable and negotiable and might be used to further 
political ends. Winston Churchill is reported as saying, ‘Time is neutral; but it can be made the 
ally of those who will seize it and use it to the full’.132 The incarcerated Martin Luther King 
wrote similarly in 1963, ‘time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or 
constructively’.133 Time is not the silent background before which human progress unfurls 
inevitably but a resource for advancing one’s earthly ambitions in all their uncertainty and 
contingency. It follows that the time of politics—and security—is not unitary. It is not a 
singular, empirically identifiable entity—‘time’—but a multiplicity of intersubjectively 
constructed temporalities within the broader rubric of sociotemporality.   
 
Sociotemporality is the temporal umwelt that corresponds to the level of collective social 
entities and can be considered further in the light of social epistemology. Social epistemology 
is concerned with the social construction of knowledge, specifically ‘the relevance of social 
relations, roles, interests, and institutions to knowledge’.134 This perspective assumes that 
knowledge is socially rather than individually constructed and that truth and evidence are 
negotiated through social relations rather than through individual cognition alone, as is the 
assumption of ‘traditional’ epistemology as a sub-field of philosophy.135   
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[Social epistemology] encompasses an interwoven set of historically contingent 
intersubjective mental characteristics, ranging from spatial or temporal cognitive 
biases, to shared symbolic forms, to various group identities, or to ‘imagined 
communities’ […] which are unique to a specific historical context, and differentiate 
one epoch from another.136 
 
With respect to the ‘temporal cognitive biases’ that comprise in part the social episteme, 
sociotemporality is that aspect concerned with the totality of social beliefs about, and 
experiences of, time. Anthropological studies have long shown how varied are these collective 
conceptions of time between social groups.137 Whilst stressing sociotemporal heterogeneity 
within the human species, this extensive body of work posits a general understanding that 
conceptions of time are fundamental to collective self-understanding and social organisation. 
This baseline assumption has been challenged recently by studies of Amazonian social groups 
whose languages lack tenses and other linguistic constructions indicative of such a universal 
grammar of time.138 That these conceptions of temporality are often culture- or language-
specific is illustrated by the difficulties experienced by those learning second languages in 
accessing the subtleties and idioms of temporality embedded in those other languages.139 Not 
being able to speak the appropriate ‘language of time’ is a hindrance to full engagement with 
any language community, on account of the habitual strategic manipulation of the dimensions 
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of temporality to convey ‘important social messages’ of similarity and difference within both 
interpersonal relations and societal politics.140 
 
John Bender and David Wellbery extract from Bakhtin’s chronotope its temporal aspects, 
which they term the chronotype, a model or pattern through which ‘time assumes practical or 
conceptual significance’.141 This prefigures Helga Nowotny’s later idea that everyone is ‘a 
practician and theoretician of time’.142 Stressing the socially constructed aspect of temporality, 
time is not given but ‘fabricated in an ongoing process’.143 Moreover, as Bakhtin might have 
said: 
 
Chronotypes are themselves temporal and plural, constantly being made and remade 
at multiple individual, social, and cultural levels. They interact with one another, 
sometimes cooperatively, sometimes conflictually. They change over time and 
therefore have a history or histories, the construal of which itself is an act of temporal 
construction.144  
 
Chronotypes are not ‘produced ex nihilo; they are improvised from an already existing 
repertoire of cultural forms and natural phenomena’; the ‘social and cultural processes of 
temporal construction rely on and also reelaborate antecedent rhythms and articulations’.145 
Time is ‘intrinsically manifold’ and numerous chronotypes ‘intertwine to make up the fabric of 
time’; these multiple chronotypes ‘can become the objects of contention because individuals 
experience them differently and because they bear ideological implications’.146 Socially 
constructed and historicised notions of time are open to refutation, contestation and 
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resistance, and recognition of the potential for conflict between sociotemporal chronotypes is 
at the heart of chronopolitics.   
 
2.7 Towards a Politics of Time 
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to show how conceptions of time emerge from the 
physical universe and has stressed the importance of sociotemporality as a form of social 
knowledge about time. This knowledge is not restricted to the experienced time of the human 
but extends through reason and technology to incorporate what we can know about the times 
of nonhuman others. The ways in which we understand time and temporality shape and are 
shaped by the broader chronotopic narratives of history and human enquiry and contribute to 
all social imaginaries. We have reached a point where we can posit the existence of multiple 
temporal orientations in any social context, which, in their mutual and exclusive articulations 
and negotiations, provide a source of political tension. With respect to security imaginaries, 
many different temporal cognitive biases co-exist within and across different communities and 
shape the narratives through which these communities understand their social existence, their 
role in the world, and through which their political behaviours are shaped. At its broadest, 
Charles Maier states, politics is inevitably about time: 
 
Politics comprises one of the fundamental means by which all societies resolve and 
carry out the decisions that order their collective life …. politics rests upon vision as 
well as compulsion. It is based on shared or competing concepts of collective purpose. 
It envisages a desired future; it invokes a formative past. To act in the political domain 
is to propose a view of how society should progress through history.147 
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There always exists a politics of time because those or govern or desire to do so will always 
advance their own visions of how society should ‘reproduce itself through time’.148 We may 
observe the primary ideological role of time in politics, in which the temporal imaginings of 
political actors and those who provide their intellectual sustenance are powerful ways of 
constructing historical identities and concepts of national destiny and right.149   
 
Johannes Fabian demonstrates how temporal narratives construct the Other through the 
anthropological 'denial of coevalness' between cultures—‘I am modern, you are not’—
instantiating webs of powerfully asymmetric social relations.150 To travel to a society under 
such anthropological contemplation is also to travel back in time, a reversal of the relationship 
between space and time by which we ordinarily locate ourselves in the world.151 Least this be 
thought purely a relic of Western colonialism and Kantian cosmopolitanism, these discourses 
operate even in modern Europe. Italy, in particular, is often referred to in terms of ‘tradition’ 
and ‘backwardness’ that contrast with its otherwise obvious status as a modern country. These 
are moral judgements upon a nation and society and perpetuate the myth of Italy as ‘non-
modern’ and somehow acting according to pre-modern rules of social and political 
organisation that are ‘out of time’ with respect to its geopolitical neighbours.152 
 
As Maier notes, there is an important second dimension to the politics of time at this level of 
abstraction: politics is not only about how time is constructed as the medium of history but 
about how it is allocated for political purposes, viewed as a ‘scarce collective as well as 
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individual resource’.153 We might distinguish, as does Maier, between the sociotemporalities 
that inform the politics of 19th-century liberal modernity and of 20th-century totalitarianism. 
The time of liberal modernity has its roots in early modern rationalism, mechanical horology 
and the temporal standardisation of urban working life. Politics and history unfold in a linear, 
absolute time from which derives teleological notions of social ‘progress’. By the beginning of 
the 20th century, science and philosophy had determined that time was not only less absolute 
than their Newtonian predecessors had assumed but more amenable to quantification, control 
and distribution. In the case of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, totalitarian regimes could 
not afford ‘to let time remain a private resource or market commodity’, so time was 
‘repoliticised—on the Left by an enthusiasm for centralised planning, and on the Right by 
fascist themes of subjecting its flow to heroic control’.154 Soviet time subordinated ‘the private 
present to the collective [socialist] future’ and claimed ‘social immortality’. Nazi time was more 
romantic and primitive and even whilst planning for a thousand-year Reich was otherwise 
occupied with building mausolea and sanctifying the transformative power of death; it ‘sought 
less to subordinate the present than to perpetuate it’ and to restore the glories of an imagined 
past.155 ‘The only thing that matters’, said Hitler in 1933, ‘is that it is we who are the last to 
make history in Germany’.156 Conceptions of past, present and future, of history and destiny, 
found divergent political expressions and helped shape the lives and deaths of these political 
regimes.   
 
As something to be politically controlled and distributed, time may belong to ‘the political 
economy of relations between individuals, classes, and nations’.157 In many influential 
accounts, the increased commodification of time is presented as a key driver of the successful 
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spread of global capitalism.158 Nowhere is this thesis presented so strongly than in Lewis 
Mumford’s Technics and Civilization (1934), in which he writes: ‘The clock, not the steam-
engine, is the key-machine of the modern industrial age …. a piece of power-machinery whose 
“product” is seconds and minutes’.159 Fractions of time form the basis of a ubiquitous economy 
of time in which we are all subject to the desires of political elites seeking to control our access 
to and our production of temporal assets, ‘to influence or constrain the balance between “free 
time” and work, or private life and public commitments’.160 Economic and other practices not 
only unfold in time but instantiate dominant political and cultural conceptions of time: time is 
always embedded in practices.161 However, to follow this argument uncritically is also to 
engage in chronopolitics. If we adhere too rigidly to popular notions of an ever-increasing 
economy of time—a narrative predicated on speed and acceleration—we submit to a form of 
technological determinism ‘which unproblematically maps the apparent power of things on to 
subjects’.162 Furthermore, we might argue that speed itself is a culturally relativist creation, a 
modernist trope that itself depends upon the construction of a ‘non-speedy’ Other.163 This is 
but an alternative manifestation of the forms of chronopolitical othering theorised by Fabian 
and others. 
 
Yet these narratives persist, and Chapter Three is concerned with their relevance to the 
chronopolitics of cyber security. In one dystopian account of contemporary ‘time wars’, Jeremy 
Rifkin pits the political strategists of speed and technologized efficiency against those who 
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would pursue life more in tune with the ancient rhythms of body and nature.164 The roots of 
this conflict lie deep in Western culture, and are intelligible through the lens of chronopolitics: 
 
Since the dawn of Western consciousness, we have lived out our lives in a 
schizophrenic middle kingdom where biological and physical time clash head-on with 
our cultural and social time. And with every change in rhythm, tempo, and timing of 
either temporal order, we are forced to mediate a compromise that will allow us to 
continue to walk the tightrope that separates these two distinct and irreconcilable 
temporal worlds.165 
 
Recognising the emergent nature of temporality, Rifkin proposes that the nature-culture divide 
in human existence stems from ‘the first great separation, that point where we began the 
process of expropriating our own time, claiming our independence from the great temporal 
symphony that orchestrates the other worlds we are fashioned from’.166 ‘Lost in a sea of 
perpetual technological transition’, he writes, ‘modern man and woman find themselves 
increasingly alienated from the ecological choreography of the planet’.167 This account insists 
on the separation of nature and culture as a key facet of modernity, which differentiates it 
from the present enquiry. As Fraser shows, our human temporality subsumes within it 
knowledge of pre-existing and co-existing nonhuman temporalities; there is no radical split 
between nature and culture except as exists epistemologically as the ultimate unknowability of 
unmediated reality.168 In related fashion, Bruno Latour argues that ‘we have never been 
modern’: the artificial distinction between culture and nature serves to obscure the 
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innumerable intense and constitutive relations between ‘cultural’ humans and the ‘natural’ 
objects and phenomena populating the world in which we live.169   
 
Whether we agree with Rifkin or Latour does not alter the recognition that chronopolitics is 
embedded within all our notions of how society operates and how it might be characterised. 
This applies not only to the chronotypical imaginings of political elites but to those who would 
resist them and to our own analyses of the conflicts that arise. In the following chapters, we 
turn to the case of cyber security in an attempt to discern its chronopolitical dynamics, 
exploring how the cyber security imaginary constructs pasts, presents and futures, what 
informs these perspectives, and what the political implications are of these ways of 
interpreting and shaping reality. As a first step in this process, the next chapter examines how 
cyber security discourses imagine the present, how cyber security understands its position in 




                                                            




3 DIAGNOSING THE PRESENT 
 
For we which now behold these present days 
Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise.1 
 
To define the present in isolation is to kill it.2 
 
3.1 Introduction: The Revolutionary Present 
 
Elite cyber security discourses are keen to emphasise the historical importance of the times in 
which we live. The UK Cyber Security Strategy (2011) suggests that the societal changes 
fomented by information communication technologies (ICTs) already look likely to be ‘on the 
scale of the very biggest shifts in human history, such as the coming of the railways, or even 
learning to smelt metals’.3 Deploying a similarly grand historical gesture, Michael Hayden, 
former director of both the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, 
commented that ‘this cyber thing is probably the most disruptive event in human history since 
the European discovery of the Western hemisphere’.4 Inelegant though these comparisons 
may be, they do indicate that governments, policymakers and senior officials view ICTs as the 
drivers of structural change on a par with some of the most significant political, cultural and 
technological transformations of the Holocene and the language of revolution is never far 
away. ‘Thirty years ago’, the US International Strategy for Cyberspace (2011) states, ‘few 
understood that something called the Internet would lead to a revolution in how we work and 
live’.5 Cyber security, argues the White House, is essential to realising the ‘full potential’ of this 
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revolution.6 The UK government grants cyber security the power to ensure that society will 
benefit from ‘the wonders of an information revolution that could transform every part of our 
lives’.7 Yet this revolution has been characterised in policy documents on both sides of the 
Atlantic as a ‘quiet’ one, delivering ‘seamless connectivity’ to British citizens,8 and responsible 
for making the US a nation ‘now fully dependent on cyberspace’.9 This dependence is as 
cognitive as it is technological, as societies come to rely psychologically and practically on the 
proper functioning of computer networks like the Internet.10 
 
Cyber security is located relative to the wider transformations of an ‘information age’, ushered 
in by an ongoing ‘information revolution’.11 Like all revolutions, the information revolution is 
not a singular point in time, even as the search for originary events, actors and technologies 
will always be an absorbing academic game. A revolution is a process that unfolds over time—
it has duration—but it also marks the beginning of a new time.12 It serves as the convenient 
demarcation of one period of human history from another, even if such crude periodization is 
well recognised as a problematic abstraction from historical reality.13 The development of 
metallurgy invoked by the UK government refers to the period labelled by antiquarians as the 
Bronze Age, sandwiched between an earlier Stone Age devoid of worked metals and a later 
Iron Age characterised by ferrous metalworking. Developed in the 19th century to provide a 
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reliable absolute chronology of prehistory based on the archaeological recovery of material 
remains, the ‘three-age system’ has lost much of its explanatory power in the face of 
archaeological science and the erosion of teleological post-Enlightenment narratives of linear 
social evolution and improvement.14 The evidence of artefacts and stratigraphy shows that this 
conceptual framework relies on constructing false boundaries between contiguous times and 
places. Nevertheless, this ‘epochalism’ persists and has ‘taken on a reality of its own’, with 
those who sustain it ‘apparently forgetting that what we call things influences how we think 
about them’.15 In this case, periodization imposes a particular form of order on the past and 
serves to perpetuate sanitised narratives of progress in which a primitive past leads to our 
civilised present.   
 
This reminds us that the periodization of the information age is a social construction. As 
Foucault notes, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of periodization as expressive of an 
‘attitude’ or ‘ethos’, understood as ‘a mode of relating to contemporary reality’ rather than 
the circumscription of a specific historical time.16 Even recognising this, we still run the risk, as 
Daniel Pick notes, of ‘singularising what was always plural’.17 This is not to suggest that the 
information revolution is an illusion, as some have argued, but it does recognise that the 
importance and effects of the material foundations (principally, information technologies) 
upon which the concept relies are defined socially through a ‘matrix of particular political, 
economic and ideological practices’.18 More radically still, ‘the hegemonic conception of the 
information revolution is an awesome phenomenon with real meaning and consequence in 
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and for our lives’. 19 The information revolution is a discursive construction, a system of 
knowledge, ideas and practices that shapes and constrains what is possible: 
 
The information revolution produces the information age …. An age connotes an all-
pervasive logic, a logic that requires that everything be explained in its own terms. The 
articulation of an age is thus an essentialized articulation in which everyone and 
everything is subsumed to a new, expressive, reductive logic. The articulation 
suppresses any possible contradiction or non-correspondence. Everything is made to 
fit, to conform.20 
 
Myriam Dunn Cavelty notes one of the principal outcomes of this problematic periodization in 
cyber security: 
 
[It gives] expression to the common cyber-enthusiasm to which it is so easy to 
succumb, and a manifestation of the tendency to call everything that is related to the 
‘information revolution’ ‘new’ and to see it as radically different from what came 
before.21 
 
This is a key consideration in any discussion of cyber security and the social present. Frank 
Webster notes the ‘divide between information society theorists who announce the novelty of 
the present and informatisation thinkers who recognise the force of the past on today’s 
developments’.22 There is a distinction between those who proclaim the ‘newness’ of 
contemporary society, in which the Internet and other information technologies have 
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fundamentally constitutive roles, and those who argue that the ‘form and function’ of 
information and the technologies that support it are ‘subordinate to long-established 
principles and practices’.23 In historical perspective, it would seem that ‘continuity exceeds 
discontinuity’,24 and it is more accurate to describe contemporary transitions as evidence of 
evolution rather than revolution.25  
 
The language of revolution is overused but it is reasonable ‘to explore the premise that the 
digital networked computer environment is unleashing significant discontinuities from 
previous eras’.26 Such qualified opinion is not found in most government cyber security 
discourses, which unequivocally align with a perspective that stresses the novelty of the 
revolutionary present.27 ‘Newness’ permeates descriptions of ‘cyberspace’ and the 
contemporary world, as a dialectic between ‘new threats’ and ‘new opportunities’, in the 
recognition of ‘new challenges’, and in the desire for new ideas, structures and procedures. 
The latter category is central to all policy—were new things not desired or required, there 
would be little point in drafting policy in the first place—but in the characterisation of the 
‘newness’ of the environment a distinct temporality is marked out. The social present is adrift 
of its temporal moorings: there is no substantive narrative of ‘before’ against which to assess 
the ‘new’ and the ‘now’, and the present can only operate in relation to the future.  
 
It is the ‘great paradox of our age’, wrote the philosopher and anthropologist Ernest Gellner, 
‘that although it is undergoing social and intellectual change of totally unprecedented speed 
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and depth, its thought has become, in the main, unhistorical or antihistorical’.28 This tendency 
surfaces in the thin appeals of cyber security to historical periodization, which articulate 
difference and distance rather than any sincere attempt to historicise the present. In the 
context of postulated revolutionary change, it can be difficult to remember that older 
temporal structures are not immediately replaced by the new; the material and mental 
conditions of existing temporalities can persist long in the presence of new ones.29 The social 
present is a richly textured aggregate of competing and complementary temporalities but it is 
also a stratified temporal assemblage, in which ‘one time structure never eliminated another 
[but] each new structure was overlaid on the top of the previously dominant structure’.30 This 
is not a palimpsest, in which the traces of earlier temporality are erased to make way for the 
new, but a situation in which new temporalities can emerge alongside the old, even if they are 
not thoroughly understood until after they too are overshadowed.31 We can read this 
additionally against the ‘emergent temporality’ framework described in Chapter Two, which 
proposes that sociotemporality incorporates knowledge about lower-order temporalities 
identifiable with nonhuman assemblages of matter and energy. 
 
The historicization of the relations between information technologies and security is relegated 
to boilerplate introductions to hundreds of articles and books, press reports, policy documents 
and expert analyses. In one sense, we should be grateful: extended historical prefaces to each 
contribution to cyber security debates would try the patience of even the most ardent 
supporter of contextual throat-clearing. In another sense, too, we would not expect authors of 
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a technical or policy persuasion necessarily to indulge in historical exegeses ahead of their 
often fine-grained analyses of contemporary issues and problems.32 A notable exception is 
provided by an extensive appendix to the US Cyberspace Policy Review (2009), which traces 
the evolution of US legal and regulatory frameworks in response to changes in information 
technologies since the 19th century, a contribution that states, ‘History Informs our Future’.33 
This bucks the dominant trend in that it recognises the value of history in planning and policy, 
a perspective articulated by Gellner: ‘we look at those roots in order to understand our 
options, not so as to prejudge our choices’.34 
 
The delineation of an information age is an exercise in periodization and an expression of 
sociotemporality: it is a temporal structure imagined, negotiated and sustained throughout the 
social body and across multiple communities. In cyber security, its characterisation may vary in 
the details but in its essential revolutionary and transformative disposition, its presentation is 
remarkably consistent. The decoupling of the present from the past is not only a cultural 
phenomenon but also a political move that facilitates the construction of the present situation 
as exceptional and necessitating political action. The justifications for cyber security lie in the 
claims made for the sui generis present, a dehistoricized information age. It is insufficient to 
note that this socially negotiated construction of the present has important political 
implications without examining further aspects of the sociotemporality that sustains it. What 
are the key temporal characteristics of this period that distinguish it from any other and 
contribute to the sociotemporality of cyber security discourse? What forms of presentness-as-
temporality are implicated in and constitutive of the politics of cyber security? How are 
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temporal differences identified and established and how do they facilitate and necessitate 
political interventions? Finally, what can we say about the imagining of the cyber security 
present in terms of the politics of time?   
 
James Der Derian observes that when ‘a revolution stops auguring change and begins 
signifying an age, it usually means that a regime has been stabilized, a cultural shift codified, 
predictability restored’.35 ‘Not so with the Information Age’, he argues, of which the only 
constant is ‘fast, repetitious, and highly reproducible change: a kind of hyper-speed’.36 The 
present is therefore one of high speed and accelerating rates of change. Speed and 
acceleration are not measures of time but qualities of temporality of crucial importance to 
framing both the need for cyber security and the political and technical responses deemed 
necessary and appropriate. This chapter shows how the subjective experience of relative 
speed, in the forms of acceleration and deceleration, emerges from the conflict between the 
temporalities of machines, networks, people and institutions. Each has a temporal present that 
combines and conflicts with others in the sociotemporality through which the cyber security 
present is imagined and constructed. In the first section, the concepts of speed and 
acceleration are situated historically as the intersubjective experience of all cultures and as a 
key aspect of the politics of modernity and postmodernity. Two subsequent sections examine 
multiple aspects of sociotechnical speed, which we here term ‘netspeed’, considered through 
the prisms of acceleration and deceleration. The practical and political effects of acceleration 
are perhaps rather more obvious than the decelerative ‘lag’ that characterises the politics of 
cyber security but as these sections and the conclusion to this chapter demonstrate, both are 
important constituents of how the present is imagined in cyber security and what politics 
emerge from this sociotemporal imaginary.   
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3.2 Speed and Acceleration 
 
Marshall McLuhan observed that the ‘message’ of any medium of technology is ‘the scale or 
pace or patterns that it introduces into human affairs’.37 Illustrating this thesis with reference 
to the railway, McLuhan wrote that 
 
it did not introduce movement or transportation or wheel or road into human society, 
but it accelerated and enlarged the scale of previous human functions, creating totally 
new kinds of cities and new kinds of work and leisure.38 
 
The railway irrevocably altered the way we perceive time and space, giving rise to new spatial 
and temporal configurations, new pathologies and the first distinct phenomenology of 
technology and speed.39 In future decades, the airplane would accelerate the rate of 
transportation still further, and ‘dissolve the railway form of city, politics, and association, 
quite independently of what the airplane is used for’.40 Air travel abolished movement in the 
terrestrial plane entirely, allowing passengers to travel the world in a day, and gave rise to new 
spaces like airports, which, in their existence solely as entry points to the global vector of 
speed, are just as quickly forgotten as encountered. These ‘non-places’, in Marc Augé’s 
influential and evocative phrase, are ‘indissociable from a more or less clear perception of the 
acceleration of history and the contraction of the planet’.41 In our lifetimes, the non-places of 
speed have been augmented further by the emergence of a new ‘cyberspace’. Enabled by 
computer networks across which communications travel at significant fractions of the speed of 
                                                            
37 Marshall McLuhan, ‘The Medium is the Message’, in Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, rev. edn., 
eds. Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006/2001), 
108. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th 
Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986/1977). See also the case study in Carlene 
Stephens, ‘“The Most Reliable Time”: William Bond, the New England Railroads, and Time Awareness in 
19th-Century America’, Technology & Culture 30, no. 1 (1989): 1-24. 
40 McLuhan, ‘The Medium’, 108. 





light and collapse traditional notions of space and distance, cyberspace is the contemporary 
apotheosis of the successive ‘waves’ of intensifying ‘time-space compression’ in capitalist 
modernity and postmodernity.42   
 
Since public access to the Internet was granted in the mid-1980s, ‘cyberspace’ and the global 
infrastructures that enable it have been central in ‘reconfiguring space and time relationships 
in ways that promised to change our lives forever’.43 The idea of ‘cyberspace’ has been 
adopted enthusiastically by politicians, government agencies and businesses, irrespective of 
the validity or otherwise of its conceptualisation as a new realm of human activity, or whether 
it can be so easily demarcated from existing notions of sociotechnical space and experience.44 
The term has limited social-scientific analytical utility but it refuses to go away. As Julie Cohen 
argues, the ‘cyberspace metaphor is neither an arbitrary fiction that can be jettisoned nor a 
description of some fixed, eternal reality, but rather an inevitable perceptual byproduct [sic] of 
the human cognitive apparatus …. The commitment to spatiality runs far deeper than mere 
politics or intellectual fashion’.45 The territorial basis of politics encourages the retention of the 
term: politicians understandably feel more comfortable constructing ‘cyberspace’ as a space 
analogous to land or sea than as the ethereal ‘noosphere’ of Teilhard de Chardin, or any other 
of the more venerable but less easily grasped concepts through which cyberspace has been 
approached and theorised.46 At the same time, cyberspace is constructed as a space apart 
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from ‘real life’, an instantiation of ‘digital dualism’ that preserves a false dichotomy between 
‘the virtual’ and ‘the actual’.47 
 
In cyber security—another term imparting a hard-edged technicity to discussions of society 
and ICTs—cyberspace is usually presented in terms of opportunity through connectivity, 
prioritising the economic benefits of the continuing growth of the Internet and the Web. Of 
the UK, Frank Webster notes that since the mid-1970s government has asserted that ‘the most 
effective way to encourage the “information revolution” is to make it into a business’.48 This is 
a central tenet of British cyber security policy today, which sees cyber security as a way of 
deriving ‘huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient and secure cyberspace’.49 
The Cyber Security Strategy (2011) makes economic comparison with the Industrial Revolution, 
a common rhetorical device in texts extolling the virtues of the information revolution.50 
Specifically, it suggests the following, citing a 2011 McKinsey report: 
 
Real GDP [gross domestic product] per capita has risen by $500 over the last 15 years 
in mature countries enabled by the internet. By comparison, it took 50 years for the 
industrial revolution to have the same effect.51 
 
The original McKinsey report notes ‘both the magnitude of the positive impact of the Web at 
all levels of society and the speed at which it delivers benefits’.52 The comparative GDP data 
suggests that the rate of change in GDP has accelerated since the Industrial Revolution, so that 
the increase in GDP has occurred three times more quickly than it did during the earlier 
‘revolutionary’ period. Crude though this measure is, it is one example of how speed and 
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acceleration are identified as key characteristics of the contemporary world in which ICTs are 
crucial to social and economic advancement. Diverse theorists argue that we are confronted 
with and complicit in a new temporality born of the speed of the computer networks on which 
society increasingly depends and of the acceleration of the rate of technological change.53   
 
What are ‘speed’ and ‘acceleration’? Speed is a form of temporality but it is not a form of time. 
In strict physical terms, speed is a quantity derived from measurements of both time and 
space. The speed of an object is obtained by determining what spatial distance it travels in a 
given temporal duration, the quantity calculated giving the average speed of the object over 
that period. Speed is an empirical measure of continuous (if not necessarily uniform) change 
through space or an indicator of the distance between discrete events, whether these are 
social phenomena or the acts of measuring duration itself. Speed can be thought of in terms of 
‘tempo’, that is, as the ‘frequency of the “subevents” in a larger event, or between events in a 
process’.54 Speed can only be experienced subjectively if there are discrete events whose 
frequency we can sense, if not always measure. It follows that the subjectivity of speed is 
relative, even if we develop ways to objectify the frequency of events over a given duration. 
Acceleration, too—the increase in or ‘speeding-up’ of the frequency of events—and its less 
commonly invoked antonym, deceleration, are similarly subjective aspects of individual and 
collective temporalities that depend upon the experience of changes in speed between 
identifiable events and entities as much as any empirical calculation of the same. 
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Speed and acceleration have always been problematic aspects of sociotemporality and its 
relations with technology. Jose Harris records that towards the end of the 19th century in 
Britain—the transformations of the Industrial Revolution by now firmly institutionalised—the 
‘subjective time span of modernity’ became foreshortened: by the 1870s, ‘modernity’ referred 
to ‘the way we live now …. rather than the longer sweep of post-classical European 
civilisation’.55 The proximate reasons for this are not hard to identify: 
 
in a myriad mundane but basic ways the regime of nature slackened its hold on human 
life, as medicine began to cure as well as kill, as water flowed out of taps and 
excrement flowed into sewers, as the glare of gas and electricity replaced the age-old 
illumination of oil-lamp and candle, and as the man-made tempo of great cities 
increasingly superseded the diurnal, seasonal, and annual rhythms of the natural 
world.56 
 
In historical perspective, we might see these phenomena as continuations of extant processes 
but for people living at the time they seemed ‘like a quantum leap into a new era of human 
existence’.57 The popular culture of fin-de-siècle Europe expressed this disjuncture between 
‘old’ and ‘new’ temporalities, the latter characterised by ‘new technologies of speed, precision, 
and mastery’ over time and nature.58 Later authors have lamented this driving of ‘a permanent 
wedge between the rhythms of culture and the rhythms of nature’,59 but this rupture was 
glorified by some at the time, including the founders of Italian Futurism, probably the first 
authentic European avant-garde: 
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We stand on the last promontory of the centuries! … Why should we look back, when 
what we want is to break down the mysterious doors of the Impossible? Time and 
Space died yesterday. We already live in the absolute, because we have created 
eternal, omnipresent speed.60 
 
In its fascistic muscularity, misogyny and paeans to the glories of ‘hygienic’ war, Futurism may 
still shock the contemporary mind.61 It is unlikely we would concede as much to the speedy 
temporalities ascribed to the gas lamp and civic sanitation, which once amazed the urban 
populace. We should, however, acknowledge the roots of our own preoccupation with the 
historical pace of change in 19th-century industrialisation and mass commercialisation, not 
least in its pessimistic register.62 It may be that we are no better positioned to objectify our co-
constitutive relations with speed than were the Victorians and Edwardians, of whom Harris 
cautions that we should be wary of taking their modernity ‘too much at its own evaluation’.63 
We should be circumspect in validating our own perceptions of the speed of contemporary 
life, particularly as those things that were once impossibly fast are now transformed into the 
epitome of ‘slow’, a ‘dialectic of experience’ that inevitably foregrounds the subjectivity of 
speed.64 Speed has always been a feature of the natural and social worlds and the ‘past is 
packed with just as much speed and ephemera as the present’.65 As Jacques Derrida suggests, 
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‘[a]t the beginning there will have been speed’.66 Speed did not come into being in the 
industrial period, preceded by some premodern past wholly in tune with the languid rhythms 
of deep ecology, nor is it a novel property of a recently ‘wired’ world. 
 
In his study of nationalism and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Marc Beissinger introduces the 
concept of ‘thickened history’ to describe those periods in which ‘the pace of challenging 
events quickens to the point that it becomes practically impossible to comprehend them and 
they come to constitute an increasingly significant part of their own causal structure’.67 This 
reminds us that living ‘inside’ history is a problematic epistemological issue, although this need 
not be an obstacle to enquiry so much as a restraint on inappropriate generalisation or 
unwarranted prediction. In Beissinger’s reading of thickened history, events structure history 
but our historical sensitivity is hampered by the human inability to process information about 
these events and the social and political effects they catalyse. Our subjective experience is 
principally one of great speed, with multiple events occurring rapidly in sequence ‘within an 
extremely compressed period of time’.68 We could read the current information-technological 
‘revolution’ in these terms, as the speed of computer networks seems to drive an ever-faster 
pace of life and politics, in which the increasing frequency of events can lead to disorientation 
and an inability to interpret this acceleration in historical perspective.69 As David Harvey notes, 
‘time-space compression always exacts its toll on our capacity to grapple with the realities 
unfolding around us’.70   
 
Cyber security actors identify speed and acceleration as fundamental aspects of the present 
and as key drivers of uncertainty and insecurity. They are important facets of the 
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sociotemporality informing the politics and practices of cyber security but they are not the 
only ones. The following discussion examines two distinct but co-existing dimensions of the 
cyber security present, with reference to the temporalities of people, social groups, machines 
and networks, which together are components of what we might call, ‘netspeed’. This term is 
used with obvious reference to the Internet (the ‘Net) and to its secondary connotation as an 
aggregate value or assemblage of values, in this case of speeds. The first section discusses 
speed and acceleration as closely related but distinct aspects of netspeed. The second section 
considers deceleration in this light and its importance to the politics of cyber security.  
 
3.3 Netspeed I: Acceleration 
 
Cyber security actors are explicit about the speed and acceleration of events. ‘Events in 
cyberspace can happen at great speed’, observes the UK government.71 The threats posed by 
computer networks are framed as threats happening at the speed of those networks. Former 
US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn said, ‘we’re seeing assaults come at an 
astonishing speed—not hours, minutes or even seconds—but in milliseconds at network 
speed’.72 ‘Attacks cross borders at light speed’, the White House notes.73 Malware can infect 
hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide in a matter of hours and large organisations 
like the US Department of Defense regularly report ‘probes’ and ‘cyber attacks’ on their 
networks numbering millions per day.74  
 
Nowhere is the frequency and acceleration of events stressed more than in formulations of 
‘cascading failure’, in which ‘events triggering a collapse produce a series of secondary effects 
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in interdependent infrastructures’.75 This is particularly the case with the ‘negative 
technological synergies’ created in ‘hybridised’ infrastructures due to the combined effects of 
deliberate, accidental or latent ‘interference’ between elements of one or more technological 
systems.76 In information infrastructures, failures thereby catalysed will ‘escalate rapidly 
beyond control before anyone understands what is happening and is able to intervene’.77  
 
This accelerated frequency of events is diagnosed for ICTs and the contemporary world in 
general and expressed in the language of technological change. The UK government observes 
that the ‘technology that underpins [cyberspace] continues to develop at a rapid pace’.78 Not 
only is the pace of change rapid but it ‘will not let up’; it is ‘relentless’.79 We may assume that 
various inflections of the adjective are intended, in its evocation of inexorability and of its 
sternness or lack of mercy. ‘We cannot afford to be complacent’ about the pace of 
technological change, says the British government.80 ‘We expect the rapid development and 
exploitation of computers and electronic communication technologies to continue to 
accelerate’.81   
 
Cyber security texts repeatedly stress the subordinate position of humans in computer 
networks. One article begins, it is now ‘a truism that most humans cannot keep up with the 
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speed of technological development across cyber space’.82 ‘Human intelligence, unlike cyber, 
does not move at velocities approaching the speed of light’, write two prominent advocates of 
increased US government intervention in cyber security.83 From the computer science 
perspective, 
 
Current cyber-defense systems involve humans at multiple levels, but people are often 
far down in the control structure, requiring them to make too many time-critical 
decisions. Information flow between humans is slow and frequently asynchronous. In a 
crisis, humans may be unable to cooperate because of cultural, language, legal, 
proprietary, availability, or other obstacles. Such systems cannot adapt to rapid cyber 
threats.84 
 
Over the last two decades, the automation of response systems has resulted in a gradual 
removal of humans from decision loops.85 One information security professional remarked: 
 
Automated software has increased the speed of attacks to the point where little 
human interaction is needed, and less can be done to prevent it. All we see is the 
battlefield when it’s over.86 
 
The deliberate, rather than incidental, excision of human inputs and decision-making is 
suggested in the array of technologies marketed as ‘active defence’ solutions to cyber security 
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problems.87 These systems have been suggested since at least the mid-1990s, when they were 
presented as analogous to the human immune system.88 Active defence systems—described as 
‘[p]art sensor, part sentry, part sharpshooter’89—aim to devolve decision-making to software, 
which can detect, block and seek out the sources of malicious attacks far more quickly than 
could human operators.90 In 2012, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) proposed a new research program, ‘Plan X’, part of which would ‘develop systems 
that could give commanders the ability to carry out speed-of-light attacks and counterattacks 
using preplanned scenarios that do not involve human operators manually typing in code—a 
process considered much too slow’.91  
 
These systems begin to bring the ‘cyber’ component of cyber security more in line with its 
etymological roots in Greek kybernētēs (‘steersman’), the origin of both ‘government’ and 
‘cybernetics’, with their obvious connotations of the control of social as well as technical 
systems.92 It is perhaps no coincidence that post-World War II cyberneticians saw themselves 
at the beginning of a new informational era in which creative and destructive powers borne of 
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technoscientific human knowledge could be brought under control: cybernetics could ‘deal 
simultaneously with the dark politics and bright theology of a the new age’.93  
 
In these scenarios, we see a fundamental discrepancy between the speeds of computer 
networks and their effects, and the ability of humans to detect and understand those 
dynamics. Technical proposals to remove humans from those decision-making frameworks 
mean that threats and network problems are dealt with automatically by software that does 
not depend on the relatively slow reaction times and thought processes of human operators.94 
Systems will be implemented that act at the speed of the networks and the machines that 
comprise them; humans have no operational utility in such an environment. Even serious 
proposals for slowing network traffic in order to restore tactical advantage to network 
defenders leave little scope for human decision-making, despite their claims to grant network 
administrators ‘Flash-like superpowers’.95 
 
The speeds of computer networks, the frequency of events and the tactical requirement of 
rapid response times all occur in a temporality that is not human. In a world of global optical 
fibre networks, consisting of bundled glass ‘light pipes’ that transmit photons from one end to 
the other, information is transmitted across long distances at light-speed. As this light travels 
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in glass rather a vacuum it cannot attain the absolute speed of light (c) but travels instead at 
sub-light speed depending on the qualities of the glass fibre in question, typically around two-
thirds the speed of light. Even at this local speed, information is transmitted in a world of 
primitive atemporality, to which we have access through technology but no direct experience 
or intuition. A similar situation pertains with the electronic circuits in computers and the cables 
that connect them. Contrary to received wisdom, electrons do not travel at the speed of light 
in electronic circuits. In alternating current (AC) arrays they merely vibrate, one reason why AC 
is more efficient and more common than DC (direct current), in which electrons do move, if at 
very low speeds. The speed of propagation of electromagnetic waves, which carry the 
informational content of communications, varies between two-thirds and 95%-plus of the 
absolute speed of light, depending upon the physical characteristics of the conducting 
material. Again, the temporality of these processes is not directly sensible to humans’ 
biotemporal senses or their higher-level cognitive appreciation of time. This is the ‘time that 
cannot be lived as such because its rhythms fall beneath the threshold of consciousness 
perception’.96   
 
When the UK government states enthusiastically that information can be exchanged across 
global networks ‘in timescales that were previously unimaginable’,97 it would be more correct 
to state that these timescales will never be imaginable in any coherent sense to the unaided 
human mind. That the fastest supercomputer currently in existence—the Tianhe-2 at the 
National University of Defence Technology, China—has recorded a peak operating 
performance of 54.91 petaflops, or nearly 55 quadrillion (1015) ‘floating-point operations per 
second’, is natively incomprehensible.98 The many online applications available for testing 
domestic broadband speeds return results that mean almost nothing to the technically 
untutored. The aim of the UK government’s Broadband Delivery UK unit is to ‘provide universal 
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access to standard broadband with a speed of at least 2Mbps’.99 What this means is difficult to 
say, except that government policy aims to deliver ‘the best superfast broadband network in 
Europe’; it is ‘fundamental to our future prosperity’.100 The national ambition ‘should be for a 
broadband system that is the engine of the nation’s mind’.101 This is information-technological 
speed as normativity and as hard-wired public good: that absolute speeds mean little to the 
citizen-consumer is less relevant than the desire for relative speed in the form of faster 
consumer products connected to a faster Internet. Speed sells, politically and commercially. 
 
Speed is commoditized and fought over in the marketplace but it is also contested at the 
national level. The current drive to high-performance computing (HPC) is a competition 
between the owners and operators of individual machines located at research establishments 
in the world’s major economies, a contest with its origins in Cold War military 
technoscience.102 The supercomputers that have held the number one spot on the ‘TOP500’ 
list since 2009 are monolithic creations that achieve undoubtedly staggering feats of 
computational speed and volume.103 Their names—Jaguar, Tianhe-1, K, Sequoia, Titan and the 
aforementioned Tianhe-2—have some of the sober resonance of their Cold War origins and 
also act as technical proxies of national power and prestige, as did the earlier contests 
between Britain and its maritime rivals to achieve ever-faster crossings of the North Atlantic 
sea routes in the late-19th and early-20th centuries.104 HPC speeds are indeed phenomenal 
and serve the needs of ‘big data’ and ‘big science’, for which more speed equals the greater 
computing power necessary for processing untold billions of data points.  
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Tellingly, given its historical analogues, this supercomputer rivalry is not infrequently reported 
as a contemporary ‘arms race’.105 President Obama has made repeated reference to a new 
American ‘Sputnik moment’, calling for more investment in science and education, a key pillar 
of which is the further development of HPC.106 Although the White House has dismissed talk of 
an HPC ‘arms race’ as a distraction,107 Obama has spoken of these issues in just such language: 
‘In the race for the future, America is in danger of falling behind’.108 After Sputnik, the rhetoric 
of Soviet victory and American defeat was central to American narratives of the early ‘space 
race’, and a symptom of the zero-sum mentality that characterised the superpower 
relationship.109 Recent presidential addresses have been less polarised, preferring the 
exhortatory yet qualified optimism of ‘we are going to be just fine … as long as …’110 As in the 
Cold War, these views are expressed with reference to an abstracted conception of an eastern 
Other—in this case, China—although the air of existential dread that pertained during the 
decades of nuclear standoff is so far generally absent.111   
 
British Prime Minister David Cameron’s similar formulation of the ‘global race’, launched at the 
Conservative Party conference in 2012, is rather starker: ‘Britain may not be in the future what 
it has been in the past. Because the truth is this. We are in a global race today. And that means 
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an hour of reckoning for countries like ours. Sink or swim. Do or decline’.112 Speaking to 
business executives, Cameron said, ‘You need us to be tough. To be radical. To be fast …. So 
this government has been tough and we’ve been radical. But there’s something else you 
desperately need from us, and that’s speed, because in this global race you are quick or you’re 
dead’.113 Cameron has made plain the existential implications of not embracing the speed of 
global commerce, ironically emanating from and exemplified by many of the same post-
colonial and post-Soviet countries traditionally referred to in the racialized subtexts of 
Western political discourse as ‘backward’.114 The philosopher John Gray summarised 
Cameron’s political outlook: 
 
Along with much of the political class, the prime minister seems resistant to the notion 
that history has anything to teach, and looks for guidance to writers who extol the 
wisdom of crowds, explain the momentous importance of tipping points or pass on the 
revelation that humans are social animals—the fleeting nostrums of the airport 
bookstore.115 
 
Gray locates Cameron’s politics firmly within the global vector of speed through his reference 
to the commercial non-places of air travel and the Prime Minister’s apparently shallow 
appreciation of temporality.  
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After the French Revolution, politics became a driver of social acceleration and deceleration, 
the progressive left favouring the acceleration of history, the conservative right struggling to 
preserve the virtues of the past or even to slow down change.116 At the beginning of the 
present century, this dichotomy has been eroded, perhaps even reversed: 
 
if the distinction between left and right has retained any discriminatory power at all, 
‘progressives’ tend to sympathize with the advocates of deceleration (stressing 
locality, political control of the economy, democratic negotiation, environmental 
protection, etc.), whereas ‘conservatives’ have become strong defenders of the need 
for further acceleration (embracing new technologies, rapid ‘free’ markets, and fast 
administrative decision-making).117 
 
If, in these terms, speed has become the ‘center of an ideological battle’ between ‘left’ and 
‘right’,118 this conflict is rarely seen in elite cyber security discourse: there is no substantive 
argument between the nominal ‘left’ and ‘right’ over the fundamental politics of cyber 
security. A remarkable bipartisan unanimity states that cyber security is needed and it is 
needed now. The sociotemporality of cyber security is shared across this traditional political 
divide; it is in ecstatic thrall to speed and acceleration as much as it is terrified by the changes 
they bring.119 That conservative politicians should be so convinced by the need to embrace 
speed is symptomatic of the seductiveness of speed. One answer to speed—traditionally the 
enemy of conservatism—is not to resist it but to allow oneself to be enfolded by it, even as we 
may detest both its capacity for social change and our genuflection before its ecstatic potency. 
After all, writes Milan Kundera, speed is ‘the form of ecstasy the technical revolution has 
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bestowed on man’.120 So ubiquitous is the narrative of speed and acceleration in cyber security 
discourses that it has ceased to be remarkable to those who think and speak it. It has become 
sedimented as ontology, rather than remaining open for epistemological, let alone political, 
disputation. 
 
This is only one aspect of the sociotemporality of relative speed. Acceleration is threaded 
throughout cyber security policy and practice yet its counterpart—deceleration—is almost 
never mentioned, even though it is arguably one of the most important chronopolitical aspects 
of cyber security. Implicitly, deceleration is at the core of the politics of cyber security, as 
discussions of the present state of cyber security are dominated by an impression of being ‘left 
behind’, both by ICT environments and by adversaries with the offensive march on 
governments and their agents. The following section examines deceleration as an aspect of 
netspeed complementary to the acceleration discussed so far. 
 
3.4 Netspeed II: Deceleration 
 
Politically, deceleration may be something to promote actively, a necessary political resistance 
and theoretical counterbalance to the speed and acceleration of 21st-century life.121 Certainly, 
the imperative to ‘slow down’ is at the heart of much historical and contemporary social 
activism.122 It is both an encouragement to decelerate and an invitation to adopt the 
temporality of another time or entity. Manuel Castells speaks of ‘glacial time’ as an organising 
logic of eco-activism, an allusion to ‘the slow motion of time in which nature and the planet 
and the species live’ but which is also ‘the idea that we, to some extent, as a collectivity, may 
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be eternal’.123 This is not the attempted substitution of one time for another but the 
absorption of an earlier, less complex temporality into our higher-level sociotemporality, a 
process through which cultural and psychological time horizons might be expanded. 
 
Yet there is apparently no question that cyber security might in any way embrace deceleration. 
It is never mentioned and must be reconstructed from texts, even though it is central to cyber 
security politics. As suggested, the form of deceleration under consideration is a relative rather 
than absolute deceleration. Establishing measurable indices of the rate of technological or 
social change is less important for present purposes than establishing the subjective 
impression of deceleration relative to an accelerating other.124 In this situation, the absolute 
speeds of two entities moving relative to one another matter less than the simple fact that 
they are moving apart from one another at an increasing rate. More accurately still, it is the 
perception that they are moving ever faster apart from one another that is significant. We 
need not be discussing single entities either: the greater concern is in the relative motion of 
sociotechnical assemblages, so that at least one experiences this relative movement as 
deceleration. Specifically, the following discussion suggests that deceleration is experienced 
intersubjectively and collectively as a deceleration of political time in the face of rapid 
sociotechnical change. Cyber security stresses this decelerative aspect of speed qua 
temporality, although it does so in different terms. This is a critical aspect of the chronopolitics 
of cyber security’s social present, explored here through the concept of ‘lag’. 
 
In macroeconomics, the concept of ‘lag’ refers to time delays between the identification of 
economic problems and the effects of economic solutions.125 The ‘inside lag’ is the length of 
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time between a problem arising and the implementation of policy to address it. The inside lag 
is further subdivided into a ‘recognition lag’—the time between a problem arising and its 
recognition by an authority—and a ‘policy lag’, between the recognition of the problem and 
policy responses, also known as the ‘decision lag’, ‘administration lag’ or ‘implementation 
lag’.126 The ‘outside lag’ or ‘effectiveness lag’ is the time taken for authoritative action to have 
a measurable effect on the economy. By analogy, cyber security has in most countries passed 
through a long period of recognition lag, as cyber security problems are today generally 
recognised as requiring serious political attention and, consequently, we are now in a situation 
of contested policy and effectiveness lags. The degree and emphasis of government attention 
to cyber security differs between states but a key point of the original macroeconomic model 
was that lag times were variable and case-specific; they could be theorised and modelled but 
not predicted. New problems will continue to present themselves and these too will have their 
individual time lags, again derivative of multiple variables and local conditions. The duration of 
each form of lag in any specific case is not as important as the perception of lag as an 
expression of sociotemporality, specifically as an intersubjective experience of deceleration. 
 
Cyber security is deserving of tailored policy because of the unique ‘speed, scale, intensity, and 
irrevocability’ of the types of events and scenarios facing contemporary societies.127 The 
standard view of many cyber security professionals is that the current situation is ‘getting 
worse, and it’s getting worse at an increasingly fast rate’.128 ‘To put a pessimistic face on it’, 
writes one, ‘risks are unmeasurable, we run on hamster wheels of pain, and budgets are 
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slashed’.129. Just as the biotemporality of man is incapable of operating at the same speed as 
computer networks, so the sociotemporality of politics would seem to trail behind the 
sociotechnical environments enabled by them. Political deceleration is experienced relative to 
technological acceleration and, as McLuhan wrote so vibrantly, ‘it is in this period of 
passionate acceleration that the world of machines begins to assume the threatening and 
unfriendly countenance of an inhuman wilderness even less manageable than that which once 
confronted prehistoric man’.130 Helga Nowotny suggests that  
 
having to run faster in order to stay in one and the same spot exposes a different 
experience of progress, which in a relative state of being ahead can demonstrate an 
equal state of being behind.131  
 
This is the impression that haunts policymakers and which is expressed frequently in cyber 
security texts. Cyber security practice and policymaking are forever ‘playing catch-up’ to 
technological change and the uses to which information technologies are put. Security ‘guru’ 
Bruce Schneier describes this as a ‘security gap … the time lag between when the bad guys 
figure out how to exploit a new technology and when the good guys figure out how to restore 
society’s balance’.132 Crucially, Schneier observes, this gap increases when there is both ‘more 
technology’, and when technological change is rapid, both conditions that obtain presently. 
 
The inability of government to ‘keep up’ with information-technological change is because the 
digital environment ‘moves too quickly and requires too much flexibility for the processes of 
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government to be, in most cases, successful in relating to it’.133 When new technologies 
emerge, either they are left unregulated or attempts are made to regulate them with ‘the old, 
antiquated rules’.134 More importantly, many argue that governments and their cumbersome 
bureaucracies are increasingly incapable of responding effectively to internal or external 
events and processes.135 The British administration is characterised as ‘stodgy’, staffed by 
senior politicians ‘frozen in indecision, nervous of making mistakes, but unwilling to 
delegate’.136 Recent American foreign policy, argues one author, is filled with ‘bureaucrats who 
were paralyzed instead of energized by the demand for what Churchill used to call “action this 
day”’.137 
 
In politics, to accuse an opponent of ‘indecision’ or ‘dithering’ is to suggest weakness, 
complacency and the inability to make crucial decisions befitting the office entrusted to that 
person.138 Yet these are merely tactical ephemera against the backdrop of greater institutional 
lethargy to which all politicians are subject. Bureaucratic torpor has long been the cause of 
laments about effective government agency but it is not entirely surprising that the making of 
policy should be slower than that which it seeks to regulate. Policy does not derive solely from 
the internal deliberations of a single territorial political entity but through the discursive 
interactions of ‘individuals, interest groups, legislatures, courts, parties, academia, the media, 
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and other institutions’, both national and international.139 In this light, policy-making will 
always tend to be a somewhat slow process. 
 
It is not entirely clear why ‘slow’ policy should be any worse or less effective than policy made 
quickly. The opposite is probably true: policy made in the white light and heat of the moment 
is far more likely to put political expediency ahead of accuracy, ethics and considerations of its 
secondary and longer-term effects.140 Robert Hassan notes the ‘abbreviated thinking’ 
expressed by such policy and that it often pertains due to the ‘pressure of social 
acceleration’.141 It might be argued that the rate of change is so great that the subjective 
experience of relative deceleration is qualitatively more intense now than at any previous 
historical moment.142 The political pressures ‘to secure’ may or may not be more persistent 
than at any other time but the experience of technological deceleration is radically and 
uniquely disorienting. 
 
Paul Virilio, the French urbanist and social theorist described by one of his principal 
Anglophone interlocutors as ‘the only contemporary radical philosopher of speed’,143 argues 
that the corollary of speed is inertia: ‘when absolute speed, that is the speed of light, is put to 
work, then one hits a wall, a barrier, which is the barrier of light’: 
 
From that moment onwards, it is no longer necessary to make any journey: one has 
already arrived …. The world is reduced, both in terms of surface and extension, to 
nothing, and this results in a kind of incarceration, in a stasis, which means that it is no 
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longer necessary to go towards the world, to journey, to stand up, to depart, to go to 
things. Everything is already there.144 
 
This vision of a technologized future in which political agency is subject purely to the logic of 
absolute speed may at some point become real—and it possesses no minor predictive 
resonance now—but we are still in an environment of relative speeds in which such inertia 
does not yet exist, only acceleration and deceleration. This ‘realm of mobility and anticipation’, 
as Virilio calls it,145 is the domain of actual politics in which cyber security policymakers operate 
and from which policy emerges. The sense of relative deceleration permeates concerns about 
the difficulties of drafting and implementing effective cyber security policy, of which there are 
several distinct but inter-related aspects. 
 
The first issue is that existing policy is perceived as inadequate because it is unable to keep up 
with technological change. In early 2013, the UK House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee reported to Parliament its findings on the relations between cyber security and the 
British armed forces. It noted that the ‘cyber threat [can] evolve with almost unimaginable 
speed and with serious consequences for the nation’s security’.146 Elsewhere, the report 
quoted earlier government policy to the effect that ‘[e]vents in cyberspace can happen at 
immense speed, outstripping traditional responses’.147 One of the enquiry’s respondents 
observed: ‘the threat is evolving probably faster, I would say, than our ability to make policy to 
catch up with it’.148 Stated baldly, the ‘pace of events can make existing defences and 
responses look slow and inadequate.149 This does not prevent government from aspiring to 
keep pace: ‘In a domain where technology and change are fast-moving, responding effectively 
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will require a consistent and extensive effort’,150 involving ‘people who have a deep 
understanding of cyberspace and how it is developing’.151 ‘We will need very agile policy 
decision-makers to keep up with the reality of the threats facing us’.152 A key priority will be ‘to 
identify and tackle areas where governance arrangements are lacking, insufficient or are 
struggling to keep pace with the evolving threats in cyber space’.153 The first dimension of lag is 
that the acceleration of sociotechnical change means existing policies can never keep pace.  
 
The second aspect is the likelihood that any policies implemented will fall short of being able 
to cope with sociotechnical change. Summarised by Johannes Bauer and Michel van Eeten, a 
‘critical weakness of any attempt to legislate or regulate security is that specific measures may 
be outsmarted by new attack technologies quickly’.154 As long ago as 2003, the US recognised 
that its National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace is ‘not immutable’ and that it must ‘evolve as 
technologies advance, as threats and vulnerabilities change’, and, significantly, ‘as our 
understanding of the cybersecurity issues improves and clarifies’.155 British think-tank Chatham 
House characterised the situation vividly: 
 
The pace of change can be so abrupt as to render the conventional action/reaction 
cycle of strategic evolution out of date before it has begun: it is as if a government 
operational analyst has been sent to observe the effects in battle of the flintlock 
musket, only to discover upon arrival that the Maxim gun has been invented.156 
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One cannot help but think this is an illusion to Hillaire Belloc’s satirical poem on imperialism, 
‘The Modern Traveller’.157 The conscious inversion of this famous verse now reads, with 
respect to contemporary perceptions of cyber security, ‘Whatever happens, they have got / 
The Maxim Gun, and we have not’. In the face of such rapid sociotechnical change, policy 
emphasis is frequently on ‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptability’ as the means through which to ‘future-
proof’ cyber security policy. One civil servant from the Office of Cyber Security and Information 
Assurance (OCSIA) spoke openly in conference about the need for British cyber security policy 
to embrace innovative ‘non-linear’ thinking,158 although this did not appear in the UK cyber 
security strategy published shortly afterwards and for which the OCSIA was principally 
responsible.159   
 
One experienced Washington insider has suggested that the pace of change is rapid but ‘not 
blinding or impossible to describe and manage’.160 This is because, as ‘technologies mature and 
governments gain experience with them, they are brought into the ambit of societal 
control’.161 The White House recognises this dynamic: 
 
The history of electronic communications in the United States reflects steady, robust 
technological innovation punctuated by government efforts to regulate, manage, or 
otherwise respond to issues presented by these new media, including security 
concerns.162 
 
This appeal to historical precedent is accurate but does not alter the perception that speed 
and acceleration are degrading the ability of governments to regulate and legislate for cyber 
security. It may be that increased direct governmental involvement in cyber security—
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exemplified by a shift from bottom-up voluntarism to top-down policies coordinated by the 
executive163—can only ever be aspirational. Certainly, this ambition registers in UK cyber crime 
policy, in which ‘our response should not only keep pace but aim to stay several steps 
ahead’.164   
 
In a more ontological sense, what if sociotechnical change is subject to an ‘open-ended form of 
speed, which means that the rate at which humans communicate and the rates of increase in 
productivity and efficiency can never be fast enough’?165 Policymakers and those who rely on 
their guidance—military, intelligence, security agencies, businesses, citizens, etc.—may find 
themselves in a permanent state of deceleration, approaching and finally reaching the state of 
inertia presaged by Paul Virilio. Acceleration and deceleration themselves disappear in a new 
regime of temporality, the permanent nowness of ‘real time’, in which humans are removed 
from decision-making loops entirely. Being the ultimate ‘time-space compression’, this 
involves ‘forgetting spatial exteriority as much as temporal exteriority (“no future”) and opting 
exclusively for the “present” instant, the real instant of instantaneous telecommunications’.166 
Democratic process will ‘disappear with the advent of a new tyranny, the tyranny of real time, 
which would no longer permit democratic control, but only the conditioned reflex, 
automatism’.167 The tyranny of real time threatens democracy because democracy demands 
that ‘man has to reflect before acting’; in an environment where the reflex replaces the human 
decision, the ‘temporality of democracy is threatened, because the expectation of a judgement 
tends to be eliminated’.168   
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Many would consider this dystopian hyperbole or, as Nicholas Zurbrugg observes of Virilio’s 
work generally, as ignoring ‘all traces of positive technological practices’.169 There are also 
problems with ascribing a singular temporality to the human condition, which is more a 
product of Western modernity than a reflection of empirical reality.170 What the concept of 
‘real time’ does reveal are the potential political effects of the logic of speed, which presents 
the problems of relative speed and cyber security in a new and concerning light. Although 
operational cyber security is highly automated, high-level political decisions are still a human 
preserve, even if, as in the US, cyber security legislation and strategic decision-making are 
sometimes vested in the body of the President rather than in Congress.171 In this case, the 
justification is that normal legislative processes have failed—in particular, the collapse of the 
Cyber Security Act (2012)—and executive fiat is necessary to short-circuit the impasse caused 
by the decelerative lag between cyber security problem and solution.172 This has led to 
accusations that the executive is seeking to circumvent the legislative process entirely, to the 
detriment of security and democracy.173 This situation offers sustenance to the diagnosis of 
William Scheuerman: 
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Slow-going deliberative legislatures, as well as normatively admirable visions of 
constitutionalism and the rule of law predicated on the quest to ensure legal stability 
and continuity with the past, mesh poorly with the imperatives of social speed, 
whereas a host of antiliberal and antidemocratic institutional trends benefit from it.174 
 
Given the difficulties in steering legislative proposals through a deeply divided Congress, it is 
unsurprising that the executive would find ways to break this deadlock. It is also no surprise 
that (principally Republican) critics should find fault with the methods by which the (Democrat) 
White House hopes to achieve this. The President is caught between the need to act and 
criticism of the wherewithal to do so and—like the modernity of which the US presidency is so 
expressive—is suspended precariously, in Baudelaire’s terms, in a transient, fleeting and 
contingent temporality in which political action may never be fast enough to provide solutions 
or durable enough to last.175 This is the decelerative temporality at the heart of the politics of 
cyber security. 
 
3.5 Diagnosing the Present 
 
The present is not a (meta)physically ephemeral now but a textured assemblage of tensed 
knowledge about what has been and what may come, as well as knowledge we generate about 
the worlds in which we live. The present of cyber security is constructed through a complex 
interplay between measurable indices of sociotechnical change and the subjectivities of 
individual and collective human experience. This heterogeneous zone of dissonant temporality 
is an important source of political tension and opportunity with respect to speed and 
acceleration. The conflict between temporalities of the present is both an explicit aspect and a 
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powerful subtext of cyber security politics and practice. The disconnect between humans and 
the speed of networked computing machines means that the absolute speeds of 
communication can never be truly known to the unaided observer and leads to ever-greater 
reliance on computers as the providers of security. The speed of a technologized world makes 
it hard enough to draft and implement policy without the increased rate of change itself 
making some policy proposals merely aspirational and potentially counterproductive. The 
radical deceleration at the heart of the subjective experience of relative speed catalyses a 
perspectival aporia, which, in its rootlessness and concern with the present above all other, 
inevitably jeopardises the possibilities of democratic politics and its respect for deliberation 
and reliance upon the art of judgement. The ultimate political significance of speed lies not in 
its existence, challenging though this is, but in its transformation. As theorised by Hartmut 
Rosa, under these conditions there is a danger that state and civil society become 
‘desynchronized’ and politics becomes ‘situationalist: it confines itself to reacting to pressures 
instead of developing progressive visions of its own’.176 
 
Cyber security would seem to be pervaded by a profound sense of frustration and 
disorientation at being trapped in an accelerating present, cut off from history and with no 
way of controlling the future. Discourses of the cyber security present are symptomatic of a 
wider cultural phenomenon, what the science fiction writer Bruce Sterling describes as 
‘atemporality’, in which the unprecedented availability of information in the present reduces 
our desire and capacity to situate ourselves with respect to greater historical structures.177 This 
is an historical a-consciousness emerging—in the philosophy of history—from the ashes of 
modernity and the unlamented death of postmodernism. Virilio articulates this dehistoricised 
perspective when he writes that real time marks the ‘switch from the extensive time of history 
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to the intensive time of momentariness without history’.178 The ‘open horizon’ of modernity 
has been foreshortened in a headlong rush to the future, which never delivers the future, or at 
least not one identifiable with social progress as Enlightenment ideal. If the future as ‘horizon 
of expectation’ never arrives, the category of ‘future’ risks being abolished and replaced with 
that of the ‘extended present’, in which concerns about the future—in fact, the construction of 
the future itself—dictate the present, not the other way around.179 It is not that the future 
does not exist but that the future is increasingly lived in the present as a matter of existential 
urgency—that we must act now in order to save the future from ourselves; there is little sense 
of what might lie beyond the now or how we might attain it. This is the ‘culture of the 
annihilation of time, which is tantamount to the cancelling of the human adventure’.180 The 
next chapter explores in more detail the relations between present and the future, through an 
examination of how cyber security futures are imagined in the present and what forms of 
politics are thereby enabled.  
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4 IMAGINING THE FUTURE 
 
Catastrophe generates the beasts it needs.1 
 
On what principle is it that, when we see nothing but improvement behind us, 
we are to expect nothing but deterioration before us?2 
 
4.1 Introduction: Future and Futurity 
 
Saint Augustine, writing in the last years of the fourth century AD, recognised that the future is 
not merely something that stretches ahead of us and which remains to be discovered. The 
future, for Augustine, does not exist, at least not in any concrete sense that would allow us to 
know it because, quite simply, it has not yet happened in order for us to know it.3 This agrees 
with our common-sense notion that the future is something unknowable but always intriguing 
to the curious human mind. Idiomatically, we ask, ‘what does the future hold?’, and wait to 
discover its character and its complexion. This is the future perceived as something beyond 
human control but also a temporal receptacle into which we pour expectations and desires. 
We are free to imagine and wonder at the future and, as Edmund Burke observed, ‘to conceive 
extravagant hopes of the future’ is a common disposition of ‘the greatest part of mankind’.4 
For Augustine, when we think of a ‘long future’, a bright assessment of potentialities ahead, it 
is not because the future is in any sense long but that we have a ‘long expectation of the 
future’.5 Our relationship with the future changes as we change, and our perspectives on the 
future are expressions of our present condition as much as they are predictions about the 
empirical character of times yet to exist.   
                                                            
1 China Miéville, London’s Overthrow (London: Westbourne Press, 2012), 57. 
2 Thomas Babington Macaulay, ‘Southey’s Colloquies on Society (Jan. 1830)’, Critical and Historical 
Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review, vol. 1 (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1903), 266.  
3 Augustine, Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), XI.37. 
4 Edmund Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, 3rd. edn. (London: J. Dodsley, 
1770), 3. 





The previous chapter suggested that the future, in some historical and philosophical sense, has 
become subsumed within the category of the ‘extended present’, by which visions of the 
future serve to regulate the present in historically unprecedented ways. This change in 
historical perspective represents a sense that the future is no longer open and available. In a 
secular age, in which historical narratives cannot necessarily advance or ensure an improved 
future through divinely-ordained progress, and in which increased sociotechnical speed 
foreshortens global temporal horizons and potentially truncates democratic process, it is 
understandable that the future might no longer have quite the lambent appeal of its former 
religious or Enlightenment selves. More than this alone, the present period—which is variously 
labelled ‘late modernity’, ‘high modernity’, ‘supermodernity’, ‘hypermodernity’, 
‘transmodernity’ or ‘postmodernity’—has a distinctly eschatological sensibility that filters the 
present through the lens not merely of the future but of the final events of the world.6 
 
This shift from optimistic modernity to pessimistic postmodernity has occurred over a century 
defined by war and trauma.7 The positive social futurism of Victorian and Edwardian 
intellectuals was deeply affected, argues Richard Overy, by World War I, a disastrous 
adventure that enervated national spirit and dampened prior expectations of social progress.8 
This ‘domestic malaise’ was further exacerbated by developing concerns over demography, 
economy and political turmoil, a depressive atmosphere that so sensitised the British public 
that the ‘escape into war’ in 1939 came as something of an apocalyptic release.9 After the 
industrial-scale carnage of Operation Barbarossa (1941) and—in British eyes—the rout of 
German forces at the second battle of El Alamein (1942), people could finally begin to imagine 
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a post-war world free of tyranny.10 This feeling quickly soured as the Cold War took shape, and 
so irresistible was its grip on people of East and West, and so completely did it define 
geopolitics for four decades, that it had ‘the power to represent and to create a whole 
world’.11 Under the ‘nuclear shadow’, and alarmed by superpower brinkmanship, people’s 
expectations of the future were unmistakably and negatively affected. 
 
Concerns about demography and the carrying capacity of the natural world have been 
deepened further by increased awareness of human damage to the global environment. The 
possibilities of human megadeath and species extinction have brought the future very much 
into the present. From anthropogenic environmental degradation to resource shortages born 
of overpopulation and the conspicuous collective inability to address climate change the future 
has become an immediate concern guiding present action rather than a space into which to 
project human desires. In this change is often identified the shift from modernity to 
postmodernity, from a world that we can control through science and reason to a world 
foisted upon us and over which we have little influence. Telos gives way to chaos and 
contingency and the grand narratives of modernity disintegrate into the polysemic cacophony 
of postmodernity, robbing humankind of certainty and foundation. William Butler Yeats, 
writing at the end of World War I, identified this as the centre that ‘cannot hold’, and through 
the disappearance of which, 
 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
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Are full of passionate intensity.12 
 
As Yeats suggested, this growing angst is intensified by increased access to knowledge and, we 
might extrapolate, to the technologies that facilitate its pursuit and creation. Global news 
media and the Internet mean that the convolutions of global climate summits can be followed 
minute-by-minute in their failure to demonstrate the concerted political will necessary to avert 
catastrophic climate change.13 Those same technologies mediate death by ‘natural’ disaster 
and gross human violence, events that become global in their consumption and in their 
capacity to fuel popular imagination and corroborate narratives of global decline. They amplify 
concerns caused by an extant distrust of science, such as the possibility that the Large Hadron 
Collider would conjure from the fabric of spacetime a black hole capable of swallowing up the 
Earth.14 The ‘new media ecology’ enables ‘a perpetual connectivity that appears to be the key 
modulator of insecurity and security today’; it becomes in its ubiquity and significance ‘the 
very condition of terror for all of us’.15 
 
Media communicate other worries catalysed by science, as in our growing awareness of the 
transits and possible collisions of near-Earth objects (NEO) with our planet. In February 2013, 
the ‘near miss’ of asteroid 2012 DA14 was a global news event trailed long in advance thanks 
to the ability of astronomers to detect, track and predict the path of this cosmic visitor with 
impressive accuracy.16 Conciliatory assurances from the scientific community that the asteroid 
was no threat to life on earth were dented by the spectacular descent of a meteor over the 
Russian Urals the day before 2012 DA14’s fly-by, damage from which injured up to 1200 
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people.17 As one newspaper columnist remarked of these coincidental events, like ‘the 
prospect of being hanged, it concentrates the mind wonderfully … [on] a sunny day, the 
prospect of universal annihilation adds zest to a brisk walk in the park’.18 Or, as a graphic 
circulating on the Internet had it: ‘Asteroids … are nature’s way of asking: “How’s that space 
program coming along?”’ Scientific knowledge about the cosmic transits of NEOs has not 
increased the likelihood that one will strike Earth but it has made it more probable we would 
know about it in advance. Improved knowledge of our galactic neighbourhood has increased 
astronomical awareness and fostered a heightened sense of the prospects of catastrophe and 
of existential finitude.19 There are many ways to imagine ‘TEOTWAWKI’—The End of the World 
As We Know It.20 We appear to be, as John Gray suggests, ‘a culture transfixed by the spectacle 
of its own fragility’.21 
 
The previous chapter argued that the political imperative ‘to get faster’ can be understood as a 
response to the fear of national decline and as a way of mobilising political action through 
appeals to public concerns over national status. Vieira argues in his analysis of late Victorian 
and Edwardian politics that contemporary narratives of decline served political ends by 
‘rhetorically increasing the nation’s imagined proximity to a temporal endpoint’, greatly 
enhancing the perceived need for solutions to problems created by speed and the acceleration 
of sociotechnical change, opportunities ably exploited by political elites.22 Perceptions of 
dystopia and decline shape narratives through which political change is effected and this 
chapter concentrates on one manifestation of these rather sombre—although often 
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spectacular—imaginings of the future: the notion of an ‘endpoint’ against which history is 
interpreted and through which social order is transformed. The task of this chapter is to 
demonstrate this eschatological aspect of cyber security as a key facet of the chronopolitics of 
cyber security. 
 
Cyber security is situated with respect to contemporary military and security imaginaries 
dominated by dystopian visions of the future that reflect eschatological postmodernity. In 
cyber security discourses, one particular genre of future scenario emerges as a dominant form, 
that of ‘cyber doom’. Catastrophic scenarios are presented as inevitable products of present 
insecurities and display a distinct temporality that can be identified as apocalyptic, not just in 
the narrative reliance on catastrophe but in the primary sense of apocalypse as a time of 
revelation and transformation, both of which qualities are in some sense ‘desired’. These 
aspects are examined in detail and linked to the concept of the ‘technological accident’ as a 
theorisation of temporality and technology that is inherently apocalyptic in its dimensions of 
imminence and immanence. I further argue that resilience in cyber security discourses is an 
expression of and response to apocalyptic thinking in postmodernity.  
 
4.2 Imagination and Dystopia 
 
In a 1902 lecture to the Royal Institution, the writer H.G. Wells hoped to convince his audience 
that the future could, in a real sense, be ‘known’ through science and theory, at least in its 
general direction and probable attributes. He opened with some comments about the two 
‘types of mind … to be distinguished chiefly by their attitude toward time, and more 
particularly by the relative importance they attach and the relative amount of thought they 
give to the future’:23 
 
                                                            




The first of these two types of mind [is] the type of the majority of living people, is that 
which seems scarcely to think of the future at all, which regards it as a sort of blank 
non-existence upon which the advancing present will presently write events. The 
second type [is] a more modern and much less abundant type of mind, thinks 
constantly and by preference of things to come, and of present things mainly in 
relation to the results that must arise from them. The former type of mind [is] 
retrospective in habit, and it interprets the things of the present, and gives value to 
this and denies it to that, entirely with relation to the past. The latter type of mind is 
constructive in habit, it interprets the things of the present and gives value to this or 
that, entirely in relation to things designed or foreseen.24 
 
Wells proceeded to describe the former mind as ‘legal or submissive’ and the latter as 
‘legislative, creative, organizing or masterful [which] sees the world as a great workshop, and 
the present as no more than material for the future.’25   
 
Doubtless, this is the sort of panegyric to technological modernism in which those charged 
with securing society would wish to recognise their own talents as visionary agents blessed 
with no minor oracular powers. These future-minded professionals are characters in Matt 
Carr’s review of the ‘new military futurism’, which details how the British and American 
militaries, in partnership with the private sector, have developed ways to generate knowledge 
about the future.26 During the Cold War, Western militaries were principally concerned with 
managing relations with the Soviet Union, and how to win (or, as a minimum, survive) a 
nuclear exchange. This attitude allowed the prospect of victory and was grounded in the 
certainty and relative inflexibility of superpower bipolarity, in which the innovative likes of 
game theory could satisfactorily model diplomacy and the probable courses of military 
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interaction.27 The demise of the Soviet Union destabilised this ossified superpower enmity and 
ushered in a dynamic world of rapidly evolving risk and threats. In this environment, the major 
security threats to international order came from ‘new wars’, in which transnational 
constellations of insurgents, terrorists and criminals combined to challenge states’ monopolies 
on legitimate violence and their ability to exert control over their restive populations.28   
 
On 11 September 2001, this thesis seemed to have been confirmed, with al-Qaeda’s attacks on 
the United States bringing home to continental America the tragic potency of globalised 
violence. The events of 9/11 caused deep reflection on whether they could have been 
somehow foreseen and averted. The official diagnosis of a ‘failure of imagination’ resulted in ‘a 
new willingness amongst the US national security establishment to consider further “strategic 
shocks” by “imagining the unimaginable”—a tendency which has generated imaginative 
scenarios that sometimes owe more to apocalyptic Hollywood movies, manga comics and 
science fiction than they do to sober analysis’.29 Those charged now with imagining and 
forecasting the future are often even more pessimistic than during the Cold War and envisage 
an ‘unsafe and unstable world’ in which the US military perceives itself as ‘the last bastion of 
civilisation against encroaching chaos and disorder’.30 These visions of dystopia are not 
warnings against the perils of misplaced utopianism—as per the science-fictional futures of 
Aldous Huxley or George Orwell—but justifications for ‘limitless military “intervention”, 
techno-warfare, techno-surveillance and weapons procurement programmes’.31 The new 
military futurism intends to counter exactly the ‘submissive’ mindset identified by Wells, which 
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views the future as ‘a perpetual source of convulsive surprises, as an impenetrable, incurable, 
perpetual blankness’.32   
 
However, this new military futurism is not the body of knowledge envisioned by Wells when 
he wrote of ‘building up this growing body of forecast into an ordered picture of the future 
that will be just as certain, just as strictly science, and perhaps just as detailed as the picture 
that has been built up [of] the geological past’.33 Rather than science, imagination is mobilised 
as an additional mode of fostering security knowledge, through which to ‘dispel secrecy and 
ignorance, compute risk and uncertainty, and prepare for surprise and novelty’.34 Through 
imagination as an aesthetic rather than scientific approach to the future, ‘a range of 
apparently disparate details, perceptions, ideas and assumptions can be brought together in a 
seemingly coherent whole’.35 By processing the future through a dystopian aesthetic, military 
planners may be discharging their duties to prevent the preventable but might be bringing 
about, by thinking the unthinkable, exactly those situations in which interventions might be 
required, further justifying investment and expenditure in future capabilities. This is the 
construction of a system of knowledge about the future, based in the imaginative capacities of 
security actors and communities and which facilitates certain political operations with respect 
to the future, as is the task of all security.   
 
We might extrapolate the dystopian military mind-set to the security imaginary more broadly, 
as there are affinities with the ways in which cyber security futures are imagined. However, 
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analyses along these lines often tread the same path as the phenomena they seek to 
understand, in that their attention to the future forgets the history of those futures, in this 
case the history of dystopia as an expression of perceived societal decline and other forms of 
collective anxiety. Sean Lawson correctly observes that contemporary cyber security concerns 
are rooted in historical fears occasioned by the invention and adoption of earlier information 
and communications technologies, such as the radio, telegraph and telephone.36 He notes the 
genealogy of anxiety accompanying the development of interconnected and interdependent 
infrastructures in modern industrial societies, worries consistent with general apprehension 
about the impact of new technologies on society. As Marshall McLuhan observed in 1967 of 
new developments in communications, ‘wherever a new environment goes around an old one 
there is always new terror’.37   
 
The pervasive ubiquity of ‘cyberspace’ has stimulated multiple misgivings as to its actual and 
potential effects. The Internet has brought to the fore issues of child protection, violent media, 
pornography, crime, social alienation, to mention but a few, all of which have induced periodic 
public spasms of moral panic.38 For commerce, Internet technologies have threatened 
supposedly stable business models and encouraged a range of consumer-led activities that 
undercut their bottom lines. Politicians fret at the thought of the diffusion of ‘power’ via the 
Internet to people and organisations at odds with their own strategic ambitions and worry at 
the new tools of conflict available to non-state actors. At the same time, they see no irony in 
their own attempts to deploy technology, law, regulation, military force and sometimes 
dubious moral authority in order to preserve the status quo. Cyber security intends to secure 
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against all of these things and many more but it also seeks to preserve and encourage what is 
‘good’ about the Internet and ICTs. In one standard expression of this orientation: 
 
[Cyber security is about] our struggle to have our cake and eat it too—about how we 
try to reap the benefits in productivity and information sharing that come from a 
globalized web of cyber connections while somehow managing to avoid (or at least 
reduce) the damage done by malfeasant actors who seek to take advantage of that 
globalized web for their own reasons.39 
 
On one hand, cyber security is the antidote to state-sponsored cyber attacks on critical 
information infrastructures and to the actions of cyber terrorists and criminals. On the other, 
cyber security creates a more conducive environment for business and affords government 
opportunities for the exploitation of cyberspace as a means to achieve, inter alia, ‘a potentially 
more effective and affordable way of achieving our national security objectives’.40   
 
However, it is the darker visions of possible security futures that give principal sustenance to 
the cyber security imaginary. As Carr asserts, American military futurism is one response to the 
apparent decline of the United States as the pre-eminent political—if not military—power.41 
American concerns about China’s sponsorship of commercial and political cyber espionage are 
framed by an interpretation of China as the potential usurper of American global power and 
portend the renewal of superpower rivalry. This taps into existing stereotypes, cultural 
categories ‘whose subjective resources can be quite easily activated’.42 In the US-China 
context, we might assess the resurgence of reference to the ‘aggressive behaviour’ of China as 
a rhizomatic eruption of the persistent American cultural trope of the racialized ‘Yellow Peril’, 
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although one should not dismiss China’s stated strategic aims or the demonstrable activities of 
Chinese entities in this space.43 National decline is a powerful narrative and is often 
constructed with reference to one or more external entities rather than to abstract history 
alone but there is another aspect of cyber security discourse that shifts attention from actors 
and entities to ‘events’. As Carr suggests, imagined events are often catastrophic and rely upon 
a distinctly dystopian mindset that generates predictions that are ‘often very grim indeed’.44 
 
4.3 Catastrophe and Apocalypse 
 
In postmodernity, ‘the future looks less like the past than ever before and has in some basic 
ways become very threatening’.45 In the cyber security imaginary, we might suggest, the future 
looks almost nothing like the past, and has become not only threatening but also catastrophic 
in an existential register. This is true only in one important sense, however. It is a key 
discursive strategy in cyber security to note that the problems of ‘cyber insecurity’ are long-
standing and deserving of political action that has never arrived. This applies even when 
referring to ‘new’ risks and threats, the possibilities of which are catalysed by extant 
vulnerabilities and processes rather than being truly novel in all their dimensions. The ultimate 
effects of these insecurities are often deferred to the future and frequently reduced to singular 
catastrophic events that demonstrate the shortcomings of contemporary politics and 
politicians. These events have no direct historical analogues, although attempts are often 
made to link them to other historical events with which they share superficial similarities.46 
Given the historical dearth of comparable events, these events are necessarily the product of 
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the security imaginary and ‘remain fiction, not to say science fiction’.47 Although we cannot 
pursue here the rich history of science fiction as a genre instrumental to national security 
thinking,48 it is necessary to note that the sorts of catastrophes which populate the science-
fictional imagination as applied to security are ‘both the stuff of Hollywood films and the 
product of expert imagination’.49   
 
This emphasis on the catastrophic event has been identified repeatedly in analyses of cyber 
security discourses and characterised as the production of ‘cyber doom’ scenarios.50 These are 
‘worst-case’ scenarios that impress upon audiences the serious consequences of inappropriate 
or inadequate actions to secure information infrastructures in the present yet discount the 
salient fact about these postulated catastrophes, their ‘unsubstantiated nature’.51 These 
scenarios are examples of a tendency in cyber security towards ‘hypersecuritisation’, in which 
discourse ‘hinges on multi-dimensional cyber disaster scenarios that pack a long list of severe 
threats into a monumental cascading sequence and the fact that [none] of these scenarios has 
so far taken place’.52 Richard Clarke and Robert Knake’s book, Cyber War (2010) contains a 
five-page description of what could happen if cyber security is not sufficiently addressed in the 
present.53 As ‘cyber warriors’ assault the critical national information infrastructures of the 
United States, aircraft fall from the sky, trains are derailed in their dozens, cars crash as traffic 
control networks go down, gas pipelines explode, chemical plants vent poison gas across urban 
areas, financial systems crash and satellites spin out of orbit into space. Food, water and 
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energy distribution networks falter and fail and, when law enforcement and security agencies 
fail to cope with rising public panic and civil unrest, the government finally loses control.  
 
It is hypothetically possible, especially because software is often the ‘least robust’ component 
of infrastructural systems, that subversion and degradation of information infrastructures—by 
accident or design—may cause failures to cross ‘infrastructure boundaries’ and, potentially, to 
radiate throughout infrastructure networks, with potentially disastrous effects.54 Infrastructure 
failure might not just cascade through physical infrastructures but could ripple into the 
affective realm.55 It would bring hunger, thirst and psychological distress, before undermining 
the structures of government and, ultimately, of society itself. It is possible that ‘concatenating 
these sorts of events can trigger the economic and political panic that no recent war has ever 
brought to an advanced society’.56 It is not the malware or even the failure of the 
infrastructure that worries governments most but ‘the fear of the release, the presence of a 
negative symbolic virus, the contagion of insecurity, which disseminates distrust and fear’.57 
However, as Howard Schmidt, later chief cyber security advisor to President Obama, wrote in 
his 2006 memoir: ‘Is it possible for one of these events to happen? Sure. Is it likely? Absolutely 
not’.58 
  
More important than whether such catastrophic events will happen or not is that by definition 
they have not yet happened. That is, they are always in the future, whether they eventually 
occur in some future present or not. Read through the lens of securitisation theory—which 
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stresses the speaking-into-being of security threats through which to mobilise political 
resources—these constructed ‘cyber doom’ scenarios perform political work.59 As Myriam 
Dunn Cavelty concludes in her exhaustive analysis of US cyber security policy, ‘in theory, it 
does not matter whether the threat is real or not: what matters is that decision-makers 
consider cyber-attacks a real threat and act accordingly’.60 This is not to ignore the practical 
ramifications of addressing ‘real’ security issues, nor of ignoring them, but it does stress that 
these future scenarios can be nothing other than imaginative constructs, no matter how 
‘expert’ that imagination is. The question here is to examine further the political aspects of the 
temporality of these constructions of catastrophe that are not reducible merely to their 
interpretations as securitising speech acts. In their role as future events through which present 
politics are shaped, cyber catastrophes represent an eschatological dimension of cyber 
security and we can identify an apocalyptic aesthetic in cyber security that finds expression in 
these scenarios, a constructed temporality that allows us to enquire more deeply into the 
politics of cyber security than the lens of securitisation alone. 
 
Although the present enquiry attempts to delineate the apocalyptic aesthetic as a way of 
imagining and thinking cyber security futures rather than as literal recourse to what we 
ordinarily perceive as a religious sensibility, we cannot ignore the many explicit references to 
religious apocalypse in cyber security discourses. These are more often found in headlines than 
in high offices, with numerous references to Judaeo-Christian doctrines of the end-times, 
including ‘cybergeddon’, ‘cyberarmageddon’, ‘cybarmageddon’ and ‘cyber apocalypse’. A 
‘cyber-apocalypse’, one dictionary suggests, is ‘a cyber attack that could wreak havoc on the 
nation by bringing down critical information infrastructures’.61 So pervasive is the 
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contemporary ‘fear’ of ‘devastating viruses and worms’ that the period from 2001 onwards is 
presented as the ‘Fear of a Cyber Apocalypse Era’.62 It is ‘only a matter of time’, we read, 
‘before cyberterrorists are able to unleash a cyber apocalypse’.63 When it happens, this 
cataclysmic event will ‘make 9/11 look like a tea party’.64   
 
One commentator, inviting professional fraternity, wrote, ‘“Cyber-geddon” is imminent. I am 
hardly alone’.65 He was not: one senior lawyer, writing in The New York Times, claimed that 
‘cybergeddon’ is ‘one of the greatest existential threats facing the United States’.66 Eugene 
Kaspersky, an influential voice in information security, told a Tel Aviv audience that when the 
‘event’ happens, ‘it will be the end of the world as we know it …. I’m scared, believe me’.67 
Although these professionals are in a minority in voicing their fears that a literal 
‘cybergeddon’—whatever that actually means—is imminent, and many others are openly 
skeptical, this does not alleviate a widespread sense of fatalism in cyber security discourses.68 
The ‘sky is falling’, writes one defence information security professional, ‘but very slowly’.69 
 
These Biblical allusions are not uncommon but should not be read in a superficial sense: none 
of the examples above should be interrogated as if their creators truly believe that a religious 
apocalypse in the Judaeo-Christian mould is imminent. Rather, Armageddon and apocalypse 
are cultural reservoirs providing ‘readily available tropes’ for use in narratives of disaster.70 The 
ubiquitous sense of doom is a key indicator of a more entrenched apocalyptic aspect of cyber 
                                                            
62 Ibid., xxv. 
63 Kelly A. Gable, ‘Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using 
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 43 (2010): 118. 
64 The Economist, ‘Hype and Fear’, 8 December 2012, 62. 
65 Adam Levin, ‘How the SEC Almost Shut Down Wall Street’ Huffington Post, 15 November 2012.  
66 Preet Bharara, ‘Asleep at the Laptop’, The New York Times, 4 June 2012. 
67 Tova Cohen and Maayan Lubell, ‘Nations Must Talk to Halt “Cyber Terrorism”—Kaspersky’, Reuters, 6 
June 2012. 
68 Misha Glenny, ‘Virtual Warfare in Race to Avoid “Doomsday”’, The Guardian, 17 May 2011; Jason 
Healey, ‘The Five Futures of Cyber Conflict and Cooperation’, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs 11, no. 1 (2010): 110-117. 
69 Kenneth Geers, ‘The Cyber Threat to National Critical Infrastructures: Beyond Theory’, Information 
Security Journal: A Global Perspective 18, no. 1 (2009): 4. 
70 Ian Stronach, John Clarke and Jo Frankham, ‘Economic “Revelations” and the Metaphors of the 




security: eschatological discourses are structured around events that represent end-points of 
social order. Moreover, because they interpret history in the light of the final events of the 
world, eschatological narratives impart meaning to events in the present. Contemporary 
events are imbued with eschatological meaning and are interpreted as ‘signs’ of impending 
apocalypse.71   
 
In cyber security, there is a long list of ‘signs’ which structure a thousand texts: Cuckoo’s Egg, 
Eligible Receiver, Morris Worm, ILOVEYOU, Estonia, Georgia, GhostNet, Conficker, Operation 
Aurora, Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, Shamoon.72 The historical details and specificity of each entity in 
this roll-call of malware, sabotage operations, government exercises, countries and espionage 
programs is less important than their construction as discrete ‘events’ that populate and 
corroborate the apocalyptic narrative. In cyber war narratives, a particular example of the 
cyber security apocalypse, these events become ‘signifiers of the no-longer-future-but-reality 
of cyber war’.73 They ground cyber security narratives in a constructed history, in which these 
foundational events act as metonyms for insecurity and as mnemonics to remind audiences of 
the consequences of ignoring the signs. Crucially, the frequency of these events increases 
towards an apocalyptic end-point, a ‘thickening’ of history in which isolated events impart an 
increasingly cohesive structure to the temporality of the present.74 Not infrequently, these 
signs are constructed definitively as events bringing the future into the present; in the case of 
Stuxnet, for example, ‘the future is now’.75 
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Prophets tend to be self-appointed and there has been no shortage of people willing to ‘read’ 
these signs and pronounce upon them. There seems to be no requirement to heed Horace 
Walpole’s advice that ‘the wisest prophets make sure of the event first’,76 given the high 
anecdotal quotient of many pronouncements, particularly as the ‘distance’ between historical 
event and speaker increases. This is not, however, to discount a priori the sincerity or expertise 
of many of these ‘Cassandras of cyber warfare’.77 These scenarios are often the products of the 
‘expert imagination’ and perhaps should not be dismissed lightly, given the possible 
consequences of doing so.78 Again, the framing of apocalypse is of most interest, particularly 
with direct reference to those who self-identify as prophets, like Eugene Kaspersky: 
 
The evolution of cyber-Armageddon is moving in the predicted trajectory (proof it’s 
not just a matter of my frightening folk just for the sake of it); this is bad news. The 
good news is that the big-wigs have at last begun to understand …. Looks like the 
Cassandra metaphor I’ve been battling for more than a decade is losing its mojo—
people are listening to the warnings, not dismissing and/or disbelieving them.79 
 
Kaspersky is partly correct, as there is no doubt that cyber security spending—if we can take 
that as a proxy for ‘belief’ in apocalyptic narratives—has increased markedly over the period 
he describes.80 However, in the belief system espoused here, Kaspersky cannot be wrong. 
Unlike religious prophets, who might predict the dates and times on which future apocalyptic 
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events will occur, secular prophets like Kaspersky have no need to excuse themselves from 
inaccurate predictions because they simply do not make predictions with calendrical 
certainty.81 They do share with religious prophets their talents as ‘masterful bricoleurs, skilfully 
recasting elements and themes within the constraints of their respective traditions and 
reconfiguring them to formulate new, meaningful endtimes scenarios’.82 They have in common 
that ‘the error revealed by the non-fulfillment of such an expectation itself [becomes] proof 
that the next forecast of the End of the World [is] even more probable’.83 The specific vectors 
of ‘cyber insecurity’ may change—new vulnerabilities and malware variants are discovered all 
the time—and the timescales may expand and contract—‘tomorrow’, ‘soon’, ‘within a 
decade’—but the faith and certainty in the ‘cyber apocalypse’ remains firm.   
 
The level of ‘apocalyptic intensity’ already elevated through the reading of signs can be 
heightened further by making predictions that are ‘imminent but indeterminate’, creating a 
constant state of awareness and readiness—‘a temporal liminality or intermediacy as the 
present is ending while the future is yet to be born’—in which those involved ‘feel themselves 
to be standing poised on the brink of time’.84 This leaves futuristic scenarios deliberately 
‘shrouded in a cloud of speculation’.85 This is an established tactic of national security 
discourses, in which claims of and for security often have ‘an air of slovenly imprecision’ 
obscuring the nature of the phenomena in question but which serve as useful rhetorical 
resources in pursuit of political ends.86 In common with other forms of security, cyber security 
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invokes ‘realities and necessities that everyone is supposed to acknowledge, but also vague 
generalities about everything and nothing’.87 Ignorance, it seems, can sometimes be 
strategic.88 
 
The epistemic tensions between the poles of clarity and obscurity are partially resolved by 
reading the signs of the apocalypse as corroboration of a ‘script’ of the future, Kaspersky’s 
‘predicted trajectory’. Apocalyptic worldviews are inherently deterministic and in many cases 
the future is—often, literally—already written.89 These scripts of the future gain explanatory 
power when events and scenarios appear to converge and potentially increase the volatility of 
those subscribing to such an outlook, particularly if already psychologically stressed.90 Given 
the tendency to construct apocalypse in dualist terms, millenarian scripts usually have entities 
playing each of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ roles. In this way, as happened at Waco in 1993, the 
actions of government may cause it to play one of those roles, acting in ways already ‘scripted’ 
in advance, unwittingly bringing about exactly the apocalypse ‘predicted’ by believers.91  
 
The self-fulfilling and prophetic aspects of the cyber apocalypse register in the admonitions of 
cyber security experts not faithful to apocalyptic scripts. To the untutored, strange animals can 
appear unduly fearsome: 
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For those new to cybersecurity, all worms and viruses look catastrophic …. Like the 
monsters in your imagination, these phantoms can take on a persona of an unrelenting 
danger that easily surpasses their true capabilities. We must guard against this.92 
 
Sometimes these beasts are real but as ‘ominous as the dark side of cyberspace may be, our 
collective reactions to it are just as ominous—and can easily become the darkest driving force 
of all should we over react’.93 In this way, apocalypse may be brought about by those who, 
even if they do not desire it, cannot imagine an alternative outcome. This brings into sharper 
focus another aspect of apocalypse. The apocalypse is imminent but it is also immanent: it is 
inevitable given the conditions of humanity and the world. In this respect, it finds great affinity 
with the concept of the ‘technological accident’, itself an apocalyptic expression of 
postmodernity. The following section addresses the relations between these two concepts and 
with cyber security. 
 
4.4 Immanence and Accident 
 
In considering the origins of apocalypticism, Jeff Lewis identifies the ‘eschatological-Faustian 
pact’ that led prehistoric humans to settle in fertile and resource-rich areas at high risk from 
tectonic and volcanic activity, like the Pacific ‘ring of fire’ and the Mediterranean basin, a 
process that continues and intensifies to this day.94 Lewis cites the apocalypse movie 2012 (dir. 
Roland Emmerich, 2009), in which Los Angeles is spectacularly destroyed by earthquake and 
consigned to the ocean. Los Angeles’ precarious location between the tsunami-prone Pacific 
and the seismically active San Andreas Fault, along with its long history of wild fires, floods, 
killer bees and other life-threatening phenomena, has led to its portrayal by sociologist Mike 
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Davis as ‘Doom City’, permanently on the edge of disaster.95 Such is its reputation and 
potential that it serves as a cipher for American fears (and desires) of urban catastrophe, being 
destroyed in popular novels and films some 138 times during the 20th century.96 Los Angeles 
has few rivals in its role as a symbolic sacrifice to assuage the violence of nature or the myopia 
of man but to fulfil its mediated destiny it must always rise again in order to be demolished 
once more.97 However, Los Angeles’ marginal existence means it is destined one day to be 
destroyed, at least in part, a city built in denial of nature but unable finally to withstand it.   
 
Theorising the human-ness of ‘natural’ disaster may be an expression of intellectual 
anthropocentrism but it does suggest humanity’s complicity in its own downfall rather than a 
mere dumb recipient of cosmic ill fortune.98 Like other commentators on the American 
condition, Davis cites Henry David Thoreau’s Walden (1854), the quintessentially American 
meditation on nature and modernity, in which he ‘sounded the tocsin against the potentially 
catastrophic environmental threat of the industrial revolution’.99 Thoreau’s analysis of 
modernisation does not restrict itself to the effects of man on nature. In one striking passage, 
he writes of the impact of man’s technology on man, equating the enthusiasm for railroads 
with ‘grading the whole surface of the planet’: 
 
Men have an indistinct notion that if they keep up this activity of joint stocks and 
spades long enough all will at length ride somewhere, in next to no time, and for 
nothing; but though a crowd rushes to a depot, and the conductor shouts ‘All aboard!’ 
when the smoke is blown away and the vapour condensed, it will be perceived that a 
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few are riding, but the rest are run over,—and it will be called, and will be, ‘A 
melancholy accident’.100 
 
Thoreau does not say if he had in mind the death of William Huskisson MP, who in September 
1830 had become the first railway fatality, killed by George Stephenson’s Rocket at the 
inauguration of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, an archetypal death often described in 
memoriam as a ‘melancholy accident’.101 Rather than cancel the event, the railway directors 
decided to proceed, in order to show that the incident was ‘a mere accident, and had not 
happened through any fault of the machinery’.102 A jury swiftly convened by the Liverpool 
coroner decided no criminal homicide had taken place and ‘acquitted the engineers and the 
machinery of all blame’.103 The verse of one contemporary poet reflected this conclusion, 
recording that Huskisson by ‘unforeseen mischance was over-run’.104 These interpretations of 
Huskisson’s death as ‘bad luck’ differ greatly in emphasis from Thoreau’s reading of the same 
type of ‘accident’. For Thoreau, the railroad accident is immanent to the technology of the 
railway, rather than some mishap or trick of fortune.105   
 
This perspective is familiar to critics of technology, from the machine-breaking Luddites of the 
19th century to the anarchists and primitivists of the 20th and 21st centuries, who see in 
technology the seeds both of its own downfall and of society itself. George Woodcock 
observed that it is ‘a frequent circumstance of history that a culture or civilization develops the 
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device that will later be used for its destruction’.106 Theodore Kaczynski, the notorious 
Unabomber and prominent neo-Luddite, based his ideology (and practice) around the idea 
that ‘technology’ itself, rather than any technological form or function, is the cause of societal 
destruction.107 ‘Technology’ is seen as a unitary if internally heterogeneous entity, possessive 
of an auto-generative ‘life force’, a view shared with some contemporary technophiles.108 
Moreover, once en train, ‘technological progress marches in only one direction; it can never be 
reversed’.109 This places technology at the heart of a teleological interpretation of history, in 
which technology often stands as a proxy for the Western humanist and liberal ethos of 
progress.110   
 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch suggests that prior to the industrial revolution there was no coherent 
concept of the ‘technological accident’ as something brought about through the existence of 
technology itself. After the industrial revolution, however, ‘destruction by technological 
accident came from the inside’ and the more intensely packed the physical forces of 
technology, ‘the more thorough-going was its destruction in the case of dysfunction.111 The 
speeding projectile of the steam train—or, later, the airplane and motor vehicle—causes 
carnage upon impact with another object, obliterating itself, its passengers and other entities 
caught up in the maelstrom of the accident. But this catastrophe is local, its causality linear 
and traceable: the points failed, the brakes locked, the accident happened. A different 
category of accident emerges from non-linear technological systems, the inherent catastrophic 
potential of the ‘normal accident’. 
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Sociologist Charles Perrow popularised the idea that highly complex technological systems will 
always produce ‘normal accidents’. These are ‘normal’, like the Three Mile Island nuclear 
accident (1979) that prompted Perrow’s original work in this field, because they are not only 
‘unexpected’, ‘incomprehensible’ and ‘uncontrollable’ but also ‘unavoidable’.112 Far from 
ameliorating this situation, attempts to reduce risk often increase it, by adding more layers to 
the very complexity which increased the risk in the first place.113 Moreover, because accidents 
are often initiated by the interactions of multiple small failures, large accidents usually have 
banal and trivial causes, which take untold possible forms: ‘We have produced designs so 
complicated that we cannot anticipate all the possible interactions of the inevitable failures’.114 
Even if we could somehow attain perfect ‘system knowledge’, we can never know enough 
about the potential interactions of components to predict when and where failures might 
occur and with what other components they would interact and magnify—cascade—through 
the system and those connected with it.115 Failures are immanent to complex technical 
systems and will occasionally be catastrophic. 
 
This is the accident as ontology of technological modernity, a perspective that also permeates 
Paul Virilio’s progressive theorisation of the accident over the last two decades. As Perrow, 
Schivelbusch and others also recognised, to ‘invent the train is to invent derailment; to invent 
the ship is to invent the shipwreck’.116 This is the ‘technological accident’, which is always 
‘local’ because vehicles moving relative to one another collide in highly specific locations, 
restricted in space and time. A qualitative difference emerges, Virilio argues, between these 
accidents and the accidents created by nuclear and information technologies, which deploy 
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the absolute velocity of electromagnetism. When this occurs, the accident is no longer local 
but ‘general’, as radioactive fallout and information circulate globally.117  
 
Unlike radioactivity, however, the information accident will happen everywhere 
simultaneously because of the ‘interactivity, the networks and the globalization brought about 
by the communication revolution’; as with the Janus-like power of radioactive fission, 
interactivity too ‘can bring about union of society, but it also has the power to dissolve it and 
disintegrate it on a world scale’.118 Virilio saw in the 1987 stock market crash a harbinger—a 
‘sign’—of this ‘integral’, ‘global’ or ‘generalised’ accident, responsibility for which he ascribes 
to the high-frequency trading programs of a highly automated global financial system.119 Since 
2007, the ongoing financial crisis has—for Virilio—shown the accident lurking at the heart of 
the global system of turbocharged capitalism and the ‘instant and simultaneous globalisation 
of affects and fears’ caused by cascading failures of financial institutions and the resulting 
strains on socioeconomic relations.120 In the previous chapter, we encountered Virilio’s 
conception of speed and the accident of technology is also the accident of speed; they are 
inseparable and integral aspects of the integral accident itself. For Virilio, time itself—the 
chronos of the world—is constructed through technology and is ‘rapidly moving to an 
(apocalyptic) end’.121   
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In the ‘Flash Crash’ of the US stock exchange on 6 May 2010, the Dow Jones experienced its 
largest-ever one-day decline, only to recoup those losses within a few hours. Early suspicions 
that the crash was caused by a ‘cyber attack’—launched by persons unknown—were 
subsequently dismissed in favour of explanations calling into question the nature of 
algorithmic trading and the positive feedback loops that can develop before failsafe 
mechanisms kick in or human operators intervene.122 Virilio asks a pertinent question of the 
federal investigation into the crash: ‘When you are incapable of detecting the origin of a stock 
exchange crash and, so, find it impossible to know if it’s a cyber attack of some reach by one 
state against another, or whether it’s a systemic crash that’s purely accidental, what do you 
do?’123 Virilio echoes here one of the key—and historically most intractable—epistemological 
concerns at the core of cyber security practice and politics: the ‘attribution problem’.124   
 
The ‘problem’ is simultaneously evidentiary and technical, normative and legal, political and 
strategic, situated at the juncture between two temporal regimes of commission and 
response. The first relates to the past: who did it? and why? and the proof thereof. The second 
concerns the future—what can we do? what must or should we do?—and the justifications for 
those actions. During the Cold War, attribution was a relatively straightforward issue but the 
complexities of a post-bipolar strategic environment introduce fundamental uncertainty to the 
issue of cyber attacks and their causality. Adversaries can remain anonymous, hide their tracks, 
falsify identities, mislead investigators, shift blame to third parties and, sometimes, simply 
refuse to declare their hand. The ability to determine the source and intent of adversarial 
actions is central to determining the appropriate technical, tactical, political and strategic 
responses available to an authority charged with cyber security. This is particularly the case at 
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the national level, where governments require a substantial burden of proof before, for 
example, responding to another state with military action.   
 
There are three notable responses to the attribution problem. The first seeks to resolve the 
technical aspects of attribution, in order to prove causality through forensic methods and 
provide a firm legal basis for consideration of further action. The second jettisons the burden 
of absolute proof—difficult to obtain, if not impossible—by taking into account contextual 
factors, such as prevailing inter-state relations and the probable responses of other strategic 
actors should particular responses be enacted. This is a probabilistic mode of risk management 
that prioritises the need to respond over the need to determine causality and operates below 
the threshold of ‘reasonable doubt’. Technical attribution is more straightforward: it is 
forensic, scientific, and seeks to establish the empirical ‘truth’ of causality. Strategic attribution 
steps into the breach where technical attribution is unobtainable, or requires 
contextualisation, and is an epistemological suture bridging the gaps between fields of 
ignorance and knowledge. The principal intent of both technical and strategic attribution is not 
to trace the causes of a particular phenomenon but to facilitate modes of future action and the 
category of future action itself. Strategic attribution, in particular, is less about ‘truth’ than 
creating the impression that there is a truth at all. Where technical attribution finds 
complexity, strategic attribution craves simplicity and seeks to create and exploit the ‘strategic 
ambiguity’ that emerges from not naming that truth, whether it is known or not, keeping an 
opponent or opponents guessing as to one’s subsequent actions and intentions. 
 
A third approach shifts focus from the cause of an event to its effects. This involves a change in 
the risk calculus, from the protective security of information infrastructures to their resilience 
in the face of attack and compromise.125 What matters more than establishing the cause of an 
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event is ‘the ability of the system to withstand a major disruption within acceptable 
degradation parameters and to recover within an acceptable cost and time’.126 Cyber security 
is not only about ‘strengthening defences’ to prevent attacks but also ‘improving resilience and 
diminishing the impact of cyber attacks’.127 Temporally, this creates a new locus of action and 
responsibility after the event as well as before it.   
 
In resilience, we find a tentative answer to Virilio’s original question about what the search for 
causality says about the system we inhabit. Both technical and strategic attribution require 
that a cause be named, even if one is not found, but resilience derogates the issue of causality 
entirely. It is less important to resilience—and to the notion of the technological ‘accident’—
whether humans, machines or faulty code bring about the event than it is that these entities 
are embedded in systems that make accidents unavoidable and inevitable. Given the ubiquity 
of sociotechnical systems, resilience takes on the distinct inflection of postmodernity: we can 
only deal with the effects of the world in which we live rather than its causes. The cause is 
banal because the system is the cause. Although we know that the accident will occur, we do 
not know when or what its effects will be. Resilience prepares us for those unknown 
eventualities but seeks to restore at least a sense of security to a field of epistemological 
uncertainty.128 Practically, suggests Bruce Schneier, resilience ‘is the best answer we have right 
now’: ‘We need to recognise that large-scale [cyber] attacks will happen, that society can 
survive more than we give it credit for, and that we can design systems to survive these sorts 
of attacks’.129 
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Resilience as a response to an epistemological shortfall discounts causality and intent and 
implicitly recognises ‘an inherent ontological insecurity within computer systems’.130 The 
pioneering computer scientist Grace Hopper remarked, ‘Life was simple before World War II. 
After that, we had systems’.131 With these systems came ‘bugs’, two categories of which were 
soon formalised.132 The first arose from faults in the machine itself, the second from input and 
programming errors leading to poor or nonsensical output, what would later become known 
as the ‘garbage in, garbage out’ principle.133 Removing all bugs from a large system 
(‘debugging’) is, unfortunately for the computer security professional, ‘provably impossible’.134 
Not all bugs have security dimensions but a great many do and can be exploited by those with 
the will and skill to do so.135  
 
No information system can claim to be wholly secure, a condition recognised over four 
decades ago: ‘Security cannot be obtained in the absolute sense. Every security system seeks 
to attain a probability of loss which is commensurate with the value returned by the operation 
being secured’.136 We would now recognise this as an equation of risk but it is also an assertion 
of the inherent ‘insecurity’ of information-technological systems. In the light of the 
technological accident, ICT failures and cyber attacks are both immanent to technological 
postmodernity. Whether humans or machines cause ‘cyber’ accidents is less important than 
understanding that people and machines are embedded in systems that make accidents 
inevitable and unavoidable. In their eschatological dimensions, the accident and the 
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apocalypse share the same core characteristic of immanence: the catastrophic accident is 
inherent to complex sociotechnical systems like global ICTs. There is another sense too in 
which immanence lies not just in the processual interactions of complex systems but in a 
system that brings into being technologies that contain within themselves the potential for 
societal catastrophe: the ‘producibility of the catastrophe is the catastrophe’.137 This sense of 
the anthropogenic catastrophe circumscribes postmodernity and the accidents—
apocalypses—that may arise. Yet our common comprehension of ‘catastrophe’ as an 
embodiment of destructive negativity does justice neither to the fullness of the concept of 
apocalypse nor to its utility in the analysis of cyber security. The primary sense of apocalypse is 
not of catastrophe but of revelation and transformation, both qualities that are in some sense 
‘desired’ and which are examined in the following section. 
 
4.5 Revelation, Transformation and Desire 
 
The relationship of postmodernity to time has been characterised by Jean Baudrillard as a 
reversal, in which time ‘is no longer counted progressively, by addition, starting from an origin, 
but by subtraction, starting from the end’, a countdown through which ‘the maximal utopia of 
life gives way to the minimal utopia of survival’.138 Resilience is an expression of this 
postmodern concern with survival but contained within this broad statement of societal 
eschatology is the recognition that apocalypse is not, despite common impressions to the 
contrary, the end. All apocalypses are passage points leading from one form of social order to 
another. The nature of the ‘post-apocalypse’ has become not only a staple of popular culture 
but is congruent with secular and religious imaginings of ‘the end’. Indeed, the ‘world after the 
world, the post-apocalypse, is usually the true object of the apocalyptic writer’s concern’, 
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whether imagined as ‘paradise or wasteland’.139 The apocalypse is not just the end but ‘a 
beginning, an uncovering, an illumination unveiled precisely at the very moment of the 
greatest darkness and danger’.140 The apocalypse is not only a point of transition and 
transformation but also a process of revelation and, importantly, an object of desire. These 
three foundational aspects of apocalyptic thinking—revelation, transformation and desire—
are the themes of our continued examination of cyber security’s discursive relations with the 
future. 
 
Implicit in Virilio’s interpretation of the global financial accident is his characterisation of the 
integral accident as ‘the revelation of the destructive capacity of hyper-modernity for 
humanity’.141 Virilio denies any similarity between the accident and the religious apocalypse: 
the catastrophism he describes has ‘nothing in common’ with ‘the pessimism of the 
“millenarian” obscurantism of days gone by’.142 Virilio does not dispense with a secular 
apocalyptic reading of the accident, however, especially in his insistence on ‘exposing the 
accident’ as a way of understanding technologized society and thereby to query and resist its 
political foundations.143 Virilio understands that ‘apocalypse’ is not a priori negative and, in its 
primary sense of ‘revelation’, apocalypse is a ‘singular instant both revealing the meaning of 
the past and announcing the future’.144 This, one assumes, is what Virilio means to 
communicate through the ‘exposing’ of the accident through the accident itself, a revelation 
that is intended to be partly positive rather than wholly pessimistic.145 Elsewhere, Virilio has 
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diagnosed his own orientation as concerned less with ‘truth and falsehood’ than with 
apocalypse: ‘I am not a revolutionary but a revelationary … what is revealed forces itself above 
what is past and forces itself upon our situation as a revelation, as in the case of the integral 
accident and finitude’.146 
 
In imagined cyber apocalypses, the criticality of ‘critical infrastructures’ is revealed physically 
and in its social and political dimensions. Revelation occurs when the mundane functionality of 
ICT systems is disrupted, whether deliberately by adversaries—as is the principal 
preoccupation of cyber security—or in the less sensational circumstances occasioned by 
accident or disrepair. Information technologies like the Internet are infrastructures that, 
etymologically, are the foundations of a greater whole, the ‘collective term for the subordinate 
parts of an undertaking’.147 In this case, infrastructure is the physical and organisational 
substructure essential for the maintenance and progressive functionality of society as a whole. 
Although ‘infrastructure’ is itself a 20th-century coinage, what we today would classify as 
infrastructures are attested archaeologically, such as the diverse examples of the hydraulic 
systems of ancient Egypt and the Middle East, the cloacae (sewers) of early Rome, or the road 
networks of the pre-Columbian Americas. In each case, these infrastructures were not solely 
pragmatic contributions to the common good but symbolic and constitutive of political power 
and control, and expressions of local cultural cosmologies.   
 
In the modern urban context developed an ‘infrastructural ideal’, in which centralised 
infrastructure development and urban planning co-instantiated the harmonious and 
integrative tenets of modernity itself, ‘as Enlightenment ideals of universal rationality, 
progress, justice, emancipation and reason were applied to all areas of social life’.148 
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Infrastructure, even in today’s managerial political climate, may still be an expression and 
source of this civic spirit.149 Joseph Bazalgette’s sewerage system for London, opened in the 
1860s and 1870s, is even today invoked as a model for public urban works, including by the 
incumbent (and classically-minded) Mayor of London, whose plans to improve Bazalgette’s 
overloaded yet ‘remarkable system’ includes a new ‘cloaca maxima’ for the city.150   
 
Information infrastructures are not only just unseen but un-cognised: for most people, the 
existence of infrastructures is ‘more or less imaginary’.151 Like Bazalgette’s Londoners, most 
Internet users ‘are frequently unconscious of the magnitude, intricacy, and extent of the 
underground works, which have been designed and constructed at great cost, and are 
necessary for the maintenance of their health and comfort’.152   
 
Internet infrastructure, and its use, is often taken for granted because, unlike roads or 
railways, it is largely invisible—buried underground, snaking across ocean floors, 
hidden inside wall conduits, or floating unseen in orbit above us. Indeed, given its 
invisibility, it is easy to assume that it is as ethereal and virtual as the information and 
communication that it supports.153 
 
Mundane technologies ‘only come into visible focus as things when they become inoperable—
they break or stutter and they then become the object of attention’.154 This physical 
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manifestation of ‘virtual’ infrastructures is a key component of the violent scenarios described 
by apocalyptic cyber security discourses and, following Heidegger, is the way through which 
information technologies—in fact, all objects and things—reveal aspects of themselves 
ordinarily hidden from view: ‘These entities were once silent and withdrawn, but have now 
become obtrusive …. An entity malfunctions and loudly announces itself; later, the entity 
might retreat into the background and be taken for granted once again.155 The personal 
computer, for instance, is taken entirely for granted until it malfunctions: 
 
The trustworthy world that developed around the computer …. is abruptly destroyed 
…. Its transparency is transformed into opacity. The computer can no longer be utilized 
in the practice of writing, but abruptly demands interaction with itself. The relation 
with the world around the computer that took place ‘through’ it is disturbed. Only 
when it starts up again and everything works without a hitch is the world that was 
destroyed again restored.156 
 
We can scale this concern with the proper functioning of information technology to the 
societal level. The coupling of electrical and electronic infrastructures is revealed in its messy 
complexity by cascading failures: 
 
Together this infrastructure materially represents and sustains the trompe l’oeil of 
otherworldly immateriality while simultaneously depending upon a physical 
assemblage of wires, plugs, and sockets to distribution lines and poles, transformers, 
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transmission towers and electrical power plants. Without these extensions, 
Cyberspace [sic] would cease to exist.157 
 
Whether by accident or by design, the failure of the electrical system reveals itself and also 
that it ‘has no substitute, and all other infrastructures depend on it’.158 In turn, the ‘virtual’ 
social spaces and information flows enabled by the material substrate of the Internet are 
exposed in their fragility and precariousness. The ultimate revelation is the extent to which 
societies are both technologically and cognitively dependent upon ICTs, the ‘invisible global 
infrastructure serving as a global nervous system for the people and processes of this 
planet’.159 These revelatory events lay bare the material anatomy, psychological dependencies 
and functional relations of infrastructures that are embedded, transparent and ordinarily 
‘invisible’.160 Referring once more to the fictional destruction of cities like Los Angeles, through 
‘such provocative transformations, we gain insight into the city we know’.161 
 
They also reveal aspects of temporality that ordinarily remain hidden and—literally—
unthought. Time is always being embedded in objects and artefacts, in which are enfolded 
‘heterogeneous temporalities’.162 When the space shuttle Challenger exploded in 1986, it 
allowed the official investigators—and the curious public—the opportunity to retrace the 
material and immaterial developments through which this remarkable object came into being. 
Such accidents are, according to Bruno Latour, another ‘way of hearing what the machines 
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silently did and said’.163 Failures reveal the bureaucratic and material histories of objects and 
the assemblages in which they are networked but they also draw attention to the temporality 
of the present.164 In London, the high leakage rates and bursting pipes of Bazalgette’s ageing 
sewers have in our own time brought into focus problematic aspects of utility privatisation, 
corporate pay, and so on.165 In similar fashion, the prophesied cyber security apocalypse would 
reveal the historical failure of governments and businesses to take cyber insecurity into proper 
account, and for which catastrophe is the price. Moreover, because catastrophes often come 
‘covered in the fingerprints of organised silence’, accidents often reveal the hidden politics 
that allow catastrophes to develop and, like Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima, literally 
explode into public consciousness.166 
 
In its reliance on the revelation of what is wrong, apocalyptic thinking inherently allows for the 
complementary disclosure of what can be made right. This is the transformative message of all 
apocalypticism, in which the revelation is both of the passing of one problematic social order 
and the advent of a new one. The ‘prophetic method’ proposes visions of a transformed social 
order in defiance of ‘official’ versions of reality but discounts the past in favour of the future: 
‘The world is to be understood in terms of what is to come rather than what has been …. the 
future is given greater eminence, and both past and present recede in importance.167 Very 
often, the present is ‘reduced to simply a gateway moment leading to the future’.168 However, 
apocalypse is also a necessary event, without which a better future will not arrive; not only is 
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the future desired but so too is the apocalypse. Without a cataclysmic ‘cyber’ event, many 
argue, governments will not respond sufficiently to the cyber security problem.169   
 
This is a catastrophic form of apocalypticism, rooted in a pessimistic evaluation of human 
nature and society and in the pervasive human tendency to think in dualistic tendencies’.170 It 
is hardly surprising to find catastrophic apocalypticism in politics, which is not ordinarily 
inclined to representing the subtleties of human nature in its pursuit of power, and in security, 
which, as already suggested, is shot through with dystopian visions of the future contingent 
upon bad things always being done by bad people. This Hobbesian inflection is explicit in the 
assertion that the biggest global cyber security challenge is preventing bellum omnium contra 
omnes in cyberspace.171 To do further violence to Hobbes, these are visions of a ‘perpetuall 
cyber warre’ of all against all and where, wonders one author, is the Leviathan empowered by 
citizens to deliver us from this parlous state of nature?172 
 
For some people, the interminable wait for the apocalypse is an unacceptable frustration and 
they attempt to bring the future into the present by initiating the apocalypse themselves.173 In 
recent history, we can detect this autopoietic apocalypticism in American reactions to 9/11 as 
clearly as in the jihadist beliefs of those who prosecuted the 9/11 attacks themselves.174 
Utopian belief in apocalyptic transformation of human affairs through catastrophe informs the 
avoidable tragedy of the subsequent ‘war on terror’ as strongly as it does impossible dreams of 
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a global caliphate.175 Aside from such obvious attempts to effect social change through 
apocalyptic violence, it is demonstrable historically that although the apocalypse may never 
arrive, ‘true believers’ often succeed in one specialised sense: ‘the world is a different place 
after them’.176 Although the Y2K ‘technocalypse’ did not happen in the manner prophesied, for 
instance, it catalysed political, technical and social changes to extant practices and beliefs, not 
least by implanting ‘seeds of technological doubt’ in mainstream culture.177 Concerns that 
similar intercalary time and date problems may occur in 2038, 2042 and 2107 are mediated 
partially through ‘lessons learnt’ from the ‘non-event’ of Y2K.178 Non-catastrophic events can 
have material and cognitive effects just as enduring as catastrophes.179   
 
4.6 Imagining the Future  
 
Cyber security futures are imagined and represented through ‘events’ that illustrate the 
present insecurity of information infrastructures. The recent past is read as a series of ‘event-
signs’ that presage the forthcoming catastrophe and constitute a narrative of political ‘failure 
to secure’. ‘Not all events are made equal’, however, and some ‘fail to exercise much of an 
impact at all or are barely noticed’.180 The ecology of cyber security is one in which millions of 
events of ‘insecurity’ happen daily: automated malware and human actors exploit multiple 
vulnerabilities, events which, whilst of immediate concern to the information security 
professional, may not rise to the level of a collective security issue unless identified and 
                                                            
175 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Allen Lane, 2007). 
176 Richard Landes, Whilst God Tarried: Disappointed Millennialism and the Genealogy of the Modern 
West (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 2, quoted in Andrea H. Tapia, ‘Technomillennialism: A Subcultural 
Response to the Technological Threat of Y2K’, Science, Technology, & Human Values 28, no. 4 (2003): 
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177 Tapia, ‘Technomillennialism’, 509. Also, Johan Eriksson, ‘Cyberplagues, IT, and Security: Threat 
Politics in the Information Age’, Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management 9, no. 4 (2001): 211-222. 
178 As are other processes that alter the chronos of Internet time. See, Poul-Henning Kamp, ‘The One-
Second War’, Communications of the ACM 54, no. 5 (2011): 44-48. On the ‘revelation’ of Y2K, see 
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communicated as one. As extant studies have shown, cyber security has a diverse history of 
securitisation, in which these events—and the broader processes they help structure—are 
translated from the mundane realm of technical security to the ‘higher’ levels of economic, 
national and existential security. The apocalyptic framing of cyber security discloses the 
construction of a distinct category of large-scale ‘cyber’ events that exist in the speculative 
future but act also in the present. The threat of apocalypse is ‘real and ever-present and folds 
future potentiality into the present’ and the security practices that emerge are ‘a kind of 
death-dance, a ritual in which future catastrophe is mimed and theatrically composed in order 
to ward off crises’.181 
 
Were such an event to occur we might characterise it as an accident sensu Virilio, or per James 
Der Derian’s ‘global event’, an ‘unfavourable symptom’ of a contemporary information-
technological condition, ‘a disruption in the predictable flow of events, a breakdown of the 
present en route to the past, a rude awakening into the contingency of the future’.182 William 
Sewell suggests that some events have a ‘transformative power’ beyond the politics of 
government alone, shaping history and ‘changing people’s possibilities for meaningful 
action.183 In the global accident/event, we must wonder at the ‘possibilities for meaningful 
action’, given the genesis of the cyber apocalypse in the belly of technological postmodernity. 
Resilience, for example, is presented as a fait accompli in the face of the immanent accident 
and characterised by a fatalistic acceptance that we cannot change the world, thereby closing 
down vectors of possible political agency.184 It is also an attempt to foster policies and 
practices that would enable a tolerable level of post-catastrophic survival and might be 
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considered in a more positive, and possibly emancipatory, light.185 Resilience and, perhaps, the 
cyber apocalypse itself, are attempts to generate ‘new understandings of time and temporality 
with which to conceptualize both our precarious predicament and a possible escape from a 
seemingly inevitable dystopian closure’.186 
 
The reading of apocalyptic postmodernity informing this discussion is in keeping with the 
historical tendency of apocalyptic belief to find multiple contemporaneous modes of 
expression.187 There is no singular body of theory, outstanding political movement or 
exemplary form of cultural practice that embodies this apocalyptic aesthetic in toto but there 
are many vectors of the aesthetic itself. This chapter has argued that cyber security is one such 
vector, even if this analysis exhausts neither the concept of apocalypse nor the futurity of the 
cyber security imaginary. It may be more fruitful to think of this preoccupation with finitude 
and existential crisis not as the dismantling and ultimate disposal of telos but as ‘the beginning 
of the infinity of heterogeneous finalities’.188 The core characteristic of this diverse 
postmodernity is the apocalyptic ‘destruction of the symbolic order’, whether coded as ‘God, 
metaphysics, history, ideology, revolution, and finally death itself’.189 Or, indeed, if this 
symbolic order is contemporary politics, blamed by prophets of cyber apocalypse for inaction 
and inadequacy in the face of existential threat.190 This desire for political transformation is 
surely at the heart of the apocalyptic narrative through which cyber security futures are so 
often imagined. 
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The poet Octavio Paz identifies accidents in the Virilian sense as ‘cogs of the historic order’.191 
This chapter has explored the construction of the future order but has yet to examine in any 
detail the mobilisation of history as a way of understanding cyber security presents and 
futures. Although we have identified historical events as ‘signs’ leading to the cyber 
apocalypse, by their nature none attain the practical or symbolic level of catastrophe. 
However, cyber security discourses do make explicit reference to historical ‘catastrophes’ in 
order to analogise particular aspects of cyber security, some of which we have touched on 
cursorily in this chapter. The next chapter considers the role of these analogies and deeper 
history in the making of cyber security and how this can help us illuminate further the 




                                                            
191 Octavio Paz, ‘Order and Accident’, Conjunctions and Disjunctions (New York: Viking Press, 
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5 ARGUING THROUGH THE PAST 
 
If I am anxious about a past misfortune, 
then this is not because it is in the past 
but because it may be repeated.1 
 
5.1 Introduction: Past, Present and the Appeal to History 
 
In Chapter Two, we encountered numerous difficulties in ascribing definitive (meta)physical 
ontological status to past, present and future and it is not necessary to rehearse those 
arguments to accept that from the perspective of subjective human experience the past in 
some sense happened ‘before’ the present. Our phenomenological engagement with the 
‘arrow of time’ means that, care of another spatial metaphor, the past is behind us and the 
future ahead.2 Our common experience is that this is always so and our common sense—and 
our customary apprehension of time—is that the past exists as something inviolate and 
unchangeable; it is ‘closed’, in contrast to the ‘open’ present and future. This is an expression 
of the temporality of formal modernity, a linear and mechanistic time theorised by Newton 
and materialised in the clockwork assemblages of capitalist production, and a framework 
through which other, usually non-Western, societies and cultures are characterised as 
temporally ‘backward’ Others whose political agency is suppressed by their dwelling in an 
immobile and immutable past. 
 
To be accused of ‘living in the past’ is to fall foul of one of the commandments of modernity, 
‘thou shalt not commit anachronism’, by failing to recognise the ‘radical distinction’ between 
                                                            
1 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, eds. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980/1844), 91. 
2 Unlike physical equations, in which the ‘future and the past seem physically to be on a completely 
equal footing’; Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of 
Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 392. 
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the present and the past.3 Western environmentalism, for instance, seeks ‘an unrealistic 
spatiotemporality’ differentiating change and stability as ontologically exclusive entities, 
through which the past is constructed as ‘a timeless, ahistorical refuge for virtue’.4 The 
imagined past is ‘a static world beyond commodified clock time, outside of history, progress 
and change’.5 These narratives ignore that the past is continually remade in the present as part 
of the normal operations of ‘history, progress and change’.6 For most purposes, it matters little 
if there is or there is not a physical ‘world’ called ‘the past’ with which we might possibly co-
exist if our primary experience of the past is as an individual and collective construct in the 
social present. 
 
For the furthest reaches of the past, material remains provide us with clues as to the nature of 
the world in earlier times. The early modern ‘discovery’ of a geological ‘deep time’ was a key 
development in the contextualisation of human existence within the immense duration of 
cosmic time, as important a cognitive reorientation as the later revelations of relativity and 
quantum mechanics.7 Geology revealed that religion and myth might not be the most accurate 
guides to the past, loosening the grip on the Western imagination of literal readings of the 
Judaeo-Christian creation.8 For the prominent Victorian critic John Ruskin, the geologists’ 
‘dreadful hammers’ chipped away at the authority of Christianity itself: ‘I hear the clink of 
them at the end of every cadence of the Bible verses’.9 In the 19th century, antiquarians 
                                                            
3 Barry Hindess, ‘The Past is Another Culture’, International Political Sociology 1, no. 4 (2007): 330. 
4 Peter F. Cannavò, ‘Ecological Citizenship, Time, and Corruption: Aldo Leopold’s Green Republicanism’, 
Environmental Politics 21, no. 6 (2012): 866. 
5 Glenn Jordan, ‘Flight from Modernity: Time, the Other and the Discourse of Primitivism’, Time & 
Society 4, no. 3 (1995): 283. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Stephen Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), 141-
170; Stephen Jay Gould, Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological 
Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
8 Formal geology began in Enlightenment Europe but various Chinese from the third century AD 
onwards were geologists of a sort, although their theories did not have the same domestic impact as 
those of later Europeans; Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. III: Mathematics and 
the Sciences of the Heavens and Earth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), chapter 23, esp. 
pp. 612-614. 
9 J.M.I. Klaver, Geology and Religious Sentiment: The Effect of Geological Discoveries on English Society 
and Literature Between 1829 and 1859 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), xi. 
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applied geological techniques to the history of humankind itself, adding through the new field 
of archaeology ‘the testimony of things’ to the textual evidence, and which ‘very soon 
exploded any simple, uni-directional theory of historical development’.10 Although narrow 
interpretations of ancient remains in Egypt and the Near East in particular would often seem 
to corroborate Biblical narratives, eventually the weight of evidence became too much for all 
but the most ardent literalists to ignore: the Old Testament was a story of doubtful 
authenticity and one restricted to ‘only one, rather minor strand’ of human history.11 
 
For archaeologists, neither things nor the pasts from which they originally derive are fixed or 
stable. Although many archaeological artefacts are surprisingly durable, and must be so for 
them to re-emerge ‘artefactually’ in the present, their meanings may change through later 
reuse and reinterpretation and are never fixed. ‘Things’, writes Ian Hodder, are assembled: for 
‘a period of time matter, energy and information are brought together into a heterogeneous 
bundle’ we call a thing, entangled in a web of connections with other things and the particular 
species of thing we call ‘human’.12 This dynamic approach to thingness is consistent with an 
interpretation of the archaeological record as not cleanly demarcated from the archaeologist. 
There is an interpretive problem with the ‘resurrection and irruption into the present of 
material remains from the past’ but this is a problem only made worse by insisting on an 
artificial boundary between past and present.13 The past is a ‘palimpsest of multiple events 
and time-scales’, a multi-temporality that includes the past and the present.14 We might even 
argue that all archaeology, even if it is about the past, is actually of the present.15 The present 
‘opens onto all the pasts that have preceded present time and that are recorded in it’.16 
 
                                                            
10 Toulmin and Goodfield, Discovery of Time, 237. 
11 Ibid., 238. 
12 Ian Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationship Between Humans and Things (Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 8. 
13 Gavin Lucas, The Archaeology of Time (London: Routledge, 2005), 36-37. 
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Integral to this perspective on the past is that the past is interpreted in the present. Although 
we might begin to understand the original functionality or meaning of an artefact discarded 
millennia ago, we can never escape our own interpretive subjectivity in the present. As Laurent 
Olivier notes, ‘archaeology does not exhume parts of history that took place before and 
outside of it [but] directly contributes to the construction of this history by inscribing them in 
the present’.17 It follows that interpretation of the archaeological record can be directed 
towards particular ends, including the political. The role of archaeology in the construction and 
maintenance of national identity has a long history, including the promotion of ethnically-
charged constructions of distinct European ‘cultures’, of which Nazi Germany’s self-promotion 
through the work of archaeologist Gustaf Kossinna remains perhaps the most uncomfortable 
assertion of cultural-historical superiority.18 This approach remains common in many countries, 
in which there is a long-observed tendency ‘to glorify the “primitive vigour” and creativity of 
people assumed to be national ancestors rather than to draw attention to their low cultural 
status’.19 In late 20th-century Europe there were conscious political moves to develop a pan-
European ‘Celtic’ heritage as a foundation of the modern and future Europe, including in 
countries like Spain not normally considered ‘Celtic’.20 Even the recent exhumation of the 
remains of English King Richard III, which sparked a legal challenge by his supposed 
‘descendants’ over their right to decide the location of his re-burial, can be read in terms of 
identity politics.21 Given its potential for political manipulation, archaeology is ‘a discipline 
almost in wait of state interference’.22  
 
                                                            
17 Ibid., 60. 
18 Bruce G. Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
163-167. 
19 Ibid., 174. 
20 Margarita Díaz-Andreu, ‘Constructing Identities Through Culture: The Past in the Forging of Europe’, in 
Cultural Identity and Archaeology: The Construction of European Communities, eds. Paul Graves-Brown, 
Siân Jones and Clive Gamble (London: Routledge, 1996), 56-57. 
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22 Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, ‘Archaeology in the Service of the State: Theoretical Considerations’, 
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So too history, in which the past is always remade in the political present in order to shape the 
future. ‘Does the past exist concretely, in space?’, asks Winston Smith’s torturer in George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). ‘Is there somewhere or other a place, a world of solid 
objects, where the past is still happening?’23 Smith replies under duress that there is not, and 
that the past only exists in records and in memories, records and memories that the Party 
wishes to convince him are controlled exclusively by them. But the torturer detects in Smith an 
‘error’, a hidden belief in the existence of a reality outside of the Party, a reality that might 
afford the possibilities of individual human remembering. However, Reality only exists in ‘the 
mind of the Party, which is collective and immortal. Whatever the Party holds to be truth, is 
truth’.24 The past is the sole preserve of the Party, to be remoulded in the image of their 
politics, as encapsulated in the fictional Party slogan now normalised in our own culture: ‘Who 
controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past’.  
 
The political gaze, like sociotemporality itself, therefore extends into both the past and the 
future as a way to achieve symbolic and material ends through the manipulation of imagined 
history. The uses of history and appeals to the past are at the core of the construction of 
statehood and nationhood.25 As Carmen Leccardi observes in her discussion of movements of 
resistance to the clock time of global capitalism and the vertiginous pace of hypermodernity, 
these are more than just politics through which to conceive possible futures. They emphasise 
the contingent relations between past and present, in particular ‘the strategic question of 
memory: the teleological chains linking the past to the present’.26 This chapter intends to 
excavate some of these ‘chains’ linking the past to the cyber security present in the service of 
                                                            
23 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (London: Heinemann, 1965/1949), 192. 
24 Ibid., original emphasis. 
25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. 
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futurity and to augment the developing picture of the temporality of the cyber security 
imaginary. 
 
The previous two chapters have put forward two propositions with respect to the temporality 
of cyber security. Chapter Three proposed that cyber security is sufficiently preoccupied with 
the uniqueness of the present that it tends to ignores both its own history and the historicity 
of the present. In Chapter Four, this concern with the present was revealed not as a baseless 
preoccupation with the ‘now’ but as a response to the future, a form of eschatological thinking 
in which the future conditions the political imperatives of the present. In each case, there 
appears to be little engagement with the past, except as a source of ‘signs’ that corroborate 
apocalyptic narratives and which confirm the likelihood of forthcoming cyber catastrophe. 
These ‘events’ are collectively shaped into a narrative of past ‘cyber insecurity’ that cyber 
security must overcome in order to avert even more insecure futures, thereby acting as a 
quasi-historical resource for the political promotion of cyber security.  
 
We can see a similar process at work in the selective peppering of the UK cyber security 
strategies with brief case studies and statistical factoids. These data are culled from industry, 
media and government reports and used to illustrate particular arguments in the main text 
and represent highly formalised and decontextualized interpretations of events and processes 
in the recent past. In contrast to the signs of apocalypse discussed previously, they are often 
used to illustrate positive as well as negative aspects of the use of ICTs for government, 
business and society that will be enhanced or assured through the policies proposed in the 
remainder of the document. Often, they are data points rather than events of enduring 
historical interest and are often out of date by the time of publication, although this is hardly 
unusual in discussions of contemporary ICTs. They are not intended to contribute historical 
knowledge to our understanding of the present but instead adhere awkwardly to the principal 




Is there really such limited interplay between cyber security and the past? Can cyber security 
as an assemblage of political and technical practices be so selective and perhaps even 
amnesiac about the past, or are deeper connections with the past decipherable in political 
discourses of cyber security? As the foregoing examples illustrate, there is no definitive break 
with the past but a patrolled boundary across which only selected ‘facts’ may pass, plucked 
from recent history for narrative purposes. In the language examined previously, it is not only 
events of the recent past that become part of the narrative present. Long histories of Judaeo-
Christian culture are sedimented in the figurative constructions of future cyber catastrophe as 
‘Armageddon’, with its allusions to the real entity of Tell Megiddo in Israel and the battles that 
occurred there in the second and first millennia BC. Although the apocalyptic reading of 
Megiddo as the future site of Armageddon is fanciful and not supported clearly by scripture or 
doctrine, the sense that Armageddon is tied to a specific place and past events is a powerful 
one and will escape few who use the term seriously. Those who warn of ‘cybergeddon’ are not 
deliberately invoking the spirit either of ancient wars against the Egyptians or of a literal 
Armageddon still to occur but there are multiple historical layers of cyber security discourses, 
even if etymology is often subordinate to more contemporary inflections and available 
meanings.  
 
The language of ‘cybergeddon’ and ‘cyber-apocalypse’ is freighted with past meanings and 
connotations and is usually avoided by public officials: elected politicians, civil servants, senior 
security personnel and military officers tend not to deploy language that is so obviously 
hyperbolic, even if, as argued in the previous chapter, their discourses remain strongly 
apocalyptic in tone if not in obvious intent. No such restraint applies to those answerable to 
shareholders rather than voters: media and industry reports and commentary are the principal 
loci of overtly apocalyptic discourses, including the contributions of those who were once but 
are no longer in public service. This might suggest there are normative constraints on Western 
164 
 
public officials uttering clearly Biblical-sounding apocalyptic discourses but this, historically, is 
not the case at all.  
 
For instance, the millennialism of US president Ronald Reagan is a matter of record, as are the 
beliefs and public statements of officials during his administration.27 In common with other 
millennialist Christians, Reagan was keen to garner the spiritual bounties promised to the true 
believer and―with his finger on the metaphorical button―was in a better position than most 
to ensure the Armageddon of divinely-sanctioned nuclear war that would deliver them.28 ‘It is 
later than we think’, he remarked, in direct reference to the temporal proximity of the end-
times,29 although he would later claim not to have allowed his eschatological beliefs to 
influence policy decisions, let alone influence plans for nuclear war.30 With the passing of 
Reagan and the Cold War, millennial rhetoric of this nature seems to have faded from high-
level political discourse and become one with the general apocalyptic underpinnings and more 
subtle expressions of eschatological postmodernity. For all its overt ‘born-again’ Christianity, 
the Bush II administration did not attempt to resurrect Reaganite language of this kind, either 
in marshalling support for the ‘war on terror’ or to justify its on-going prosecution, despite its 
many allusions to ‘holy war’ and the divinity of its mandate.31 
 
Politicians might wish to avoid the slightly hysterical language of Armageddon and religious 
apocalypse but no such caution exists in their invocation of historical events and processes in 
political cyber security discourses. Analogies, especially of war, are a commonplace of political 
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speeches and help to explain in culturally intelligible terms particular aspects of the present 
situation or of catastrophes yet to happen. On one level, there is the simple metaphor of war 
to describe the present Hobbesian cyber security situation of ‘cyber war’ of all against all.32 
‘We are currently at war’, reported the BBC in 2012, ‘on a battlefield we can’t see, with 
weapons most of us know nothing about’.33 ‘Britain is under attack, constantly, every day’, Sky 
News told its viewers a month later, ‘but most of us would never know. This is the cyber war; 
not a new conflict but an ever-developing battle’.34 This campaign is proceeding badly for the 
home side, as it is a battle that ‘the British government and military isn’t winning but is 
containing. Just’.35 Other influential voices go a step further, one former senior intelligence 
official stating, the ‘United States is fighting a cyber-war today, and we are losing. It’s that 
simple’.36 This is the ‘hidden battle’, a report to the US President stated in 2008, referring to 
the Allied code-breakers of World War II: ‘It is, like Ultra and Enigma, a battle fought mainly in 
the shadows. It is a battle we are losing’.37 Stretching historical tolerance still further, ‘We are 
in a “Hundred Years War” against formidable, adaptive, and creative opponents …. The war 
will be a struggle for the survival of a way of life’.38 
 
These examples are but a small selection of the volume and variety of historical analogies 
deployed by cyber security actors. The security orientation of these discourses means that 
historical events mobilised for contemporary political purposes are also usually ‘security 
events’, the most common being 9/11, the Cold War and Pearl Harbor, an extended discussion 
of which forms the basis of the two main sections of this chapter. These events are deployed 
as ‘historical analogies’, a term which ‘signifies an inference that if two or more events 
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separated in time agree in one respect, then they may also agree in another’.39 With respect to 
cyber security, the principal issue is not—as policy scholars like to debate—whether the 
analogies used are ‘accurate’ but what purposes the deployment of historical analogies serve: 
what is the ‘value’ assigned to them?40 Given their highly mediated nature, these processes 
also deploy ‘media templates’, in which historical events are ‘key reference points’ used 
analogically to ‘encourage a particular understanding’ of new events.41 
 
The focus of this chapter is not on the failures of historical analogies but on the political work 
they perform, which helps to explain why this form of argument and justification persists, 
despite the often seemingly inappropriate use of particular analogies. It is not that politicians 
are ignorant of history, an assumption sustaining the strategic studies literature in particular, 
in which the proffered solution is managerial: educate politicians and their staff so that they 
can learn ‘to use history more successfully’.42 Politicians are often keenly aware of the 
limitations of their chosen analogies but choose to pursue them for their utility in ways that 
aid policy and political decision-making. Although we might not be able to quantify the political 
efficacy of these analogies, we can begin to see how they might be effective or otherwise, 
although this is not the primary intention of the current exercise. Rather, the aim is to explore 
how the use of history in cyber security discourses expresses temporal aspects of the cyber 
security imaginary: what does the use of history say about the temporality of cyber security 
and how does it shape its politics? 
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42 Khong, Analogies, 12; Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). 
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5.2 Provocative Politics  
 
On 8 December 1941, a day after the Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii, President Roosevelt went before a joint session of Congress seeking assent for a 
declaration of war against Imperial Japan, a request duly granted by the assembled legislators. 
The President described the previous day’s events as ‘a date which will live in infamy’, and his 
short address is widely considered one of the most important political speeches of the 20th 
century. Not only did it precipitate US involvement in World War II but both attack and speech 
were subsequently central to the continual remaking of American national identity. As Emily 
Rosenberg notes in her exemplary study of the construction of Pearl Harbor in American 
memory, ‘the near-sacred symbol of Pearl Harbor … “lives” in a thousand guises and 
symbolizes dozens of often conflicting historical “lessons”’.43 The repurposing of the memory 
of Pearl Harbor is symptomatic of its status as ‘a figurative site of contested meanings where 
power is exerted and challenged’.44 Pearl Harbor lives ‘less as a specific occurrence in the past 
than as a highly emotive and spectacularized icon in an ongoing present—always in interaction 
with the mediated representations that constitute memory/history’.45  
 
As Rosenberg and many others have pointed out, 9/11 was recast rapidly as a new ‘day of 
infamy’, President George Bush even writing in his personal diary: ‘The Pearl Harbor of the 
21st century took place today’.46 President, politicians, press and pundits alike were ready and 
eager to equate Pearl Harbor with 9/11, portraying 9/11 as an act of treachery and as an ‘act 
of war’, and framing the coming American response as ‘saving the world’ once more from a 
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perfidious and inhuman foe.47 Thus was ‘resurrected the sense of a divine mission’ through 
‘the reiteration of innocence violated, the language of trauma, and the expression of the need 
for retaliation against a faceless enemy who has come to resemble earlier evildoers in the saga 
of Western civilization against barbarism’.48  
 
The transformation of Pearl Harbor into an allegory for the present is indicative of its 
continuing ability to inspire a range of emotions and reactions congruent with the American 
identity and mythos it has done so much to shape. Responses to 9/11 comprise probably the 
largest assemblage of analogical uses of Pearl Harbor since the original event but the most 
consistent deployment of Pearl Harbor as historical analogy is in cyber security discourse, 
where it has been in regular use for over twenty years.49 Whereas 9/11 demonstrably did 
happen—even if conspiracy theorists contest otherwise consensual narratives of causality and 
representation—cyber security constructs its interpretations of Pearl Harbor with reference to 
future catastrophic events like those imagined in the previous chapter and which have yet to 
happen, if they ever will. 
 
The earliest reference to an ‘electronic Pearl Harbour’ appears to be by information security 
specialist Winn Schwartau, ‘the rock manager-turned-preacher of “information warfare”’.50 In 
an op-ed for Computerworld magazine in January 1991, Schwartau suggested that for ‘a 
motivated individual or organization, an assault on our information processing capabilities 
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would be an effective attack on a global Achilles Heel, an electronic Pearl Harbor’.51 Schwartau 
continued to popularise the term throughout 1991, including in testimony to a US 
Congressional Subcommittee on 27 June, whom he claims to have told: ‘Government and 
commercial computer systems are so poorly protected today they can essentially be 
considered defenceless—an electronic Pearl Harbor waiting to happen’.52  
 
Other authors connect early use of the term to D. James Bidzos, president of computer and 
network security company RSA, who was reported in 1991 as saying there was ‘no assurance 
that foreign governments cannot break the [US government’s digital standards] system, 
running the risk of a digital Pearl Harbor’.53 However, Schwartau’s long-standing claim to have 
coined the phrase is bolstered by the publication, in the same month as his Congressional 
testimony, of his first novel, Terminal Compromise (1991).54 This plot-driven and thinly 
disguised chunk of policy exhortation refers to both the historical Pearl Harbor and its 
electronic counterpart, concepts that come together in the title of the novel’s post-9/11 
reissue as Pearl Harbor Dot Com (2002).55 The ‘electronic Pearl Harbor’ is an event described 
by Schwartau in existential terms: 
 
the target is one of the most crucial segments of our way of life: Information …. the 
key building block upon which modern society functions …. the lifeblood of the United 
States and the world …. a global and a national strategic asset that is currently under 
attack …. Without information, without the machinery that allows the information to 
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remain available, a veritable national electronic library, the United States steps back 
thirty years.56 
 
In the novel, the villainous Japanese Homosoto plots against the United States, intending to 
avenge the death of his family at Hiroshima and to assuage his own shame at being hibakusha, 
a survivor of the nuclear blast. The historical Pearl Harbor plays a constitutive role in 
Homosoto’s own thought: ‘We may have lost after Pearl Harbor’, he says, ‘but we won with 
the transistor radios and VCRs. The war is not over’. The forthcoming ‘Electronic Pearl Harbor’ 
would be ‘the ultimate cyberwar attack against the United States’.57  
 
Since its inception, the term has been used with ‘startling frequency’ to conjure up ‘images of 
a sudden crippling blow against critical infrastructures resulting in chaos and destruction’.58 By 
1997, it was considered the ‘most common analogy’ in US military planning discourse, in which 
it represented a future event which would ‘wipe out communications and leave the front-line 
soldiers, unable to act on their own initiative, helpless’.59 By 2003, the term was described as 
‘bromidic’, so frequently was it used and so attenuated had its meaning become.60 Former US 
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism Richard 
Clarke changed the target set compromised by such attacks to include private companies as 
well as government and military assets.61 These statements pluralised the previously singular 
‘event’ and located them across multiple sectors, altering the presentation of the relations 
between cyber (in)security and the state. The integrity of the historical event is subverted still 
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further by reference to the possibility of multiple ‘small-scale’ digital Pearl Harbours.62 Clarke, 
for example, asserted that ‘digital Pearl Harbors are happening every day’.63 By 2011, the 
phrase had become ‘rather stale from overuse’.64 
 
In the autumn of 2012, its stock rose again, with US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta using it in 
a high-profile speech to business executives: 
 
The most destructive scenarios involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our 
critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our 
country. Attackers could also seek to disable or degrade critical military systems and 
communication networks. The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a 
cyber Pearl Harbor; an attack that would cause physical destruction and the loss of life. 
In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of 
vulnerability.65 
 
The speech was reported with little critical comment, save for that implicitly recognised in the 
Pentagon’s denial that the Defense Secretary’s words were in any sense hyperbolic.66 Panetta 
had deployed the analogy on at least two previous public occasions—before a House 
intelligence committee in February 2011 (when director of the CIA) and during his 
confirmation hearing as defense secretary in June 2011.67 His use of the phrase only attracted 
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widespread attention at the end of 2012 and into 2013, as he continued to use it to illustrate 
the hypothetical American vulnerability to a massive and debilitating cyber attack.68 It is 
notable that other high-ranking officials have refused to use the Pearl Harbor analogy. Howard 
Schmidt, who in 2009 would become President Obama’s cyber security ‘czar’, expressed his 
dislike of the phrase in his memoirs, albeit without explaining why in detail.69 One of 
Washington, DC’s most astute cyber security commentators and policy advisers, James Lewis 
of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has long been opposed to overuse of the 
Pearl Harbor analogy: ‘it would be nice if the phrase went away’, he said after Panetta’s 
comments, ‘but it seems to be stuck’.70 
 
Critics of the Pearl Harbor analogy populate two principal categories. The first aims to dismiss 
the notion of future catastrophe entirely and is intent on ‘debunking’ what is seen as a wider 
symptom of faulty logic and political self-interest. The second is determined to show where 
the analogy fails and suggests alternative ways of conceptualising the relevant issues. 
Panetta’s determination to breathe new life into the ‘stale’ Pearl Harbor analogy was in part 
successful if we are to judge by the volume of reactive commentary his remarks elicited, 
examples of which fall into both categories of criticism. In the first category, some, like Russia 
Today, rejected Panetta’s ‘scare-mantra’ as outright fearmongering and part of a concerted 
campaign of American ‘scare tactics’ intended to give ‘Washington bureaucrats greater control 
over what happens online in the US’.71 Writing in The Guardian, Glenn Greenwald expressed 
similar sentiments, identifying Panetta’s use of the analogy as the culmination of a process of 
‘fear-mongering rhetoric from government officials [which] has relentlessly intensified, all 
devoted to scaring citizens into believing that the US is at serious risk of cataclysmic cyber-
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attacks from “aggressors”’.72 Greenwald was correct to note that the defense secretary failed 
to report that the US is still the only state (in probable partnership with Israel) known to have 
launched a sophisticated cyber ‘weapon’ (Stuxnet) against another sovereign entity. In this 
light, mentions of foreign aggression ring rather hollow, an omission noted by other 
commentators, including The Financial Times.73 
 
In the second category, John Arquilla’s op-ed in Foreign Policy magazine took Panetta to task 
for his choice of the ‘wrong metaphor’, offering instead a vision of the Internet as analogous to 
the North Atlantic shipping lanes under assault from German naval forces in 1942.74 As far back 
as 1999, Arquilla, professor of defense analysis at the US Naval Postgraduate School and a 
veteran of debates on strategy and information technologies, had urged the US to discard 
‘digital Pearl Harbor’ as the central metaphor of strategic thought, offering an alternative 
metaphor, ‘a “Manifest Destiny” for the information age’.75 This idea was neither elaborated 
nor its ramifications examined further and it is hard to see how this metaphor is any less 
problematic than that of Pearl Harbor, given its negative connotations of divinely sanctioned 
American imperialism and territorial expansion.76 This is especially pertinent because 
accusations have long been levelled against the United States that it is attempting in some 
fashion to ‘colonise cyberspace’ through normative, commercial, military and other means.77 
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However, it illustrates further that analogies are always sought to frame speculative cyber 
security futures in terms drawn from the non-cyber security past. 
 
Most discussions of cyber security at some point mention the Pearl Harbor analogy and many 
identify reasons why it fails to illuminate particular technical and strategic aspects of cyber 
security. This is to be expected; as Arquilla concedes, ‘no metaphor can address every aspect 
of a problem’.78 Given that the Pearl Harbor analogy in cyber security has always attracted 
hostility, if not outright ridicule, we should perhaps assume that Panetta and others were not 
ignorant of this when they used it. This suggests a degree of deliberateness in their choice of 
analogy and the likelihood that those who use it are aware of its rhetorical force and the 
cognitive work that the analogy advances, rather than dwell on the inaccuracies of the analogy 
itself with respect to the historical record and geopolitical context. Possibly the most extensive 
engagement with the term is a 2003 article in CIO (Chief Information Officer) magazine by 
journalist Scott Berinato.79 Berinato reviewed the historical and conceptual use of the phrase 
and—perhaps unsurprisingly, given the depth of his analysis—found it lacking. He argued that 
most of the scenarios painted by policymakers and others do not rise to the level of a Pearl 
Harbor for the simple reason that they fail ‘to inflict significant, collective psychological 
damage’.  
 
Berinato outlined five requirements for something to qualify as an event of Pearl Harbor 
magnitude. One, it would disrupt the back-up systems that would ordinarily mitigate the 
effects of large-scale cyber incidents. Two, it would lead to cascading failures in networked 
infrastructures. Three, its effects would continue for many weeks. Four, the vulnerability 
responsible would be determined after the event, which would lead to, five, the public 
revelation that ‘the loss of property and life was completely and absolutely and tragically 
avoidable’. At this ‘exposure of negligence to the public’, security would start to improve as 
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public outrage led to litigation, regulation and the imposition of security standards on the 
public and private sectors: 
 
this notion of an industrywide smartening up [is] based on the assumption that there 
will be a security incident of such mind-boggling scope and profoundly disturbing 
consequence …. that conducting business will become inconceivable.80 
 
Given the previous discussion of catastrophe in Chapter Four, we can again see the apocalyptic 
consciousness at work. The digital Pearl Harbour is an event—or a series of tightly bound 
events constituting an ‘accident’—marking the end of one world and the beginning of another. 
The current world is one in which politicians pay insufficient heed to security experts, and 
software manufacturers and systems designers ignore important security issues. Catastrophe 
is inevitable and imminent but it is necessary in order to shock relevant parties into 
constructive action, always in the direction of more and better cyber security. The digital Pearl 
Harbor is transformative and, because of the belief in a positive, post-Pearl Harbor future, 
desired and desirable.81  
 
Jason Healey, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative of the Atlantic Council of the United 
States, responded to Leon Panetta’s use of the Pearl Harbor analogy: 
 
While the possibility of a catastrophic first cyber strike is indeed not a new idea—and 
likely fails to capture just what such an attack would be like—Panetta is using this 
loaded phrase to startle people, to convince them we are not paying enough attention 
to our cyber problems.82  
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Healey supported this provocative stance, noting that the ‘administration is reaching for more 
visceral imagery’: ‘After two decades, yelling “fire” to get attention isn’t enough and people 
must smell the smoke and feel the heat on their own faces’. He argued that Panetta was 
probably right to invoke Pearl Harbor but the government needed to support its warnings of 
catastrophe with sufficient information ‘to win over enough of the doubters’ to enable 
reform.83 In 1998, Arthur Cebrowski, founding director of the US Office of Force 
Transformation and chief architect of network-centric warfare, articulated this dimension of 
the digital Pearl Harbor analogy. Effectively noting that to pick holes in the analogy was ‘to 
miss the point’, Cebrowski identified its continuing political utility: 
 
what really happened at Pearl Harbor was that a threat that had been sketchy, 
abstract, and distant became personal and immediate. Then, as now, there were those 
who saw the growing danger and strove to be heard and to influence policy and 
priorities. However, it took the actual attack to galvanise the nation. I suggest that 
Pearl Harbor’s real effects were felt in the areas of policy, law, and national 
commitment to respond to a recognizable threat.84 
 
Physical scenarios are required in order to materialise and make comprehensible the ‘virtual’ 
threat and the Pearl Harbor analogy helps to do this by making the ‘abstract and distant’ 
‘personal and immediate’.85 This has the effect of ‘waking’ America from its cyber security 
slumber, the ‘sleeping metaphor’ that has become an integral part of the Pearl Harbor myth, in 
which innocence and complacency are both embedded—with respect to cyber security, ‘it 
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seems the “sleeping giant” is again awaiting a public, catastrophic event before awakening’.86 
As Rosenberg notes, when the nation ‘suddenly loses its childlike innocence’ maturity and 
manhood, often in the form of military force, follows.87 Moreover, Pearl Harbor serves to warn 
of the dangers of not being alert to new Pearl Harbor-type events. During the Cold War, 
security elites used the analogy to help improve intelligence, build new weapons and increase 
military budgets and it became a ‘[p]owerful metaphor for international vigilance, a large 
military establishment, and a need for standing tough and unified against forces that might 
threaten the nation’.88 This is precisely the argument of many commentators who argue for 
the military to take the lead in national cyber defence. 
 
As suggested previously, references to Pearl Harbor are not accidental and continue the 
analogy’s long history of becoming ‘ever more elastic, connoting any potential national 
security disaster …. an all-purpose cue for those wishing to trigger insecurity and a proactive 
response’.89 Although we cannot trace definitively causality between use of the analogy and 
the undoubted increase in US cyber security spending, institutional reorganisation and drives 
towards legislation, if Healey is right that the administration is actively seeking to cultivate fear 
through ‘visceral imagery’, it seems likely that Pearl Harbor once again serves to assist the 
political processes required for resource allocation, doctrinal development, changes in force 
posture, and other signs of institutional change in the pursuit of cyber security. The 
mobilisation of collective memory and identity are important aspects of this dynamic and the 
following section discusses Pearl Harbor, and historical analogies more generally, from this 
additional perspective. 
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5.3 Memory and Identity  
 
Pearl Harbor has been invoked in cyber security for two decades, ‘with each cyber incident 
that reaches the media articulated as proof of its encroaching inevitability’.90 If steps are not 
taken to ‘defend our nation against this gathering cyberthreat’, write two prominent US 
legislators, ‘the day on which those cyberweapons strike will be another “date which will live in 
infamy”, because we knew it was coming and didn’t come together to stop it’.91 For academics 
too, Pearl Harbor is always imminent and inevitable.92 However, the final cataclysm that must 
wake government from its complacency is forever deferred, creating a temporal hiatus filled 
with fearful anticipation and longing.93  
 
Some policymakers do reject the inevitability or necessity of a digital Pearl Harbor and make a 
distinction between the inevitability of a future attack—‘not a matter of if, but when’—and the 
preventability of a Pearl Harbor-type event. Although attacks will happen, they will not reach 
the catastrophic level of a digital Pearl Harbor if appropriate political action is taken now. The 
future is therefore still open for negotiation and is to some degree contingent upon the 
present, although it is the future that shapes to a great extent the contemporary politics of 
cyber security. The narrative of imminent and immanent catastrophe is challenged from within 
political elites themselves and restores a sense of agency to the political present, although the 
omnipresent threat of future disaster is only deferred rather than cancelled altogether.  
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This future-oriented aspect of the Pearl Harbor analogy is only one part of its potency and the 
past surfaces in its contemporary invocation and is constantly remade through its repeated 
enunciation. Or, more accurately, without the present and future imaginings of the past, we 
cannot begin to understand the future through historical analogy. This is the source of 
disagreements over the validity of the metaphor itself, as there is no satisfactory way of 
comparing a future that has not yet happened with to a past that cannot be experienced 
directly. Without an appreciation of the past, Pearl Harbor would lack its emotive qualities and 
the history of the term itself does political work in cyber security before it is even linked to 
threats, however specific or general these may be. 
 
How is this so, and what influence does this have on the politics of cyber security? Revisiting 
Roosevelt’s speech in 1942, Rosenberg describes how it tapped into existing structures of 
national memory and identity: 
 
In emphasising the ‘character’ of the attack by Japan and promising that such ‘infamy’ 
needed to be followed through to ‘inevitable triumph’, Roosevelt structured his 
narrative to recall America’s most celebrated frontier legends: Custer’s Last Stand and 
the Alamo. These, too, were terrible defeats that provided rallying cries for 
overwhelming military counterforce leading to total victory. Memory research 
confirms that people remember events in ways that fit already familiar patterns and 
narrative structures. The infamy framework for Pearl Harbor was perhaps so powerful 
because it already circulated widely in frontier lore.94  
 
We might make a similar argument for cyber security, in which the frontier myth is made 
definitive and foundational of future security. A report by the Center for a New American 
Security asserted that ‘governance in cyberspace resembles the American Wild West of the 
1870s and 1880s, with limited governmental authority and engagement’, even if this ‘condition 
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of anarchy is not absolute’.95 Because its interests depend upon cyberspace, the US ‘cannot 
allow a regression toward a Wild West of continuous malicious activity’.96 It calls for ‘a cleaner, 
healthier cyber environment in order to secure a broad range of United States and 
international interests’.97 Although the report bases its policy proposals on models of public 
health, it might easily have built upon the cultural trope of ‘cleaning up’ recalcitrant and 
problematic communities of the American West, no great leap as the authors had already 
established the Wild West as a foundation of their argument. It does not do so because it is 
not attempting to dredge up suppressed national memories of aboriginal genocide (bad) but 
because it is trying to remember the role of pioneer Americans in making the frontiers safe 
and prosperous (good). In an environment of no borders (the Internet), it is the role of America 
to ensure no space is left ungoverned, least these interstices harbour enemies that may strike 
at American interests home or abroad.98 
 
Like Pearl Harbor, the American West has always been a flexible concept, reimagined for 
multiple ends. It is ‘a region of endless possibilities, a vast, magnificent, ideal stage for the 
national drama of liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness’, a cultural myth that relies on 
‘the uniquely-American frontier spirit and pioneer values that propelled the US to the West 
Coast in the nineteenth century, into space in the twentieth, and to the forefront of the so-
called Information Age at the dawn of the twenty-first’.99 In the hands of anti-authoritarian 
cyber-utopian groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the myth becomes the basis for 
visions of opportunity and libertarian futures; in the security imaginary, the Wild West is 
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something to be tamed and regulated. Each draws upon different aspects of the myth to guide 
and direct their aspirations for the future; each remakes the past in so doing. 
 
However, as historian Eric Hobsbawm notes in a posthumously published essay, ‘only 
Americans live in Marlboro country’.100 American cultural exports have moved on from movie 
Westerns and the image of the rugged cowboy is no longer quite the international pin-up it 
once was. This has not prevented recent US presidents—Reagan and Bush, Jr., in particular—
from adopting the semiotic trappings of the mythic gunslinger and the pioneer, often willingly 
assisted by the news media. George W. Bush, in particular, made concerted efforts in his first 
presidential campaign to veil his blue-blood east coast origins with the persona of a working 
class hero dispensing justice on behalf of honest America, a role he revived successfully after 
post-9/11.101 Successfully, that is, for domestic audiences. The international press, by contrast, 
dropped their belief that Bush ‘could be a statesman [and] now had no doubt that Bush was 
destined to remain the loathsome cowboy … “Bush thinks he is Wyatt Earp”’.102 One 
prominent British journalist described Bush’s recourse to Wild West rhetoric after 9/11 as ‘a 
man reaching for a childhood cliché rather than a subtle thought’.103 Similarly, contempt was 
heaped upon Tony Blair’s infamous ‘thumbs-in-belt’ 2002 photo call with President Bush, after 
which he was pilloried as a subservient Tonto to Bush’s Lone Ranger.104 For their respective 
audiences, it might just be acceptable for an American president to impersonate a cowboy but 
it was unthinkable for a British prime minister to do so.  
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Cultural snobbery might partly explain non-American attitudes to American myth and its 
attempted appropriation by someone like Blair but ‘the cowboy’ has come to mean different 
things to different audiences: one nation’s self-image does not necessarily translate well across 
cultural boundaries. This is true of Pearl Harbor, which has a local specificity that does not 
necessarily reveal itself in all its dimensions when communicated to a global audience. When 
Maura Conway writes that the analogy has ‘immediate resonance and attracts wide 
understanding’,105 this is probably the case across multiple audiences but it is only in the US 
that it will elicit what John Arquilla calls its ‘surefire emotional effect’.106 It is hard to imagine it 
having the same ‘resonance’ elsewhere. Even amongst the US’ Western allies, Pearl Harbor is 
remembered more as the event that brought the US into World War II than as a blow that 
struck at the heart of American society and self-image. 
 
Pearl Harbor discourse mobilises some aspects of the frontier myth but it has its own powerful 
role in constructing memory and maintaining national identity. In cyber security, Pearl Harbor 
as ‘historical trauma’ is linked to the ‘new risks’ of the globalised and interconnected world.107 
As with the original attacks on Pearl Harbor, which showed that the US was not geographically 
separate from the rest of the world, future Pearl Harbors warn against considering the US 
invulnerable from foes located ‘geographically and morally’ outside the US.108 Bendrath 
extends this argument further: this construction of an external ‘other’ ‘reinforces the idea of 
the nation as a collective self …. [the] referent object of security, then, is the whole [of] 
American society’.109 A serious cyber attack would already demand a high-level political 
response but this pressure would be increased considerably by constructing an ‘attack’ on 
infrastructure—even an attack perpetrated by an invisible and undeclared protagonist—as an 
attack upon American nationhood itself, bound together, in Benedict Anderson’s phrase, by a 
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‘deep, horizontal comradeship’.110 It assists in constructing such an event as an issue of 
national, rather than merely technical, security; one, in fact, that requires a militarised 
response. Pearl Harbor is part of the ‘national symbolic’, that discursive regime which 
‘transforms [American-born] individuals into subjects of a collectively-held history’, with all the 
rights and responsibilities this ‘pseudo-genetic condition’ confers.111 
 
The US is framed as vulnerable but it is also presented as uniquely vulnerable to catastrophic 
cyber attacks. This is expressed two ways, both stemming from the American condition of high 
dependency on sophisticated information infrastructures. First, it is more vulnerable than 
other countries: ‘its overwhelming military superiority and its leading edge in information 
technology’, writes one commercial security expert, ‘have also made the United States the 
country most vulnerable to cyber-attack’ and other forms of asymmetric warfare.112 Second, 
the US is more vulnerable now than it has ever been, with its ‘digital underbelly’ exposed for 
all the world to see, a point made by probably hundreds of authors. Moreover, this is 
exacerbated by the inability of the federal government and military to protect the nation from 
cyber attacks. Even those who believe the Pearl Harbor scenario—‘there may well be an 
electronic fleet preparing off our shores tonight’—assert that ‘this is the first time in history 
where the American military cannot defend the American people’.113 ‘We can’t hire an army or 
a police force that’s large enough to protect all of America’s cell phones or pagers or computer 
networks’.114 The United States is therefore supremely vulnerable in space, where it is an 
isolated global hegemon, and in time: at no point in its history has it been so open to 
catastrophic attacks of this nature. 
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Pearl Harbor was a moment of extreme vulnerability, as was 9/11, narratives of which 
frequently invoked Pearl Harbor, as already discussed. American narratives of ‘cyber’ 
vulnerability also use 9/11 as a specific historical analogy. As Myriam Dunn Cavelty has found, 
9/11 had the profound effect of recalibrating ‘cyber-doom’ discourses by strengthening that 
element concerned with terrorism, particularly Islamist terrorism.115 Linking conventional 
terrorism to aggressive use of ICTs, ‘cyberterrorism’ was mentioned twice as often in The New 
York Times and Washington Post after 9/11 as before.116 Discourses of cyberterrorism are now 
almost as prevalent as—and frequently confused with—those of cyberwar, a ‘hyping of an 
(imagined) fatal connection between virtual networks and critical infrastructures that, to date, 
has very little form or substance’.117  
 
Cyberterrorism connects strategic terrorism with information technologies but 9/11 provides 
an analogical bridge between information technologies and 9/11 as a spectacular national 
security event not restricted to terrorism alone. Since approximately 2003, there have been 
many assertions as to the likelihood of a digital, electronic or cyber 9/11.118 Mike McConnell, 
formerly director of the National Security Agency and later Director of National Intelligence, 
was an early adopter of the phrase, asserting the likelihood of a cyber attack equivalent to 
9/11 in scale and impact, whilst embracing it as a ‘forcing issue’ to improve cyber security 
across public and private sectors.119 McConnell frequently obscured the distinction between 
acts of cyberterrorism and other forms of ICT-mediated aggression and a decade later his 
references to ‘the cyber equivalent of the World Trade Center’ were a straightforward cipher 
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for any large-scale cyber attack on the US, regardless of perpetrator or intent.120 The tendency 
has become to attribute a ‘cyber 9/11’ not to terrorists but to an assemblage of other actors: 
‘an attack [like this] could see a country like Iran work with Russian criminals or Chinese 
hackers’, suggested McConnell.121 In January 2013, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet 
Napolitano also referred to the imminence of a ‘cyber 9/11’. Speaking at the Wilson Center in 
Washington, DC, she explained: ‘We shouldn't wait until there is a 9/11 in the cyber world. 
There are things we can and should be doing right now that, if not prevent, would mitigate the 
extent of damage’.122  
 
It is possible that the choice of analogy partly reflects the institutions each official represented: 
the defense secretary opted to refer to an episode in military history (Pearl Harbor), the 
homeland security secretary preferred comparisons with a terrorist attack (9/11), which was, 
after all, the direct catalyst for the creation of her department in 2003. However, as suggested, 
the question of actors’ intent was, by 2012, all but absent from both analogies. Neither Pearl 
Harbor nor 9/11 were being used by senior officials with much consideration of the causes of 
future catastrophic events, except with reference to a non-specific external threat and to the 
problems arising from the general insecurity of sociotechnical systems. This is not to deny that 
these analogies continue to work in sophisticated registers but it does suggest there is more 
concern about the effects of potential cyber catastrophes than their causes, exemplified by a 
further subset of historical analogies drawn from a catalogue of recent ‘natural’ disasters.  
 
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina collided with the southern US seaboard, killing nearly 1900 people, 
causing upwards of $80 billion of property damage, and severely disrupting socioeconomic 
activities across the southern states. It was, by all estimates, one of the most deadly and 
costliest weather events ever to hit the United States, the official meteorological report 
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recording simply that the extent, magnitude and effects of the hurricane were ‘staggering’.123 
Not only were the physical impacts of Katrina of a severity not experienced in living memory 
but the images of public panic, government impotence and social disorder―notably, looting in 
New Orleans―are now synonymous with what can go terribly wrong in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster.124 It was perhaps inevitable that Katrina would enter cyber security 
discourse in the form of ‘cyber Katrina’ to connote a forthcoming catastrophe.125  
 
The proximal purpose in invoking a ‘natural’ event in this fashion is to highlight the lack of 
current attention to resilience, particularly with respect to government disaster planning.126 
That political utility might outweigh decency and respect for persons caught up in unfolding 
crises is amply demonstrated by Secretary Napolitano’s invocation of a cyber equivalent to 
Hurricane Sandy even as the endgame of that destructive event was still playing out in late 
2012.127 As Sean Lawson has pointed out, ‘No natural disaster in the last several years has 
passed without a government official or civilian “expert” using it to raise fears of cyber 
threats’.128 Like 9/11, Katrina is presented as a ‘focusing event’ for national disaster response 
policy; without these events, the forms of multi-sector cooperation required to mitigate the 
impact of disasters will not be explored and developed.129 Once again, the cyber disaster is 
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constructed―through historical analogy―as something necessary in the formulation of 
appropriate policy and strategy. 
 
Previous discussions of these analogies have teased out where they succeed and fail.130 What 
is less commonly noted is their national specificity. We might argue that the discussion to this 
point has been heavily weighted in favour of US cyber security discourse to the exclusion of 
any other. This is a valid criticism but defensible partly with reference to an established 
analytical tendency to prioritise the US in cyber security discourses, on account, principally, of 
its historical pre-eminence in the field of critical infrastructures and their security and 
protection.131 This apparent bias demonstrates the importance of that national particularity, 
indicating that the emotional and cultural aspects of historical analogies are equally as 
important as their other points of comparison. Indeed, they may be selected for these, in the 
knowledge that more accurate analogies might be available but which do not trigger specific 
collective aspects of identity and memory of greater political than technical utility.  
 
Maura Conway notes that a 1998 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Washington, DC, found the term ‘electronic Waterloo’ a more appropriate 
comparison, although it is rarely, if ever, used today.132 The Battle of Waterloo (1815) was the 
decisive encounter of the Anglo-Allied campaign to unseat Napoleon from the French imperial 
throne, from which the CSIS authors drew inspiration in sketching the character of a possible 
future ‘information warfare’ campaign against the United States, ‘where technology, planning, 
and careful execution were used as part of a long-range plan aimed at altering the world’s 
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political, military, and economic order’.133 Even were it able to capture the dynamics of the 
present situation better than the Pearl Harbor analogy, it would stand little chance of 
widespread adoption in the US because Waterloo does not resonate with American audiences 
as it might with the British. Tennyson may have constructed Waterloo as that ‘world-
earthquake’,134 whose tremors are felt even today in the continuing importance of the British 
victory at Waterloo to the British national psyche, but it means much less to a United States 
who by June 1815 had only just fought their own war with Britain to a draw, a war in turn 
mostly forgotten by a British nation preoccupied with Napoleon’s challenge to European 
stability. 
 
Although the two events are very different, Pearl Harbor has as unique a role in American 
national memory as Waterloo does in the British. There are both archetypal events which still 
possess the power to shock and inspire, to mobilise popular sentiment, and through which 
political ends may be pursued. We should not be surprised to find that other nations 
appropriate and repurpose their own histories to narrate and explain present cyber 
insecurities. In Australia, for instance, we find mention of an ‘electronic Gallipoli’ in a 1999 
article written ahead of both Y2K and the Sydney Olympics.135 This article is notable for 
mentioning Gallipoli in its title but not once in the body of the piece itself. Given the 
importance of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915 to Australian national identity, it 
seems it is enough just to allude to it in passing to stir the patriotic emotions of populace and 
politicians alike and (hopefully) thereby to further the ends of cyber security. Gallipoli is often 
regarded as the beginnings of a true Australian national consciousness and one wonders 
whether the ‘electronic Gallipoli’ is similarly intended to arouse a cyber security 
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‘consciousness’ in its Australian audience. As the concluding section discusses, this search for 
foundations is characteristic of cyber security’s argumentation through the past.  
 
5.4 Arguing Through the Past 
 
The reliance on historical analogies to describe and explain speculative future scenarios is 
comprehensible in terms of appealing to existing national archetypes that stimulate emotional 
responses, mobilise patriotic sentiment, raise awareness of potent insecurities and facilitate 
the political processes of legislative attention and resource allocation. In this sense, both 
‘national memory’, the curated historical discourses of nationhood, and ‘cultural memory’, 
that ‘memory that is shared outside the avenues of formal historical discourse yet is entangled 
with cultural products and imbued with cultural meaning’, are evoked and politicised.136 This 
process is greatly assisted by the recall of explanatory ‘media templates’ of historical events 
which, rather than ‘opening up historical reflection […] reify a kind of historical determinism 
which can filter out dissenting accounts, camouflage conflicting facts and promote one type of 
narrative’.137 These established modalities of discursive action exist in many other fields of 
security, although they are notable in cyber security for their persistence even in the face of 
the non-appearance of the future catastrophes such analogical reasoning portends. There is 
another facet of this form of representation and argumentation that speaks more 
fundamentally still to the temporality of cyber security as an expression of its self-image and 
identity, in which historical analogies serve as proxies for the foundational events that cyber 
security lacks.  
 
In its attempts to sketch the contours of the future, cyber security cannot appeal only to its 
own limited past but has recourse to a generalised past of national security lodged in the 
                                                            
136 On this distinction, see Marita Sturken, Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and 
the Politics of Remembering (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997). 
137 KItzinger, ‘Media Templates’, 76. 
190 
 
memory not only of policymakers and those who execute policy and strategy but in the 
broader and deeper memories of the societies they exist to serve. As Hansen and Nissenbaum 
demonstrate, it is difficult to communicate and represent cyber security through images 
alone.138 As suggested in Chapter Four, this is why future scenarios are sketched principally in 
physical terms: it is easier to evoke emotion and catalyse political action through narratives of 
death and obviously material destruction than to expect audiences to comprehend a rather 
abstracted vision of digital ones and zeroes comprising and circulating in a medium somehow 
‘less real’ than everyday reality itself.139 This applies even if the societal impact of illegal data 
transfer, subversion and deletion far outweighs the importance of the disasters imagined and 
communicated through catastrophic cyber security discourses.140 This is one reason why a 
generic attendance to catastrophic ‘cyber war’ is distinctly deleterious to the progress of 
appropriate cyber security policy, as it ignores the rather less glamorous but arguably more 
insidious effects of increasingly banal and ubiquitous cyber crime and cyber espionage.141 Due 
to the inherent difficulty of visually representing even cyber security events which have 
already happened—except in language only accessible to specialists—it is perhaps easier to 
draw upon a repertoire of ‘real’ rather than ‘virtual’ events that offer spectacular imagery 
accessible to a wide audience.  
 
However, as Hansen and Nissenbaum suggest, whilst cyber security always mobilises the 
‘specter of the future’, the past is articulated as ‘a legitimising reference that underscores the 
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gravity of the [present] situation’.142 This appeal is necessary because cyber security has no 
history of ‘founding incidents’ comparable to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which, in the field of 
nuclear security and global politics, were illustrative of what might happen should the Cold 
War become ‘hot’.143 Many examples of cyber insecurity are used to construct narratives of 
the future, as the previous discussion of apocalyptic signs demonstrates, but the catastrophic 
cyber security events imagined by many interlocutors have no historical precedents that might 
ground these speculations in empirical reality, as far as history can ever serve as such.  
 
The search for foundations is frequently expressed with direct analogical reference to nuclear 
weapons. The speaker of the Estonian parliament, Ene Ergma, compared the 2007 cyber 
attacks on her country to a nuclear explosion and its resulting fallout: ‘When I look at a nuclear 
explosion and the explosion that happened to our country in May, I see the same thing. Like 
nuclear radiation, cyber warfare doesn’t make you bleed, but it can destroy everything’.144 For 
Ergma, wrote the journalist who reported her thoughts: 
 
She spent years studying nuclear energy and watched the world transform as it 
wrapped itself around the advent of nuclear technology. For her, information warfare 
is a similar defining moment in world history.145 
 
For many, Estonia was a sign of future catastrophe but in this formulation it becomes a 
foundational event too, an historical anchor that grounds cyber security itself. Was Estonia 
‘Web War One’? asked journalists and senior defence analysts alike.146  
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When news of Stuxnet emerged in 2010, comparisons with nuclear weapons were not far 
behind. ‘Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war’, wrote one journalist in Vanity Fair: 
 
That is its true significance, and all the speculation about its target and its source 
should not blind us to that larger reality. We have crossed a threshold, and there is no 
turning back.147 
 
One veteran of the US Department of Homeland Security took great pains to demonstrate why 
atomic weapons ‘were utterly transformative …. Cyberspace is no different’, paying close 
attention to Stuxnet: 
 
The last time the settled geopolitical worldview was so disrupted, a nuclear explosion 
devastated Hiroshima. The physical effects of Stuxnet are nowhere near that severe, 
thankfully. But the cognitive disruptions that will come are just as great. Stuxnet was, 
figuratively, the first explosion of a cyber atomic bomb.148 
 
The search for an originary event upon which to build policy and strategy is evident in such 
statements. The atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 became the 
quintessential reference points for all subsequent nuclear strategy and the absence of such 
events in the ‘virtual’ realm has hampered the quest for strategic ‘cyber’ deterrence, for 
example.149 Repeated attempts have been made to frame contemporary cyber security—in its 
military and societal dimensions—as a ‘new Cold War’ but these often founder on inaccuracies 
and misconceptions, including the inability to identify historically important ‘moments’ from 
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which this postulated new era might spring.150 Although such analogies may help in rallying 
support around a particular issue, it is undeniable that cyber security communities would 
benefit greatly from ‘a catastrophe to call their own’, which could serve as a touchstone for 
their own communal identity and as a powerful motivating tool for shaping the wider politics 
of cyber security.  
 
The tendency to reduce the temporally extended to the discrete moment has been identified 
previously, in which a series of interconnected processes is compressed into a single, more 
easily digestible ‘event’. An event is more readily assimilated into discourses of identity 
construction, persuasion and political coercion than is a complex assemblage of historically 
contingent processes that belie easy description or explanation.151 In the US, Rosenberg 
identifies this dynamic in the ‘diverse meanings that cluster around the icon of Pearl Harbor’, 
which ‘suggest emplotments of the past that are centered on the detail of conspicuous events, 
linked together in frequently overblown or all-too-clear cause and effect relationships’.152 
Narratives that appropriate Pearl Harbor always potentially ‘downplay’ the longue durée, she 
writes, ignoring historical specificities to construct identity and politics in the present.153 Cyber 
security would seem to accord with that conclusion, cut off from its own history but selecting 
historical events as the discursive means through which to motivate memory and identity in 
pursuit of political aims in the present. 
 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the past contributes to the temporality of 
cyber security. Selective though the examples have been, including an extended discussion of 
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the historical analogy of Pearl Harbor, we can see that proponents of cyber security attempt to 
construct narratives of the future through narratives of the past. This requires the idiosyncratic 
use of history to illustrate contemporary problems and their possible future solutions and, as 
suggested above, shapes the identity of cyber security communities themselves. In the 
absence of a foundational catastrophe of its own, cyber security looks to history for significant 
security events from which it may draw inspiration and identity, most often within the context 
of national memory and the military experience. However, some final comments are required 
that draw out the effects of this form of arguing through the past, particularly with respect to 
the interplay between memory, metaphor, history and myth. 
 
Andreas Huyssen observes that the ‘real can be mythologized, just as the mythic may 
engender strong reality effects’.154 Myth is ‘not simply a reflection of an existing reality [but] a 
source and condition of that reality’.155 This reminds us the stories we tell about the past are 
not in the past at all but are told in the present and shape our actions and identities now and 
for the future. As archaeologist Laurent Olivier states, the past ‘does not lie behind us, like 
some older state of things. It lies ahead of us, with us’.156 The past is continually remade and 
repurposed and will always be so, particularly as ‘the capacity to construct a myth of origins 
carries enormous political advantage’.157 The contradictions between myth and history are 
summarised by Raymond Aron: 
 
                                                            
154 Andreas Huyssen, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 16. 
155 Craig M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination, and the Conduct of Battle in the First 
Marine Division, 1941-1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 270, quoted in Theo Farrell, 
‘Figuring Out Fighting Organisations: The New Organisational Analysis in Strategic Studies’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 19, no. 1 (1996): 130.  
156 Olivier, Dark Abyss, 9. 
157 Walker, ‘History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations’, Millennium: Journal of 
International Relations 18, no. 2 (1989): 170 
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Mythologies consist of the substitution of a single factor for the plurality of causes, of 
lending unconditional value to a desired objective, and of a failure to realize the 
distance between the dreams of men and the destiny of societies.158 
 
There are dangers in this mode of thinking, aside from the obvious implications of identity 
politics for the communal evils stemming from the creation and maintenance of artificial 
divisions and discrimination. The use of analogies and metaphors to construct myth and 
identity plays a particularly important role in ‘structuring political reality for manipulative 
purposes’.159 The contemporary study of metaphor is greatly influenced by the idea that 
metaphors influence what we say and the cognitive frameworks that allow us to speak and act; 
they are, in a real sense, ‘metaphors we live by’.160 It is no surprise that analogies and 
metaphors can be important factors in fomenting ‘groupthink’ and closing off other avenues of 
intellectual enquiry.161 As Murray Edelman notes, this can result in the ‘dulling’ rather than 
‘awakening’ of our critical capacities, which impacts negatively on our collective ability to 
enact appropriate and progressive policy and legislation.162  
 
The forms of analogical reasoning we choose come with ‘practical implications about contents, 
causes, expectations, norms, and strategic choices’.163 In information technologies and 
security, Martin Libicki warns that to ‘use metaphor in place of analysis verges on intellectual 
abuse’ and counsels strongly that situations be avoided in which analysts and policymakers are 
                                                            
158 Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (London: Derek Verschoyle, 1954), 97-98. 
159 Glenn D Hook, ‘The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergy as Political Metaphor’, Journal of 
Peace Research 21, no. 3 (1984): 259. 
160 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
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‘apt to make their metaphors do their thinking for them’.164 This suggests that over-reliance on 
the explanatory potential of some of the historical analogies discussed above may constrain 
our capacities to think about future cyber security scenarios productively as much as they 
enhance them.165 Historical analogies will not a priori foreclose on particular exploratory 
avenues of policy or strategy, nor necessarily affect the outcomes of political decision-making 
but, as other studies show, analogies can help political decision-makers both to understand 
contemporary situations and to justify their political agendas.166  
 
The uses to which cyber security actors put the past demonstrate both these characteristics 
but it is far too early to tell how longer-term decision-making might be impacted by these 
selective uses of historical analogies. What is clear is that cyber security, whilst always 
imagining and, sometimes, desiring a catastrophic future, is seemingly always forced back to 
history in an attempt to understand the future, most often by situating itself within grand 
narratives of national security threat and response. Not least this is because of cyber security’s 
expression of a contemporary tendency for mediated discourses to ‘plunder the past for signs 
of stability, as though to mitigate the inherent instability of an obsession with the here-and-
now with an intelligible there-and-then’.167 In this light, the historical past will continue to be 
remade in the image of cyber security’s present and future. 
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6 INHABITING THE FUTURE 
 
The only certain thing about the future is that it will  
surprise even those who have seen furthest into it.1 
 
6.1 Introduction: Anticipation and Preparation  
 
As if to illustrate further how a national icon can be repurposed by contemporary security 
logics, in July 2002 the US Naval War College hosted ‘Digital Pearl Harbor’, a three-day war 
game, the objective of which was ‘to develop a scenario for a coordinated, cross-industry, 
cyber terrorism event involving mock attacks by computer security experts against critical 
infrastructure systems in a simulation of state-sponsored cyber warfare attacks’.2 The exercise 
concluded that a large-scale event analogous to its historical namesake was unlikely to occur in 
the future, although the possibility of major disruptions could not be ruled out. It found that ‘a 
group of hackers couldn’t single-handedly bring down the United States’ national data 
infrastructure, but a terrorist team would be able to do significant localized damage to US 
systems’.3 In particular, it determined that the most vulnerable systems were the Internet and 
parts of the digital infrastructure of US financial systems.4 ‘Digital Pearl Harbor’ illustrates one 
of the key aims of this form of activity: to identify defensive weaknesses in ‘friendly’ systems 
and the probable effects of their deliberate targeting by adversaries. Exercises and simulations 
of this type are a key area of cyber security practice and intend both to anticipate the 
character of future events and to prepare and train participants for what may be expected of 
them should such events occur.  
 
                                                            
1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (London: Abacus, 1994/1987), 340. 
2 Clay Wilson, Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2005), 9. Note, already in 2001, the conflation of 
‘cyber terrorism’ and ‘cyber war(fare). 
3 Margaret Kane, ‘US Vulnerable to Data Sneak Attack’, CNet News, 13 August 2002. 
4 Wilson, Computer Attack, 10. 
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A genealogy of these activities would note earlier forms of testing and verification 
implemented as responses to the multi-user systems that evolved after World War II, which 
brought non-specialists into computer environments and with them a host of new security 
problems. In particular, ‘time-sharing’ practices developed in the 1960s and 1970s drove 
awareness of and research into computer security, as these allowed multiple users to access a 
computing resource concurrently, during which time any user’s programs and data were held 
in central memory and hypothetically accessible by any other.5 Due to the possibilities of 
malicious behaviour, systems began to need protection from their users and users from each 
other. Computer scientists and hobbyists alike have always attempted to compromise the 
defences of other people’s systems and networks but by the 1970s ‘penetration testing’ (‘pen-
testing’) was formalised as a method of checking the robustness of one’s own systems, 
especially in the defence sector, where ‘tiger teams’ were routinely deployed as part of 
software and hardware development and testing.6  
 
Unfortunately for systems designers, the tiger teams usually found ways to breach system 
security, even after the patching of vulnerabilities revealed by earlier testing.7 These exercises 
revealed that ad hoc approaches to security would never provide perfect security, leading to 
new forms of security specification and verification that by the early 1980s had crystallised 
into what we would now regard as ‘classical’ models of computer security.8 The efficacy of 
                                                            
5 On the development of time-sharing, see Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 2nd. edn. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003/1998), 154-158. 
6 Donald Mackenzie and Garrel Pottinger, ‘Mathematics, Technology, and Trust: Formal Verification, 
Computer Security, and the US Military’, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 19, no. 3 (1997): 41-
59; Edward Hunt, ‘US Government Penetration Programs and the Implications for Cyberwar’, IEEE 
Annals of the History of Computing 34, no. 3 (2012): 4-21. 
7 Mackenzie and Pottinger, ‘Mathematics’, 46. In 2013, the Pentagon noted these teams still ‘invariably’ 
managed to penetrate Department of Defense systems; Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: 
Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
January 2013), 28. 
8 Foremost amongst which is the Bell-LaPadula security model, which restricted access to data by 
granting users security clearances only to data labelled as accessible to that level of clearance. For a 
personal perspective on its legacy, see David Elliott Bell, ‘Looking Back at the Bell-LaPadula Model’, 




these models was not to last, as multiuser mainframes became networked systems and there 
was ‘no clear unitary route to the solution of network security’.9 
 
Cuts in defence expenditure after the end of the Cold War contributed to this problem of 
computer security without obvious boundaries, as cheaper ‘commercial off-the-shelf’ solutions 
were sought for defence systems, with research and development costs borne by industry 
rather than the taxpayer.10 The requirement that such software operate with many different 
hardware and network configurations effectively made it impossible for any manufacturer to 
keep abreast of new security vulnerabilities except by issuing more and more retrospective 
patches to their products. The unimaginably large number of possible combinations of 
hardware and software mean that, effectively, ‘there is no such thing as a forced entry in 
cyberspace’.11 There will always be a gap into which an attacker can insinuate code or through 
which data, in the jargon, can be ‘exfiltrated’.12 
 
This is the environment in which ‘cyber exercises’ and their ilk operate. No longer designed 
merely to identify points of vulnerability and failure in friendly systems, they exist because of 
an acceptance that vulnerability and failure will always exist and must be dealt with. They 
operate as forms of anticipatory security practices that do not aim principally to prevent a 
cyber attack from happening―although other aspects of cyber security do aspire to that―but 
as a minimum to reduce the impact of such events through present attention to all aspects of 
network operation and management, both social and technical. The intention is not just to 
identify technical problems exposed and caused by the simulated attacks but also to reveal 
flaws in existing organisational protocols, working practices, emergency response frameworks 
                                                            
9 Mackenzie and Pottinger, ‘Mathematics’, 56. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 35. 
12 In military jargon, ‘exfiltration’ is the ‘removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control 
by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means’; Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02, 8 November 2013, as amended through 15 April 2013. In 
information security, the object of ‘friendly’ exfiltration has changed from ‘people that belong to us’ to 
‘data that belong to them’. 
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and other managerial and cultural aspects of institutional life. As one analyst argues, most 
organisations’ knowledge of their own cyber security issues is so limited as to be ‘alarming’.13 
 
Simulations and exercises are considered necessary, above and beyond the requirements of 
organisational audit and training, because, particularly as one moves towards the military end 
of the ‘attack spectrum’, there is a limited set of ‘real world’ case studies from which to draw 
information and lessons, let alone ones particular to the institution in question, be it in the 
private or public sector. In the military case, there has been no conflict between two state 
militaries in which ‘cyber’ operations have played the dominant part and from which we could 
learn how such a conflict evolves and what its effects might be on non-military sectors of 
society. Again, in the military example, planners often need to simulate cyber attacks and 
stress-test defensive cyber security without ‘threatening the integrity of operational 
networks’, although many are undertaken in non-laboratory situations with appropriate 
safeguards.14  
 
Such practices have become increasingly common across multiple sectors, bringing together 
government, private sector and civil society actors in sophisticated exercises intended to 
mitigate future uncertainty. In this respect, cyber security accords with developments 
elsewhere in security governance, as summarised by Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster: 
 
Increasingly, security professionals, high-level officials, civil servants, emergency 
responders as well as ordinary citizens are required by law to take part in exercises and 
simulations or become the eyes and ears of security experts. As such, we suggest, they 
are increasingly regimented within the sensorial regime of future catastrophic events. 
Although this may take place at different sites―from public spaces and artistic 
expressions to preparedness exercises―surprise and novelty require subjects to 
                                                            
13 Kenneth Geers, ‘Live Fire Exercise: Preparing for Cyber War’, Journal of Homeland Security & 
Emergency Management 7, no. 1 (2010), article 74: 1. 
14 Ibid.  
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inhabit the future …. By making the unexpected visible and perceivable, preparedness 
exercises stage an encounter with the future in which subjects are not just spectators 
but active participants.15 
 
This chapter explores the ways in which cyber security futures are ‘inhabited’. Rather than 
peer helplessly at the uncertain future or merely speculate as to its possibilities, people are 
encouraged to ‘inhabit the future’ through tangible and intelligible means that prepare them 
for when the future―often catastrophic―actually arrives. The informing logic of the many 
forms of cyber security practice we may situate in this category of preparedness is a temporal 
one, a distinct temporality of anticipation and longing that we have already encountered in 
previous chapters, particularly in apocalyptic discourses of future cyber (in)security. As 
suggested above, cyber security exercises, in common with similar practices elsewhere, shift 
attention ‘from the pre-evental temporality of prevention and precaution to the time of the 
event’ itself and by engaging in such rehearsals of future attacks ‘bind future decisions to 
decisions in the present’.16 This is the essence of all training, practice and rehearsal in which 
future actions are shaped by preparatory actions undertaken in the present, and in which 
‘memory’ and ‘body memory’ are equally important aspects of ‘remembering’ how to respond 
to particular situations. As Philip Sabin notes in his study of war gaming and military 
simulation, humans are not ‘mere helpless victims of an utterly uncertain world, but are 
capable of shaping their futures to a very considerable extent by taking actions founded on 
past learning and experience’.17 
 
Aradau and van Munster argue that in order to achieve such ends, an aesthetic ‘sensorium of 
anticipation’ is developed with respect to catastrophic security futures.18 Crucially, this is not 
                                                            
15 Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 95, emphasis added. 
16 Ibid., 86. 
17 Philip Sabin, Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation Games (London: Continuum, 2012), 
56. 
18 Aradau and van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe, 85. 
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merely a visual aesthetic but a full-spectrum aesthetic that ‘entails modalities of tactilizing [all] 
the senses in order to render the future palpable and foster subjects who can inhabit the 
future not just through fear and anxiety but also through desire’.19 The authors distinguish 
between catastrophe and crisis, arguing convincingly that in contrast to the responses elicited 
by crises―through which crisis can be controlled and risk managed―catastrophes are 
‘incalculable, uncontrollable and ultimately ungovernable’.20 Whereas crises develop and 
escalate over time, catastrophes simply happen and are unexpected and unpredictable events 
that disrupt ordinary social conduct.21 The anticipatory forms of ‘inhabiting the future’ are 
responses to this uncertainty and the means through which to govern the unpredictability of 
catastrophe. This is an analytically useful distinction but this chapter asserts that the concepts 
of inhabitation and sensory aesthetics are also applicable to the crises potentially encountered 
in cyber security. The instances of cyber security ‘emergency’ for which actors prepare are 
frequently not, despite rhetoric to the contrary, single catastrophic events like the terrorist 
attacks that are the principal objects of the forms of security governance examined by Aradau 
and van Munster. Most future cyber security scenarios consist of a concatenation of small 
events and are often better described as crises rather than catastrophes, even if the emphasis 
is often on the latter.22 
 
This chapter extends Aradau and van Munster’s conceptual framework of ‘inhabiting the 
future’ beyond their study of catastrophe to the field of future cyber security events in 
general. It also develops the concept of inhabitation in a further important direction. ‘To 
inhabit’ a place, figuratively or otherwise, is to be the subject that takes the transitive verb: 
one always dwells or lives in somewhere or something. If I inhabit the future, in some way I act 
                                                            
19 Ibid., 86. 
20 Ibid., 28-29.  
21 Birkland suggests that ‘crises tend to build over time, whereas disasters strike suddenly’; Thomas A. 
Birkland, Lessons of Disaster: Policy Change After Catastrophic Events (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2006), 5. Catastrophes are ‘more profound’ forms of disaster, on account of their scale 
and impact. 
22 ‘The modern crisis is not boxed in by set dates that mark a clear beginning and ending: it is an 
embedded vulnerability that emerges, fades, mutates, and strikes again’; Arjen Boin, ‘Lessons from Crisis 
Research’, International Studies Review 6, no. 1 (2004): 166. 
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as if I am residing in that temporal register, even if my physical person can only exist in the 
present. There is an additional older, if now obsolete, meaning of the transitive verb, ‘to 
inhabit’, which speaks to the more active connotations of ‘to people with’ or ‘to furnish with 
inhabitants’. Inhabiting is not just passive dwelling within a space but the active colonisation of 
the space that enabled the dwelling; it is the ‘becoming’ of the inhabitation that complements 
its ‘being’. This enables us to think more fully about how security processes go about actively 
‘populating’ as well as inhabiting the future and augments Aradau and van Munster’s 
acknowledgement of the capitalist ‘colonisation’ of the future in modernity through credit, 
insurance and risk management.23 By doing so, we might more fully account for the role of the 
corporeal political subject in the anticipatory practices of cyber security. 
 
This chapter develops these themes in three stages. In the first section, cyber security 
exercises and simulations are examined which bear little resemblance to preparedness 
activities in any other field. Conducted through information-technological means away from 
the public view, these abstracted and bloodless simulations of future cyber security events are 
meaningful to participants yet unintelligible to outsiders on account of their primarily virtual, 
hidden and technical nature. An epistemological problem is encountered when attempting to 
communicate the outcomes and findings of these to the general public, who have no way of 
accessing and understanding these phenomena for themselves and must rely on the 
statements of security professionals, journalists and policymakers, an asymmetric relationship 
potentially fraught with distrust. The second section argues that in order to mitigate this 
situation, an increasing number of exercises and simulations are communicated to the public, 
in which attempts are made to ‘materialise the virtual’, such as by demonstrating what 
physical effects cyber attacks have on infrastructure. These make the previously intangible 
tangible and draw the public into cyber security preparedness in ways analogous to older 
public information campaigns that aim to render invisible threats visible. This shift towards the 
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public mediation of cyber security exercises includes the televised Cyber ShockWave exercise 
(2010), which suggested strongly the deliberate construction of an aesthetic sensorium of 
crisis in the public domain, allowing observers to inhabit the unfolding simulated events 
through their own mediated experience. The third section examines how recruitment 
campaigns bring people directly into cyber security preparedness, a situation enabled by a 
perceived lack of skills and personnel in this field of security. There is often a competitive 
element to these recruitment campaigns, in which people enter contests to catch the 
attentions of government and industry. These activities are directed at professionals and 
university students and at children through education and skills training. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of how these various security practices contribute in various ways 
to the inhabitation of the uncertain future. 
 
6.2 Exercise and Simulation  
 
In June 1997, the US government undertook one of the earliest and best-known formal large-
scale cyber security exercises, couched in terms of the then-fashionable ‘information warfare’ 
(IW). ‘Eligible Receiver’ imagined a military crisis on the Korean peninsula requiring the rapid 
deployment of US forces in support of its South Korean ally. Several dozen staff of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) were cast as North Korean hackers and―with no prior intelligence and 
using only code freely available on the Internet―were tasked with disrupting US military 
operations, a situation which would assist in the ‘softening’ of Washington’s stance towards 
Pyongyang. Over a two-week period, the NSA ‘red team’ compromised enough systems that 
official sources professed the outcome ‘frightening’: not only could the ‘North Korean’ red 
team have seriously affected US command-and-control structures in the Pacific theatre but it 
was also in a position to inflict ‘crippling damage’ on urban power grids on the American 
mainland.24  
                                                            




In the absence of unclassified data, it is difficult to confirm the veracity of these claims, and 
they have long been subject to scrutiny and subsequent scepticism.25 More significant than the 
plausibility of the exercise scenario is how Eligible Receiver quickly became the standard by 
which other exercises were judged. Chapter Four noted that Eligible Receiver is often 
interpreted as a ‘sign’ of ‘cyber apocalypse’ and the official conclusion drawn from Eligible 
Receiver―that US military capability and domestic infrastructures were at grave risk from 
adversarial hackers floating ‘effortlessly through global cyberspace’26―has become almost the 
default ‘lesson’ of subsequent US exercises, a lesson apparently corroborated by subsequent 
real cyber attacks. The year after Eligible Receiver, for instance, a series of cyber attacks 
dubbed ‘Solar Sunrise’ was perpetrated against US Department of Defense assets, with Iraq 
initially suspected due to ongoing US military operations there at the time. Two Californian 
high school students and a teenaged Israeli hacker were subsequently identified as the 
intruders but the episode, as a report to Congress concluded, ‘confirmed the findings of 
Eligible Receiver: US information systems are vulnerable’.27 A US government training video 
later circulated on the Internet captured this dynamic: ‘Though no hostile government or 
group was behind these intrusions, [Solar Sunrise] clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of the 
nation’s complex information systems to terrorist assault’.28  
 
George Smith, an outspoken critic of US government IW rhetoric in the late 1990s, described 
what he felt, in the case of Eligible Receiver, was a ‘jump from alarming scenario to done 
deal’.29 Smith held that the continued classification of information pertaining to such exercises 
disbarred external, objective evaluation of the claims made for the vulnerability or otherwise 
                                                            
25 For example, George Smith, ‘An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely’, Issues in Science & Technology 
15, no. 1 (1998): 68-73. 
26 Gertz, ‘Computer Hackers’. 
27 Steven A. Hildreth, Cyberwarfare (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2001), 5. 
28 National Infrastructure Protection Center, National Counterintelligence Center and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Solar Sunrise: Dawn of a New Threat, training video, 1999. 
29 Smith, ‘Electronic Pearl Harbor’. 
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of information infrastructures to attack, subversion and degradation. This is the persistent core 
of cyber security narratives—‘confusion over what is real and what is not’—an epistemological 
problem that can only begin to be resolved by government disclosure, in the absence of which 
the published findings of exercises like Eligible Receiver ‘must be treated with a high degree of 
skepticism’.30 The ‘done deal’ to which Smith referred is the logical conclusion to which the 
public is drawn in the absence of credible, verifiable information: such exercises will expose 
vulnerabilities that can only be addressed by increasing the activities of the national security 
state. It is not that security problems do not exist but that we are in no position as external 
observers to judge for ourselves whether they do or not; nor can we be content with the 
increased public expenditure on cyber security such exercises facilitate. 
 
Writing in 2008, Myriam Dunn Cavelty also noted how Eligible Receiver and other early 
exercises confirmed existing fears about the vulnerability of US information infrastructures to 
attack. Of a US government-sponsored IW exercise conducted by RAND in early 1995, she 
concluded: 
 
the study naturally demonstrated that because the US economy, society, and military 
relied increasingly on a high-performance networked information infrastructure, this 
infrastructure presented a set of attractive strategic targets for opponents possessing 
IW capabilities. The fears everybody had were thus substantiated by this exercise.31 
 
In 2009, John Arquilla asserted that exercises subsequent to Eligible Receiver—Black Ice 
(2000), Blue Cascades (first held, 2002), Silent Horizon (first held, 2005), Cyber Storm (first 
held, 2006)—‘have confirmed beyond doubt that huge vulnerabilities to cyber disruption do 
                                                            
30 Ibid. 
31 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 82. 
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exist’.32 This is not equivalent to arguing that ‘huge’ cyber disruptions will occur but it does 
presume that vulnerabilities can be exploited such that they might. There remains a sense that 
these large-scale exercises merely confirm the already known: that an adversary might exploit 
vulnerabilities, resulting in the serious degradation of a world power’s ability to protect itself 
from cyber attack.  
 
The official public reports of exercises like Cyber Storm―run by the US Department of 
Homeland Security―are, by contrast, often quite circumspect, preferring to concentrate on 
processual and procedural aspects of the institutions and organisational structures under 
stress, rather than on the future probability of the ‘Significant Cyber Incident’ simulated.33 
Nevertheless, the singular and destructive event is still the benchmark against which the 
mettle of these institutions is tested, be they NATO, the European Union, or any one of the 
dozens, if not hundreds, of other commercial, national and multilateral exercises conducted 
annually across the globe.34 Cyber exercises are also conducted in preparation for large-scale, 
‘non-cyber’ events that definitively will happen, such as the Olympic Games and other public 
spectacles.35  
 
Like counterterrorism exercises contingent upon a terrorist ‘event’, what these cyber exercises 
demand from those involved in them is ‘not so much that they are able to imagine plausible 
futures in order to help prevent them from becoming real but rather urges them to inhabit, 
rehearse and exercise the event in order to devise adequate responses should the event ever 
materialize’.36 This requires that there be a ‘world’ for participants to inhabit and cyber 
                                                            
32 John Arquilla, ‘Information Wars’, in Globalization and Security: An Encyclopedia, vol. 1, Social and 
Cultural Aspects, eds. G. Honor Fagan and Ronaldo Munck (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
2009), 212. 
33 Reports on Cyber Storm I (2006), II (2008) and III (2010) are available from http://www.dhs.gov/cyber-
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34 For a survey of 85 cyber exercises (2002-2012), see ENISA, On National and International Cyber 
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35 For a review of IT security for London 2012, see Institute of Engineering and Technology, Delivering 
London 2012: ICT Implementation and Operations (Stevenage: The IET, 2013). 
36 Aradau and van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe, 22. 
208 
 
security has long created its own simulated environments, circumscribed by technology and 
the demands of the exercise. Cyber Storm I (2006) and its subsequent biennial iterations have 
‘provided government, private sector, and international participants with a neutral and 
controlled environment in which to exercise their response procedures to a significant and 
coordinated cyber attack’.37 Baltic Cyber Shield 2010 was conducted entirely ‘within the 
confines of a virtual battlefield’, which could, if necessary, be accessed from anywhere in the 
world.38 London 2012’s technical partner, ATOS, described its approach to simulating future 
cyber attacks: 
 
Security testing on the system will be carried out in a specially isolated version of the 
Olympic network, using an in-house team of pretend hackers. ‘We simulate past 
competitions and we have a shadow team of about 100 people coming and creating 
problems―injecting viruses, disconnecting PC servers …. We are using a simulation 
system so it doesn't really matter if we corrupt the data. We simulate the effect and 
see how people react.’39 
 
These environments are isolated from the wider Internet, in order that malware and other 
forms of code do not escape and create problems elsewhere but they are inherently incapable 
of replicating all the conditions pertaining in a real crisis. They are, by comparison with the 
information infrastructures likely to be affected in a live situation, very localised and often 
represent few of the interdependencies between systems that exist outside the simulation. In 
military exercises, these highly simplified simulations cannot hope to correspond to ‘full-scope’ 
operations that deploy a wide range of political resources and military capabilities in addition 
to computer network operations.40 The responses to this inevitable shortcoming are either to 
run more simulations, or to increase the computing power of the simulation. In the former 
                                                            
37 National Cyber Security Division, Cyber Storm: Exercise Report (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2006), 14. 
38 Geers, ‘Live Fire Exercise’, 6. 
39 BBC News, ‘Cyber-Attack Tests for Olympic Computer Systems’, 10 October 2011. 
40 Geers, ‘Live Fire Exercise’, 4. 
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category, the two large ‘technical rehearsals’ in March and May 2012, ahead of the London 
Olympics, examined ‘the performance of people, process and systems in different situations 
selected from a playbook of over 1000 different technology scenarios built up over previous 
Games’, and organisers also ran repeated simulations for months prior to the Games.41  
 
In the second category, there have been notable attempts to build truly impressive simulation 
environments, such as the US Department of Defense’s National Cyber Range (NCR), 
development of which began in 2008.42 This scale model of the global Internet is a 
‘representative network environment’, used as a test-bed for developing and deploying 
‘revolutionary cyber testing capabilities’, including exercises of a military nature.43 Secretary of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff informed a security conference of the historical 
significance of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) of which the NCR 
would be part:44 
 
This is, I don't want to overdo the analogy, but it would almost be like a Manhattan 
project to defend our cyber networks in the same way that we've undertaken previous 
efforts in the past to deal with emerging threats.45 
 
One defence insider was quoted similarly, claiming of the NCR, ‘Congress has given DARPA a 
direct order; that’s only happened once before―with the Sputnik program in the ’50s’, the 
                                                            
41 Institute of Engineering and Technology, Delivering London 2012: ICT Enabling the Games (Stevenage: 
The IET, 2011), 23. 
42 The UK launched its own cyber range in October 2010; ‘Defence Minister Opens UK Cyber Security 
Test Range’, Gov.uk, 26 October 2010, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-minister-opens-
uk-cyber-security-test-range.  
43 DARPA, ‘National Cyber Range Proposers’ Day Workshop’, Special Notice DARPA-SN08-33, 29 April 
2008. 
44 Details of the Bush, and later Obama, administrations’ CNCI can be found at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-initiative. 
45 Michael Chertoff, ‘Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to the 2008 RSA 
Conference’, San Francisco, CA, 8 April 2008. Since 1996, there have been many calls for a ‘cyber’ 
Manhattan Project and at least one public-private initiative has taken that name. Recently, one 
prominent legal scholar has written: ‘We need a latter-day Manhattan project, not to build a bomb but 
to design the tools and conventions by which to continually defuse one’; Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of 
the Internet―And How To Stop It (London: Penguin, 2008), 173. 
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launch of which led directly to the founding of DARPA’s forerunner in 1958.46 The historical 
import of the NCR is for future minds to discern, particularly as it only went ‘live’ in 2012, 
when the operational responsibility for the $130 million project was transferred from DARPA 
to the testing and evaluation arm of the Department of Defense.47 The DARPA press release 
announcing the handover noted the ‘key benefits’ of the NCR: 
 
the speed with which the range can be re-configured, the diversity of the networks 
that can be emulated, and the flexibility to handle multiple activities simultaneously at 
different classification levels. Given the dynamic nature of real-world cyber threats, 
providing fast-turnaround time for experimentation and analysis is vital.48 
 
The NCR is able not only to simulate the behaviour of complex assemblages of code and 
machines (‘nodes’) but of people (‘users’) too, designated in the original design proposals as 
‘basic human replicants’,49 a term which owes, but does not acknowledge, its debt to the 
science-fiction movie, Blade Runner (dir. Ridley Scott, 1982). The more exuberant online news 
providers seized upon this popular culture intertexuality, the UK’s The Register declaring, 
‘DARPA Wants Matrix-Style Virtual World for Cybergeddon’.50  
 
In contrast to the replicants of Blade Runner―genetically engineered creatures which 
impersonate human form and behaviour and who live amongst them, albeit illegally―and the 
simulated corporeality of the inhabitants of the Matrix, whose physical bodies are held in 
laboratory stasis elsewhere, the NCR replicants are non-sentient, non-corporeal informational 
                                                            
46 Sharon Weinberger, ‘Cyberwarfare: DARPA’s New “Space Race”’, Danger Room, 1 May 2008. Cold War 
and nuclear analogies are common with respect to the NCR: ‘the Cyber Range is to the digital age what 
the Bikini Atoll [was] to the nuclear age’; David E. Sanger, John Markoff and Thom Shanker, ‘US Plans 
Attack and Defense in Web Warfare’, The New York Times, 28 April 2009. 
47 Ultimately, the NCR will be transferred to US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), itself only operational 
since 2010. 
48 DARPA, ‘National Cyber Range Rapidly Emulates Complex Networks’, press release, 13 November 
2012. 
49 DARPA, ‘National Cyber Range’, Broad Agency Announcement DARPA-BAA-08-43, 5 May 2008. 
50 Lewis Page, ‘DARPA Wants Matrix-Style Virtual World for Cybergeddon’, The Register, 7 May 2008. 
The reference is to The Matrix (dirs. Lana Wachowski and Andy Wachowski, 1999). 
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constructs. They have limited agency governed by complex algorithms and no persistent 
existence outside of the software configuration of the moment. Each time the test-bed is 
repurposed for the next simulation, the NCR replicants cease to be―they maintain no identity 
across programs or environments and only exist temporarily to simulate limited aspects of 
human-computer interaction relevant to the task at hand. They differ also from the denizens 
of computer-generated virtual reality (VR) simulations for military training purposes, 
descendants of video game aliens and monsters, whose bodies exist on the virtual battlefield 
solely in order to be killed. In these simulations the environment is merely a ‘kill-box’ where 
body counts matter and ‘kinetic exchanges’ are the ‘order of the day’.51  
 
For the real human participants, these ‘virtual’ environments are still experienced physically. 
James Der Derian’s description of ‘playing’ a version of the ‘first-person shooter’ computer 
game Doom created by the US Marine Corps underscores further that physical affect persists 
even in such environments: 
 
The high quality graphics, sounds of gunfire and heavy breathing, and the sight of 
rounds kicking up in your face, as well as the constant patter of the lieutenant …. gave 
the ‘game’ a pretty high dose of realism, especially if accelerated heartbeat is any 
measure.52 
 
In the case of cyber simulations and exercises such as those at the NCR, we can assume a 
similarly physiological and emotional response to sensory stimuli, even if the nature and 
character of these stimuli are quite different from the more visual and visceral experiences of 
battlefield simulations. In the absence of public information about the conduct of NCR, it is 
unwise to speculate overly about the experience of being involved in such activities but from 
                                                            
51 Christopher Coker, Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and 
Think About War (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 128. 
52 James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, 2nd. 
edn. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 90. Also, Roger Smith, ‘The Long History of Gaming in Military 
Training’, Simulation & Gaming 41, no. 1 (2010): 6-19. 
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other sources we can develop a basic picture of the environment.53 Video footage from NATO’s 
‘Locked Shields’ cyber exercises shows teams of operators sitting at rows of desks, typing code 
and commands into laptops, upon the screens of which are displayed technical information 
decipherable only by the specialist and on which individual nodes and actors are reduced to 
stylised icons. The dynamism of this ever-changing ‘battlefield’ is discernible only through 
scrolling text, blinking colour bars, the pan-continental maps of pulsing network flows on large 
wall-mounted screens, the attentiveness of the circulating team leaders, and through the 
subdued yet occasionally animated body language of subordinates entangled with the 
artefactual trinity of screen, keyboard and mouse.54 This is a sensory assemblage far removed 
from the adrenalinized physicality of the traditional theatre of war but it is still one 
experienced sensorily, physiologically and emotionally by its human participants. 
 
Such conditions will probably be encountered in the majority of cyber exercises, where 
informational rather than physical terrain is the resource over which control must be 
established. Whether military or civilian, or a combination of private and public sectors, the 
environments in which simulations are run are characterised by a distinct lack of the sensory 
stimuli and semiotic markers that ordinarily define the field of conflict. Engagement is 
facilitated by translating bits of codified information back into visual forms intelligible to the 
human senses, enabling coherent and appropriate responses by the participants. Within the 
confines of the exercise room―and from the perspective of the untutored observer―nothing 
much seems to change, even as the balance of defeat and victory shifts from one side to the 
other. In time, one team emerges victorious by achieving a predetermined defensive or 
offensive goal, a victory only sensible to the outsider through the congratulatory intercourse of 
the winning team.  
                                                            
53 Some details are provided in a Lockheed Martin presentation (2012) available at 
http://www.ndia.org/Resources/OnlineProceedings/Documents/21M0/MODSIM/03-Defense-
Pridmore.pdf. 





These abstracted battlespaces represent the informational environments in which future cyber 
conflicts will be played out but they are not the only way in which the future is imagined and 
rehearsed. Due to the epistemological uncertainty which makes ‘lessons learned’ difficult to 
communicate to the public and the inherent difficulties identified in previous chapters with 
‘materialising the virtual’ there are attempts to overcome or at least mitigate these problems 
by resorting to aesthetic modalities of a more established nature than is suggested by the 
deployment of hi-tech apparatus like cyber test-beds and the impenetrability of cyber defence 
exercises. These activities serve to generalise an aesthetic of future cyber disruption―and, 
often, catastrophe―that aims to make the ‘virtual’ material and facilitate the metaphorical 
inhabitation of the future, including by the public. 
 
6.3 The Public Sensorium  
 
In September 2007, a CNN video began circulating on the Internet, purporting to be 
Department of Homeland Security footage of an experiment conducted earlier that year at the 
Department of Energy’s research and development facility, the Idaho National Laboratory. In 
the video, dated 4th March and lasting barely a minute, a close-up shot shows a large section 
of industrial plant juddering and shaking before belching out clouds of white and black vapour; 
a second shot from distance shows what may be the same equipment ejecting similar gaseous 
emissions.55 According to sources, in the experiment—codenamed ‘Aurora’—‘a 21-line 
package of software code sent from 100 miles away caused a $1-million commercial electrical 
generator to generate self-destructive vibrations by rapidly recycling its circuit breakers’.56 The 
experiment was widely considered the first proof that hackers could enter a sophisticated 
                                                            
55 The video is no longer available from CNN but is accessible at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJyWngDco3g, accessed 4 May 2013. 
56 David A. Fulghum, ‘No Fingerprints: Culprits in the Cyberattack on Iran are Still Unknown’, Aviation 
Week & Space Technology 172, no. 36 (4 October 2010): 29.  
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industrial control system and cause a physical device to self-destruct.57 This, suggested experts, 
showed that ‘large electrical systems are vulnerable in ways not previously demonstrated’.58 
From this premise, a narrative of ever-greater threat was developed. Of the experiment, CNN 
reported:  
 
Sources familiar with the experiment said the same attack scenario could be used 
against huge generators that produce the country's electric power. Some experts fear 
bigger, coordinated attacks could cause widespread damage to electric infrastructure 
that could take months to fix.59 
 
For a specific investment―‘about $5 million and between three to five years of preparation’, 
according to one expert―an adversary could mount a plausible ‘strategic attack’ against the 
US which, if successful, could cost the country hundreds of billions of dollars.60 One 
government economist offered this dramatic perspective: ‘It’s equivalent to 40 to 50 large 
hurricanes striking all at once. It's greater economic damage than any modern economy ever 
suffered ... It's greater than the Great Depression. It's greater than the damage we did with 
strategic bombing on Germany in World War II’.61 
 
Although some of the reporting may have been hyperbolic and some of the expert scenarios a 
little fanciful or exaggerated, much of the commentary by public officials was quite 
circumspect, identifying and accepting a vulnerability, giving assurances that it was being 
addressed, and stressing that the destruction imagined by some was possible, if highly unlikely. 
Later still, another simulation at Idaho National Laboratory, this time attended by journalists, 
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showed how a red team could access a chemical plant mock-up and take control of the water-
pumping system.62 ‘If this mock facility were an actual chemical plant, hazardous liquids could 
be spilling’, reported Tom Gjelten of National Public Radio. ‘If it were an electric utility, the 
turbines could be spinning out of control. If it were a refinery, the tanks could be bursting or 
pipelines could be blowing up’.63 In a non-simulated situation, Stuxnet showed how code could 
be introduced into a closed supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, resulting 
in real physical damage to industrial plant, in that case to several hundred nuclear centrifuges. 
As journalists and analysts later found, however, it took substantial investment of time and 
resources to bring about these results.64 
 
If industrial plant might seem quite obscure to the average observer, subsequent simulations 
would attempt to illustrate the effects of cyber attacks on the urban infrastructures with which 
we are more familiar. In November 2012, a press release hit news desks from its source in 
Bethesda, Maryland, heart of the US defense sector: 
 
SANS [Institute] today announced NetWars CyberCity, a small-scale city located close 
by the New Jersey turnpike complete with a bank, hospital, water tower, train system, 
electric power grid, and a coffee shop. NetWars CyberCity was developed to teach 
cyber warriors from the US military how online actions can have kinetic effects. SANS 
has defined various missions within CyberCity to help train cyber warriors to defend 
against online attacks and teach them how to secure a city’s vital physical 
infrastructure65 
 
                                                            
62 Mike M. Ahlers, ‘Inside a Government Computer Attack Exercise’, CNN.com, 17 October 2011, 
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63 Tom Gjelten, ‘Stuxnet Raises “Blowback” Risk in Cyberwar’, NPR.org, 2 November 2011, 
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(New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 188-209. Whether Stuxnet achieved its strategic aims is debatable; 
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65 SANS Institute, ‘SANS Launches NetWars CyberCity to Train Cyber Warriors for Defense’, press 
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At the time, over 18 missions had been devised, lasting from a few hours to a few days.66 The 
online magazine that broke the story described some of these missions: 
 
students must figure out how to simultaneously turn all of the traffic lights in town 
red, to halt the escape of terrorists fleeing the city. In others, they must derail a train 
barreling toward town with radiological weapons, or reprogram a rocket launcher on 
the military base that’s been aimed at the hospital.67 
 
The rationale for creating an urban mock-up was to stress the linkages and interdependencies 
of the ‘cyber’ and the physical. 
 
[It’s] the simplest way to illustrate how dominoes fall in the real world. ‘If you were to 
do the entire thing simulated, it would be less meaningful to most of the [military] 
leadership. They want to see physical things. They want to see the battle space, and 
what’s happening there …. That’s our whole goal here: to show you can cause physical 
damage or change in a city environment entirely using computers’.68 
 
Again, the emphasis is on making the ‘virtual’ threat material and more readily 
comprehensible. In a statement of the banal―yet profound on account of being frequently 
overlooked―‘all of cyberspace comes to ground somewhere’,69 and CyberCity is an example of 
how the sociomateriality of information technology networks and their imbrication with the 
urban fabric can be brought into the realm of aesthetic experience.  
 
                                                            
66 BBC News, ‘US Military Train in Cyber-City to Prepare Hack Defence’, 28 November 2012. 
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69 Seymour E. Goodman, Jessica C. Kirk and Megan H. Kirk, ‘Cyberspace as a Medium for Terrorists’, 
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 74, no. 2 (2007): 196-197. 
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There is a long heritage of bridging the gap between practice and reality through the use and 
construction of simulated battlespaces. One expert alluded to this history, noting that 
CyberCity was equivalent to the ‘deserted villages’ of the British military training range of 
Salisbury Plain; like them, CyberCity would not prevent attacks but would teach soldiers how 
to ‘defend and respond to a situation’.70 From the Wiltshire villages first hollowed out by 
national need during World War II to the post-Iraq US training grounds for ‘military operations 
on urban terrain’ (MOUT), urban conditions have frequently been simulated as part of military 
preparedness exercises.71 What is remarkable about CyberCity is that the entire ‘city’ is not 
physically navigable. At a scale of 1:87, CyberCity is a model city contained within less than fifty 
square feet; no infantry boots can ever set foot on this particular ground and there is no way 
the city can in a literal sense be inhabited, even for a short period of time. However, this would 
be to miss the point of the simulated city, as The Atlantic identified: 
 
This isn't a working model of a town; it's just a model of a town. There's a whiff of 
security theater to all this―theater rendered in adorably modeled miniature. The 
game is, compared to its interactive counterparts, low-budget and low-
tech―comically and terrifyingly so on each count. But that's part of the point. There's 
a psychic effect to the modeling here, a reminder of the kinetic effects of cyberwar …. 
As it is, CyberCity, with its scaled-down and model-focused layout, emphasizes the 
connections between the cloud-connected world and the quotidian; in its way, it 
exposes the many vulnerabilities in the places we take most for granted.72 
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As SANS Institute director Eric Bessel asserted, when ‘you lose control of cyberspace, you lose 
control of the physical world’.73 Through illustrations of this argument, these simulations serve 
to raise awareness and concern, whilst agitating for increased political action and resource 
allocation to various government departments and contractors. We should not be surprised 
that this genre of ‘cyber-physical’ simulation acts in this way but there is a deeper logic at 
work, which aims to restore the ‘real’ to the ‘virtual’. By connecting ‘cyber’ to the visually 
comprehensible world of machines, by representing the results of cyber attacks in the 
language of physical destruction rather than of data ‘breach’ or ‘exfiltration’, these simulations 
serve to meld the abstracted virtuality of ones and zeroes with the tangibility of pistons and 
pumps, bricks and concrete. Rather than rely on spatial or martial analogies to demonstrate 
the real-ness of the threat to critical infrastructures, this form of representation draws 
audiences into a non-metaphorical and physical reality that we already recognise from our 
industrial and urban experience.  
 
In recent years, military exercises have extended controversially into existing urban and peri-
urban areas, combining imagined military scenarios with urban ‘realism’, virtuality with 
physicality. A large-scale exercise on the California littoral in 1999 was described by James Der 
Derian as ‘a strange beast, a chimera of Matrix chips-and-code and Private Ryan blood-and-
guts’.74 Der Derian wrote further that for ‘one week, on spectacular display, the mother matrix 
of war spread her wings, revealing the military-industrial-media-entertainment network in all 
its glory’.75 This ‘MIME-NET’ thesis stresses the convergence of the institutions of 
(post)modernity, together geared towards simulating, justifying and prosecuting a state of 
more-or-less permanent war. We might look even further back for exercises with a distinctly 
public face and mediated aspect that foreshadow the MIME-NET assemblage. Consider 
Operation Cue, a 5 May 1955 civil defense exercise intended to assess how a ‘typical’ US 
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community—‘rendered down to the last detail of consumer desire’—would fare after a 29-
kiloton nuclear blast: 
 
An entire town was built on the test site [in Nevada], consisting of a fire station, a 
school, a radio station, a library, and a dozen homes in the current building styles. 
These buildings were carefully constructed, furnished with the latest consumer 
items—appliances, furniture, televisions, carpets, and linens—and stocked with food 
that had been specially flown in from Chicago and San Francisco. Residences were 
populated with mannequins dressed in brand new clothing and posed with domestic 
theatricality—at the dinner table, cowering in the basement, or watching television.76 
 
The US Federal Civil Defense Administration recorded the event and its preparations and made 
available a public information film in which a female journalist―a possibly fictitious ‘Joan 
Collin’, her name excised from later versions―and male narrator together wove a tale of 
technoscientific complexity and national solidarity.77 The reported damage was predictably 
extensive but as ‘ritual sacrifice, Operation Cue made visible for a US audience the terror of a 
nuclear assault while attempting to demonstrate the possibility of survival’.78  
 
The formal message of Operation Cue was that the postnuclear environment would be 
only as chaotic as citizens allowed, that resources (food, shelter, and medical) would 
still be present, and that society―if not the nation-state—would continue. Nuclear 
war was ultimately presented as a state of mind that could be incorporated into ones 
[sic] normative reality—it was simply a matter of emotional preparation and mental 
discipline.79 
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This emphasis on ‘survivability’ and the continuing productive agency of the citizen was a 
reflection of contemporary US nuclear strategy, which for the next decade or so was 
dominated by a belief in its nuclear superiority and its consequent ability to win a nuclear war. 
By the mid-1960s, this unilateral deterrence strategy would give way to the more even-
tempered but existentially challenging problems of ‘mutual assured destruction’ and bilateral 
deterrence, the refinement of which would form the basis for all subsequent nuclear 
strategy.80 By 1983, when the television movie The Day After (dir. Nicholas Meyer, 1983) was 
viewed by an audience of 100m Americans―roughly the same as watched the Operation Cue 
broadcast―President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative was threatening to destabilise the 
hard-won nuclear standoff, and movies had moved into a significantly more pessimistic 
register that questioned the illusion of survivability.81 In Britain, Threads (dir. Mick Jackson, 
1984) abandoned this pretence entirely, being one of the bleakest portrayals of war and its 
aftermath ever seen on television.82 The great power politics that led to the holocaust of 
Threads are replaced by a ‘politics of vulnerability’ that lay bare, through its own apocalyptic 
revelation, the failure of deterrence and the utter dereliction by the state of its responsibility 
to protect its citizens.83 
 
Studies of the public reception of movies like The Day After are divided as to their emotional 
and political effect but these imagined futures doubtless serve at some minimum level to raise 
awareness of the nuclear issues presented.84 A similar argument might be made of the cyber 
security exercises above, with respect to the increasing level of public mediation. In the case of 
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the Idaho test-bed, for example, only senior officials were invited to a demonstration of cyber-
physical destruction in 2005; in 2007, a test was videotaped and presumed leaked to CNN; by 
2011, journalists were embedded in the simulation environment from the start. In 2010, CNN 
screened possibly the most elaborate attempt yet to enrol the public in a cyber security 
simulation. A two-hour special, ‘We Were Warned: Cyber ShockWave’, hosted by CNN lead 
anchor Wolf Blitzer, broadcast highlights of a simulation developed by the Bipartisan Policy 
Center in Washington, DC, which was played out before a live audience on 16 February 2010.85  
 
The event simulated the effects of malware propagating through the US cellphone network 
and the cascading failures that subsequently spread through the ICT infrastructure. As the 
problems piled up, Internet traffic slowed, financial markets buckled, transport and power 
networks failed, public panic rose and, with the news that the attacks appeared to originate 
from a Russian server, the President did not know whether to adjudge the attacks worthy of a 
strategic, perhaps even military, response. In the absence of definitive information regarding 
the perpetrators, with the problem extending beyond national borders, and with domestic 
pressure increasing, the President charged the assembled mock National Security Council to 
advise on available courses of action. The participants―all of whom were former White House, 
Cabinet, military, intelligence or legal officials―concluded emphatically that the US was 
insufficiently prepared for cyber attacks and that more administrative powers were required to 
control national communications networks in times of emergency.86 These findings echoed the 
‘lessons learned’ of a hundred prior simulations, which is not to dismiss them, but the 
difference on this occasion was the level of public exposure deliberately built into the exercise. 
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Blitzer prefaced the programme with the words, ‘What you are about to see is not real but the 
threat is very real indeed’, and concluded by saying, ‘This fictional scenario we have just seen is 
certainly frightening, but what is even more frightening is the danger of it potentially becoming 
reality’. Making people afraid of the threat, however many layers of simulation can be 
excavated from this exercise, seems to have been an important aim.  
 
Former Clinton press secretary Joe Lockhart, who played a presidential adviser during 
the simulation, said it was immaterial whether the attack was an act of war; it had ‘the 
effect’ of an act of war …. Lockhart said that people would be scared by the simulation 
but that ‘that's a good thing’. Only then, he said, would Congress act.87 
 
John McLaughlin, formerly acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who also took 
part in the exercise, stated openly: ‘People have trouble understanding warnings …. It was only 
after September 11 that people could visualize what was possible. The usefulness of the 
simulation is it will help people visualize [the threat]’.88 The public were assisted in this by the 
production itself, a mainstream approximation of what a ‘hi-tech’ situation room might look 
like, one not too dissimilar from the cyber exercise environments discussed previously, albeit 
with added futuristic graphics, dramatic overlays, non-stop portentous music and the presence 
of a real news anchor-man ‘playing’ himself.  
 
Cyber security simulations have become more public-facing as the perceived need for public 
awareness and political action has increased and are an attempt to communicate risk and 
threat through representations of material damage and destruction more readily accessible to 
the public—and policymakers—than talk of abstracted ‘information security’ might on its own 
achieve. Mediated events like ‘Cyber ShockWave’ show how audiences are enveloped in a 
sensory world created by the confluence of information technology, media, politics and 
                                                            





security. That the real and the irreal, the actual and the virtual, might no longer be separated 
with certainty is illustrated by CNN keeping the word ‘SIMULATION’ permanently on overlay 
throughout the Cyber ShockWave broadcast.89 In the absence of research calibrated to doing 
so, it is difficult to assess the effects of such activities on the public imagination and in political 
terms but such is not the intention of the present claim. Rather, a dynamic has been identified 
in which there are reasons for suspecting that this increased attention to public intelligibility of 
threat is manifest in a growing emphasis on attempts to enrol non-specialists into the 
aesthetic sensorium of cyber security, even if its substantive effects are, admittedly, presently 
unknown. In the next section, we identify a further dynamic in the relations between people 
and the state, one that aims to populate cyber security futures through a variety of 
recruitment and educational tactics that play upon the aesthetics of cyber security. 
 
6.4 Recruitment and Education  
 
The UK Cyber Security Strategy (2011) noted that keeping up with the ‘relentless’ pace of 
technological change ‘will require people who have a deep understanding of cyberspace and 
how it is developing’, a cadre of professionals it observed was ‘a scarce resource across 
Government and in business’.90 A key component of the £650 million National Cyber Security 
Programme announced in the document was to remedy this skills shortfall through a variety of 
government-sponsored programmes, public-private partnerships, and new funding streams for 
academic research into cyber security.91 A year later, speaking at Cyber Security Summit 2012, 
Cabinet Office minister Chloe Smith stated even more clearly why these activities were 
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necessary: ‘[o]ur ability to defend ourselves in cyberspace depends upon a strong skills and 
knowledge base’.92 In the first comprehensive government review of UK cyber security, the 
National Audit Office (NAO) reported in 2013 that the ‘shortage of ICT skills hampers the UK’s 
ability to protect itself in cyberspace’, a situation that might persist for at least two decades.93 
These and many other statements make a direct link between the national security of the UK 
and skills shortages in technical cyber security and allied fields, a situation one government 
cyber security official described as ‘wholly inadequate’.94 
 
In the United States, the dearth of cyber security specialists has become an even more 
prominent political issue. Both the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
have stated publicly that the recruitment situation is deleterious to national security. In 2009, 
DHS announced it would hire 1000 new cyber security personnel, an aspiration subsequently 
revised down to 400 in the absence of suitable candidates.95 One senior DHS official told 
conference delegates in a keynote address in March 2013 that his department simply ‘can’t 
find enough people to hire … we do not have enough people in the pipeline to protect our 
private sector organizations, critical infrastructure, or the nation’.96 The Pentagon’s Cyber 
Command, which became operational in 2010, with responsibility for protecting national and 
Department of Defense networks and for prosecuting offensive ‘cyber’ operations, announced 
in early 2013 that it was seeking a five-fold increase in its cadre of cyber security personnel 
from 900 to 4900, a task it confirmed would be difficult because of the recruitment situation.97 
The Pentagon recognised that defence budget cuts would compound these problems, not only 
                                                            
92 Chloe Smith, speech to Cyber Security Summit, London, 6 November 2012.  
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in making new appointments but also in retaining existing staff, whether soldiers or civilians. In 
the short term, head of Cyber Command General Keith Alexander admitted before Congress, 
he would find it difficult to staff the 40 support and operational ‘cyber’ teams he was 
committed to providing across the US military by autumn 2015.98 Given that 13 of these teams 
were, as Alexander pointed out, ‘offensive’, this was a tacit admission not only that the 
protective functions of national cyber security might be affected by the recruitment situation 
but that the US military’s capacity to conduct warfighting operations in the ‘cyber domain’ 
might also be impacted negatively. 
 
One of the largest global surveys of information security professionals across the public and 
private sectors identified three principal drivers of this apparent deficit in skills and personnel: 
‘business conditions’ demanding greater attention to information security across enterprise 
and the public sector; insufficient executive-level understanding of information security needs; 
and a lack of appropriately skilled and educated information security professionals.99 This last 
factor is a result of a decrease in the volume of computer science graduates and of skills gaps 
in the existing workforce due to the divergence between the rapid evolution of the ‘threat 
landscape’ and the capabilities necessary to counter it. For governments, this situation is 
compounded by the founding of new and expanded public-sector institutions requiring 
substantial volumes of new hires and the persistent inability to retain or recruit staff because 
of a substantial wage disparity with the private sector. This has put government departments 
into competition with the private sector for skilled personnel and also with one another.100 
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These labour market conditions are not especially new, nor are they restricted to cyber 
security. Governments have long recognised that fast-moving scientific and technological fields 
provide great opportunities for employment and economic growth but are hindered by the 
inability to fill these positions.101 In 1968, the UK Committee on Manpower Resources for 
Science and Technology reported to Parliament on the relations between emerging computer 
technologies and the labour market. The Committee noted that although it was not unusual 
for technicians to have problems ‘adjusting to more modern ideas as they grow older’, it was 
new to find that ‘the revolution which computers have forced on us is placing considerable 
intellectual strain on the whole mature generation of managers whose task is to evaluate and 
control, and whose education gave them no hint of what the future held for them’.102 The 
Committee was concerned that the basic intellectual foundations of some fields were not even 
taught when the current cohort of professionals was in education, such was the pace of 
scientific and technological change. Although this has changed since the 1960s, with far more 
people graduating with computer science degrees and professional information security 
qualifications now than would have been imaginable then, recruiting enough skilled people is 
still a challenge. Government-driven initiatives to rectify this situation are key aspects of 
national cyber security policies. Three categories of activity concentrate on particular types of 
person potentially amenable to careers in cyber security: respectively, existing professionals, 
‘hackers’, and the young. 
 
The first category is an attempt to populate the emerging cyber security landscape by 
recruiting mid-career professionals from related fields or by retraining people interested in 
technical careers or any number of support roles in ‘project management, law enforcement, 
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training and development, risk analysis, policy and business’.103 This recruitment drive is 
supported by new certification schemes aimed at providing ‘cyber professionals’ with a clear 
sense of personal progress along their chosen career paths.104 Open competitions such as 
Cyber Security Challenge UK (CSCUK), and the US Cyber Challenge (USCC) initiative after which 
it is modelled, aim to raise awareness of cyber security as a career option, whilst providing 
training, bursaries, work placements and, sometimes, job offers to those who win the various 
classes and categories of competitions held each year.105 These public-private partnerships 
present a strong sense of civic responsibility and engagement. The CSCUK, for example, 
intends to satisfy the national demand for ‘a larger and more dynamic cyber security 
workforce’ underpinning ‘the social, political and financial fabric of modern society’.106 The aim 
of the USCC is ‘to find 10,000 of America’s best and brightest to fill the ranks of cybersecurity 
professionals where their skills can be of the greatest value to the nation’.107 
 
This civic renewal is prominent in the second category of activity, which in its desire to 
‘rehabilitate’ hackers is one of the more unconventional aspects of the search for cyber 
security ‘talent’. In 1999, IBM’s head of corporate security stated that his company would 
never hire hackers, no matter how ‘reformed’ they might be: ‘It would be like hiring a burglar 
to institute [sic] a burglar system on your house. You wouldn’t do it’.108 This reflected a 
common perception of hackers as ‘anti-social, possibly dangerous individuals .… the new 
enemy of the Information Age’.109 Ten years later, UK security minister Lord West articulated a 
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different perspective on hackers and their misdemeanours. ‘If they have been slightly naughty 
boys, very often they enjoy stopping other naughty boys’, West said, hinting that this might be 
sufficient for them to be considered appropriate recruits to the new Cyber Security Operations 
Centre at GCHQ.110 Although West suggested that government would not recruit any ‘ultra, 
ultra criminals’, his comments elicited a predictably negative reaction from the information 
security community, ranging from outright derision to incredulity. One chief executive 
wondered if this were not just ‘some kind of huge joke …. Putting these amateurs, who have 
no formalised knowledge or training, in charge of national security beggars belief’.111 
 
We might perhaps expect such reactions, given the long and ongoing struggle between the 
computer security industry and the ‘computer underground’ of hackers and crackers, and their 
divergent understandings of what constitutes acceptable behaviour in computer networks.112 
Despite their similar skill-sets and fields of knowledge, there is an antagonism between the 
two ‘communities’—as loosely defined—that frequently crystallises around the ‘moral 
certainties’ of ‘us’ and ‘them’, echoing the binary language of computing itself.113 Hackers may 
have ‘potentially useful knowledge’, writes Athina Karatzogianni, ‘but such knowledge often 
does not sit comfortably with the academic and commercial worlds’ preference for ethically 
unproblematic and rigorously researched knowledge’.114 This has not prevented governments 
from attempting to recruit ‘hackers’ and Lord West’s suggestion is consistent with other 
governmental efforts in this regard. 
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Every year since 1993, the DEFCON convention in Las Vegas has been one of the largest 
meetings of hackers in the world and for most of its history has run a ‘Spot the Fed’ 
competition, in which delegates win prizes for alerting conference organisers to the presence 
of persons thought to be federal agents.115 Observers have long suspected that hacker groups 
have been infiltrated by government agents and that hackers themselves have provided 
sensitive and legally actionable information on their colleagues’ activities to law enforcement 
and the FBI, sometimes under duress.116 ‘Spot the Fed’ was in part a reaction to this situation 
and also served to reinforce the boundaries between the ‘black hats’ of the hacker community 
and the ‘white hats’ working for government.  
 
The game is still played but has lost some of its piquancy, particularly since DEFCON 7 in 1999, 
which hosted a ‘Meet the Fed’ panel for the first time.117 This popular event allowed 
government security personnel to address the hacker community directly, informing them of 
their work for government and making open recruitment pitches to the good-natured—if 
boisterous—audience.118 These overt activities intend to turn ‘black’ into ‘white’ in the 
interests of national cyber security, not an unreasonable goal considering their skills and 
knowledge. Although we cannot yet determine the success of this initiative, we might suggest 
it has some efficacy given the willingness of federal employees to attend DEFCON and other 
conferences year after year in this capacity, including, in 2012, the head of the National 
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Security Agency and US Cyber Command, General Keith Alexander.119 The well-publicised 
transformation of, inter alia, Kevin Mitnick from America’s ‘most wanted’ hacker to jailbird to 
security consultant and public speaker also provides role models for those considering a switch 
to ‘legitimate’ careers in government and commercial cyber security.120 
 
The key issue of legitimacy is expressed through the current attention to ‘ethical hacking’, the 
development of which is an aim of the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy.121 It is even possible to 
obtain professional certification as a ‘Certified Ethical Hacker’,122 although one leading 
computer security specialist dismissed this nomenclature as a ‘contradiction in terms’ 
equivalent to ‘ethical rapist’.123 In June 2013, the US held its first National Day of Civic Hacking, 
organised by ‘Code for America’ and supported by a range of public- and private-sector 
organisations.124 This event encouraged people  
 
to collaboratively create, build, and invent new solutions using publicly-released data, 
code and technology to solve challenges relevant to our neighborhoods, our cities, our 
states and our country [and] will provide citizens an opportunity to do what is most 
quintessentially American: roll up our sleeves, get involved and work together to 
improve our society.125 
 
The organisers were keen to distance themselves from the negative connotations of hacking, a 
hacker being instead, ‘someone who uses a minimum of resources and a maximum of 
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brainpower and ingenuity to create, enhance or fix something’.126 This is broadly in agreement 
with long-established self-perceptions of hacking by hackers themselves but what is different 
in these discourses of ‘ethical’ and ‘civic’ hacking is that the parameters and aims of ‘hacking’ 
are decided not by ‘hackers’ but by government and commercial interests which fix and patrol 
its ethical and legal boundaries. This is an appropriation of the term in its technical dimensions 
and a deliberate excision of much of the spirit of hacking as an exercise in personal autonomy 
and political agency.  
 
The third category includes attempts by organisations like CSCUK to engage schoolchildren and 
students through educational initiatives and other means through which cyber security is 
presented to the young as a valuable career path and ‘life skill’. In May 2012, the UK 
government’s special representative to business for cyber security told delegates to an IT 
security conference, ‘[t]here are far too many people over 40 working in this area and not 
nearly enough in their twenties’.127 Echoing the concerns of the Committee on Manpower 
Resources for Science and Technology some 45 years previously, she articulated government 
worries about the prospect of Britain being unable to defend itself in future due to a lack of 
young people channelled into the cyber security employment ‘stream’. ‘If we want to get 
people interested, it needs to start in schools’, she said; people ‘need to know this activity has 
a future and a framework’.128 This emphasis on educating children and young adults in cyber 
security has been a distinct feature of cyber security policy in the UK and provides not only a 
framework and a future for cyber security careers but a framework for the future of cyber 
security itself. 
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Through its ‘University Cipher Challenge’, CSCUK already engages with universities and 
colleges, pitting computer science departments against one another as a way to ‘showcase’ 
their skills and build their reputations.129 Several of its sponsors are well-respected computer 
science departments at major British universities. This complements new government funding 
of doctoral candidates, the naming of eight Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research at British universities, and new training programmes in cyber security at major 
universities.130 In April 2013, CSCUK announced its intention to extend its competition format 
into secondary schools, citing the search for ‘raw talent’ and the need to raise awareness of 
cyber security as a career path, particularly amongst young women. A pilot program starting in 
autumn 2013 would target 2000 secondary schools, before expanding it across England and 
Wales in 2014. ‘There will be regional trials, a bit like football’, said CSCUK’s chief executive, 
‘and then we will have a grand final in February or March next year [2014]. The winners will go 
on a cybercamp’.131 Adult versions of intensive ‘camps’ lasting several days were trialled in the 
UK in 2012 for adult participants and borrow from similar schemes in the United States; on 
both sides of the Atlantic they are also referred to in the militarised language of ‘boot camps’. 
As described by the BBC, the scenarios encountered by these youthful participants would be 
familiar to existing cyber security professionals: 
 
In one scenario, they are told that they face a nuclear threat. They are split into two 
teams and are told to break into the IT systems of each other's nuclear plant. People 
frantically tap at their keyboards trying to stay one step ahead. When a team loses, 
sirens go off and TV footage shows their nuclear plant in flames.132  
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In April 2012, the Minister for Universities and Science noted a ‘decade-long decline’ in IT and 
computer science education in British schools and universities and confirmed that Government 
was committed to making these fields once again the ‘exciting, cutting-edge’ subjects they 
should be.133 In September 2014, the existing national ICT curriculum will be replaced by 
‘Computing’, to allow schools to choose more innovative and creative ways of teaching ICT, an 
announcement stressing economic competitiveness and the need for public-private 
partnerships.134  
 
Moving away from a teaching model centred on office software packages, the reinvigorated 
ICT program emphasises the desirability of online training programmes, a more interactive 
pedagogical environment and the need and opportunities for programming and application 
development.135 It reflects the changing ICT environment outside the classroom and in the 
homes and future workplaces of a new generation of schoolchildren, although it has been 
criticised as too focused on computer science at the expense of more creative computer use 
and general digital literacy.136 This reorientation of ICT teaching is still in its early stages and it 
is presently unclear to what extent cyber security will form part of the emerging curricula, 
although government references to improving ‘cyber security education at all levels’ suggests 
that it may yet become formally integrated into ICT education.137 There are, however, 
indications that cyber security is already being taught, or at least addressed, at both secondary 
and primary levels of education. 
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A report by the Information Assurance Advisory Council in conjunction with the Cabinet Office 
records that police ‘are now in schools talking to year 3 [seven- and eight-year-olds] about 
cyber security’, although no details are provided that corroborate this claim.138 The same 
report suggests that information security should be built into teacher training qualifications, 
informed by the need to ‘spread security metaphors without making people scared’.139 The 
analogy is drawn between cyber security and road safety: ‘Appropriate education at all levels is 
like a kerb drill for cyber security’.140 The government-sponsored body charged with 
developing technology skills for business, e-skills UK, has developed ‘Behind the Screen’, a 
project preliminary to the development of a general secondary certificate in computing.141 
Cyber security is one of the topics directed at 14-16 year olds through free online resources 
developed in conjunction with multiple industry partners: 
 
The ‘Cyber Ninjas’ project allows students to progress through seven challenges 
collecting belts as they go, and foiling the machinations of Nemesis and his Henchman 
as they try to breach the security of Cyber City School. Supported by infographics, 
games, comic books and audio guides, the content covers awareness and planning; 
cyber crime and computer forensics; security practices and principles; safety, privacy 
and ethics and online interaction …. Score too little and you go to the Dark Side!142 
 
There are many other informal, private sector and civil society-led initiatives beginning to 
engage with schoolchildren of all ages, although there is little formal coordination of these 
activities at present. The emphasis on ‘safety’ rather than ‘security’ is an existing facet of ICT 
education and ‘child internet safety’ has been part of the National Curriculum for some 
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time.143 Organisations like the Child Online Exploitation and Protection Centre (CEOP) and the 
UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS), and initiatives like Get Safe Online, already 
provide outreach to schools and communities, maintain online information resources, and run 
helplines for concerned pupils and parents.144 Least these be thought excluded from the 
purview of cyber security, all three are mentioned in the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy as 
models of progressive child online safety and protection and categorised as an aspect of cyber 
security concerned with personal internet safety.145  
 
What we cannot yet tell is how the relations between ‘safety’ and ‘security’ evolve in cyber 
security practices and policies aimed at children. At what point does the emphasis shift from 
children learning how to protect themselves and their friends to them being enlisted in a wider 
project to protect society? Older pupils have demonstrated their willingness to use their skills 
and enthusiasm for the public good and surveys suggest there is no shortage of university 
students wanting to work for intelligence agencies. In 2012, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ all appeared 
in the top ten of employers for whom IT graduates would like to work.146 Through the practices 
outlined in this section, cyber security is presented not only as a potential career but as a social 
need and as the foundation of a secure nation, the responsibility for which is being increasingly 
shifted ‘downwards’, in demographic terms. Although we can read attempts to look ever 
earlier in the education system for cyber security ‘talent’ as part of a renewed privileging of 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects across the educational 
spectrum, the emphasis on security raises worrying questions about who exactly is being asked 
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to be an agent of state and commercial security and what their responsibilities might be.147 
This is a pertinent issue given the potential recruitment of children unable to give their consent 
in other fields of social life and connects to deeper issues about the delegation of security 
responsibilities from state to citizen in related practices like resilience.148 
 
6.5 Inhabiting the Future  
 
This chapter has outlined practices that attempt in various ways to ‘inhabit the future’ as a way 
of preparing for the unpredictable and the unknowable. This emphasis on the human serves to 
reinforce the fundamental insecurity of computer networks. As the global survey quoted 
earlier emphasises, human factors are far more important to information security than 
technical aspects, ‘qualified security staff’ being adjudged almost twice as important as 
‘hardware solutions’.149 This underscores both the sociotechnical nature of IT networks and 
their insecure design: if ‘perfect’ cyber security were possible, or a satisfactorily high level of 
security were attainable, the human factor would probably be diminished as technical security 
increased in efficacy. That governments and businesses actively attempt to populate the cyber 
security assemblage is a function both of the illusion of technical security and of the sociality of 
IT networks. These people are not merely additions to information systems but active 
participants in wider social, economic and political systems that find expression through cyber 
security practices. 
 
This chapter drew attention to high-level simulations and exercises that operate beyond public 
view and which drive and corroborate narratives of cyber insecurity whilst preparing personnel 
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for future eventualities, catastrophic or otherwise. They serve important institutional functions 
in training professionals to respond efficiently and effectively whilst identifying organisational 
and technical issues that can be rectified through further systems development and training. 
These practices allow people and organisations to rehearse future events and bring the future 
into the present as something that can be experienced and inhabited in a metaphorical 
register. This is enabled by the creation of simulated worlds that replicate situations and 
scenarios through a variety of aesthetic modalities involving a wide range of senses. In this 
way, the ‘imagined’ crisis becomes the ‘believable’ crisis, as is the intention of all such training 
environments.  
 
These rarefied and highly technical environments and the lessons drawn from them are often 
difficult to communicate to the non-specialist―including policymakers―and to the public. In 
order to foster greater public and political awareness of cyber security issues it has become 
necessary to find other ways to represent cyber security issues, particularly through translating 
the ‘virtual’ into physical and material terms appealing to the commonplace and to common 
sense. The media have become an integral part of this process, invited to attend 
demonstrations of the physical effects of cyber attacks and acting as the principle conduit 
through which exercises like Cyber ShockWave are communicated widely. Although these 
operations are also simulations, they engage the public through televisual media that 
deliberately blur the boundaries between the real and the imagined, so that they are 
presented not only as ‘believable’ but also even, ‘likely’. Under such conditions, cyber security 
may be more readily identified as the object of politics and public policy. We are all asked to 
inhabit these simulated futures through the mediated present, an enrolment into a complex 
assemblage of media, technology, politics and security. 
 
Both these forms of preparatory practice bring the future into the present. The third form of 
practice discussed in this chapter augments the logic of securing the future with a different 
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temporal dynamic, that of projecting the present into the future. In contrast to the 
metaphorical inhabitation of the future in our lived present, recruitment and education mean 
to populate—in a literal sense—the future with cyber security personnel. By starting people 
onto cyber security career paths ever earlier in the education system, this is a class of practice 
that both prepares for the future and prepares the future itself. The persons enlisted into 
cyber security are those people who will have agency in the future, rather than just experience 
simulations of the future in the present. Although we might make a similar argument of 
existing cyber security personnel in that they too will act in the future, the political emphasis is 
on constructing children and young people not only as future agents of state and commercial 
cyber security but as the future itself. As the cliché goes, children are the future, a future that 
we can only partly share and shape, a generational issue that finds expression in cyber security 
as much as it does in almost every other field of social action. 
 
However, this is a political operation in another important sense. We are not attempting so 
much to control the future of children as to cast them in our own image, or at least to project 
our politics of the present into the future. As Walter Benjamin observes of education: 
 
who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed the mastery of children by adults to 
be the sense of education? Is not education, above all, the indispensable ordering of 
the relationship between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use this 
term, of that relationship and not of children?150 
 
We cannot predict or control what the young will do in the future but we can try to shape the 
conditions in which they will live, based upon our own suppositions and preoccupations. Cyber 
security presumes a rather dark future unless we channel our children into cyber security now. 
In this sense, we attempt to ‘master’ our relations with children, rather than the children 
                                                            
150 Walter Benjamin, ‘One-Way Street’, One-Way Street and Other Writings (London: NLB, 1979), 104. 
The term ‘generation’ is also problematic politically; see, Jonathan White, ‘Thinking Generations’, British 
Journal of Sociology 64, no. 2 (2013): 216-247. 
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themselves. The Guardian traced the line from the present to the future in reporting on James 
Millican, a first-year university student crowned the UK’s ‘Cyber Security Champion’ after 
winning the Cyber Security Challenge in 2012: 
 
And though he may not recognise it yet, Millican has become a small player in a global 
game. There is a dotted line that links him to an ideological battle over the future of 
the internet, and the ways states will use it to prosecute conflicts in the 21st 
century.151 
 
The implication is that although Millican might be unaware of the future trajectory of cyber 
security or of the historical dynamics of inter-state warfare, we are more worldly and have 
chosen to place him in a position to do in the future what we cannot in the present. We cannot 
control him in the future but we are creating the conditions through which he may act in our 
image and in our name. Yet we are impatient with youth, the Office of Cyber Security and 
Information Assurance stating: ‘We cannot afford to wait until further generations of 
graduates are trained and ready to take up employment’.152 For this reason, we seek to recruit 
from our own generations but only as a stopgap while the young are trained and developed.  
 
In conclusion, in common with all fields of security, cyber security enacts various forms of 
preparedness, anticipatory forms of security governance that seek to envelop participants in 
an aesthetic sensorium that allows them to inhabit believable simulations of imagined futures. 
This chapter has described some of these practices, their aesthetic characteristics and 
organisational logics, and has suggested some possible future developments. Importantly, it 
has extended our understanding of what inhabitation might mean in non-metaphorical terms, 
through the active population of the future through recruitment and education. Although we 
cannot tell what events and insecurities will emerge, these modes of inhabiting and populating 
                                                            
151 Nick Hopkins, ‘Militarisation of Cyberspace: Why the West Fears the Threat from China’s “Cyber 
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the future serve to construct the future not only as something which will happen and for which 
we must be prepared but as something over which we can exert some limited agency, if only 
through devolving responsibility to a future generation we cannot control but whose 
potentialities we can attempt to constrain through practices that accord with our own 





7 CYBER SECURITY AND THE POLITICS OF TIME 
 
It had never had a past, nor could it ever have a future.  
But it was full of happenings.1 
 
7.1 Introduction: Logics and Chronopolitics 
 
Chapter Two introduced the concept of chronotype as a way of approaching the social 
epistemology of time. Social epistemology is concerned with the intersubjective construction 
of knowledge, as encountered in the posited community of cyber security practice. 
Chronotypes are the ‘models or patterns’ expressed by such communities ‘through which time 
assumes practical or conceptual significance’.2 Previous chapters have dealt with the diverse 
chronotypes of cyber security, the ways in which past, present, future and other aspects of 
temporality such as speed, acceleration and history are imagined by members of cyber security 
communities. These chronotypes, further understood as narratives expressing how given 
communities imagine time and temporality, are not mutually exclusive and together comprise 
the complex heterogeneity of the sociotemporality of cyber security, a sociotemporality that, 
as our framework of emergent temporality suggests, emerges in human cognition and includes 
the temporalities of nonhumans, of matter, energy and information. As narrative strands, 
however, these are principally stories that cyber security communities tell about themselves 
and their worlds. Although the discussion of each has explored the political implications of 
each chronotypical imagining, one more analytical step is necessary to look in greater detail at 
the chronopolitical logics of cyber security. 
 
                                                            
1 Mervyn Peake, Titus Alone (London: Vintage Books, 2011/1959), LXVI. 
2 John Bender and David E. Wellbery, ‘Introduction’, in Chronotypes: The Construction of Time, eds. John 
Bender and David E. Wellbery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 4 
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For Richard Grusin, the concept of ‘logics’ does not imply ‘universal or a priori principles that 
govern practice’, or which are ‘unchallengeable and unchangeable’.3 Logics refer instead to 
‘tendencies that emerge from and within particular historical practices and assemblages’, and 
from which ‘competing or contradictory logics or illogics’ can also be recovered.4 Ben 
Anderson is more explicit still about the temporality of logics, each of which is ‘a programmatic 
way of formalizing, justifying and deploying action in the here and now’ and which ‘involve 
action that aims to prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or pre-empt specific futures’.5 
These sets of (il)logics are organising principles through which cyber security assemblages 
coalesce and persist and that together shape the chronopolitics of cyber security. That is, they 
are proposed and presented as the principal modes in which time and temporality are 
expressed in and through cyber security, through which the politics of cyber security are 
informed and influenced and the practices of cyber security enabled. These logics enable the 
political pursuit of cyber security as a condition and a process, as a state of order and the 
techniques through which to achieve it, and reveal the fissures and inconsistencies in cyber 
security in which further political energies arise. It is the task of this chapter to identify, discuss 
and critique these logics with respect to the larger cyber security assemblage and within the 
broader contexts of politics and security. The four logics—assemblage, real time, event, 
eschaton—complement and contest one another in various ways but together comprise the 
chronopolitical manifold or assemblage of cyber security. The chapter concludes with a 




                                                            
3 Richard Grusin, Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), 5. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ben Anderson, ‘Preemption, Precaution, Preparedness: Anticipatory Action and Future Geographies’, 
Progress in Human Geography 34, no. 6 (2010): 779. 
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7.2 The Logic of Assemblage 
 
Cyber security is an ‘assemblage’, a dynamic web of human and nonhuman entities, in which 
‘the elements put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but 
are constructed in part as they are entangled together’.6 Temporal tendencies emerge from 
the logic of assemblage itself, which displays distinct temporal characteristics of relevance to 
the chronopolitics of cyber security. The first temporal aspect of assemblage is closely bound 
with its etymological origins. An assemblage is not a mere ‘thing’ that just is but an assemblage 
of things, both human and nonhuman, that becomes. The dynamism of this concept is not 
wholly captured in the modern English noun, ‘assemblage’, a sense that passed from English 
with the early modern obsolescence of ‘assemblance’—or, in Spenser, ‘assemblaunce’—whose 
active inflections better represent the nature of the object it described. ‘Assemblage’ was 
reintroduced into English from French social theory in the late 20th century, as a ready 
translation of agencement but, again, many of the active connotations of the root verb, 
agencer, ‘to arrange, to fit up, to combine, to order’, were not carried across.7  
 
In Deleuze and Guattari, we read of the condition of agencement as a ‘state of intermingling of 
bodies in a society, including all the attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipathies, 
alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expansions that affect bodies of all kinds in their 
relations to one another’.8 ‘Assemblage’ is more than its standard usage in English implies and 
its recent theoretical resurgence reconnects with its linguistic heritage to describe an 
aggregate entity in a state of permanent change, a distinctly Heraclitean temporality of 
perpetual Becoming. Change is a condition of the existence of an assemblage, whose identity is 
necessarily historically contingent and under constant renewal. The cyber security assemblage 
                                                            
6 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (London: Routledge, 2004), 42.  
7 Ibid., 41. Also, John Phillips, ‘Agencement/Assemblage’, Theory, Culture & Society 23, nos. 2-3 (2006): 
108-109.  
8 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, vol. 2, A Thousand Plateaus (London: 
Continuum, 2004/1980), 99. 
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with which we are concerned exists in a temporality of continual change but it is insufficient to 
assert this without enquiring further as to the nature and character of this temporality.  
 
To invoke Heraclitus, for example, is to reflect upon the caricatures of his original—admittedly 
often gnomic—philosophy of flux. As Plato reported Heraclitus, ‘you cannot step into the same 
river twice’.9 Not only is the river different when you revisit it―the waters you previously 
touched have long passed―but so are you: you are altered and changed since the last time 
you stood upon the riverbank. This has been taken erroneously to mean that there is no 
correspondence between the ‘two rivers’ and the ‘two yous’, and is therefore logically absurd 
and an affront to common sense. Against these criticisms, Heraclitus proposed a deeper truth: 
that change and permanence co-exist—you and the river are both different and the same at 
each temporal remove.10 No object retains all its characteristics and properties from one 
moment to the next but many of its aspects persist across time, including—as vexed the 
ancient philosophers greatly—human identity.  
 
We should read Heraclitus not as an assertion of the opposition of constancy and change but 
as a paradoxical unity of the two: change as the condition of constancy. The human 
body―from Aristotle to Deleuze and beyond―only exists by dint of its continuous 
metabolism, just as stars only remain stars through the continued violence of thermonuclear 
fusion.11 For Heraclitus, writes Nicholas Rescher, ‘reality is at bottom not a constellation of 
                                                            
9 Francesco Ademollo, The Cratylus of Plato: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 203. 
10 Hegel, with whom this dialectic approach is closely identified in modern thought, praised this unity of 
apparent contradiction: ‘With Heraclitus, we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have 
not adopted in my Logic’; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 1 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1892), 279, originally quoted in Justus Hartnack, An 
Introduction to Hegel’s Logic (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), 17. 
11 This perspective informs the ‘Red Queen’ hypothesis of evolutionary biology, which stresses constant 
adaptation as a means of species survival. Its name derives from the Red Queen’s comment to Alice: 
‘Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place’; Lewis Carroll, 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There (London: Bloomsbury, 2001/1871), 42-43. 
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things at all but one of processes’.12 Rather than subscribing to a post-Platonic perversion of 
perpetual flux, in which processes portend Heraclitean change and transformation as agents 
only of disintegration and instability, we should understand change as a process also of 
formation and stabilisation. Manuel DeLanda, a prominent interpreter of Deleuzean ontology, 
describes how an assemblage ‘can have components working to stabilize its identity as well as 
components forcing it to change or even transforming it into a different assemblage’.13 Jane 
Bennett, too, speaks of assemblages as ‘living, throbbing confederations’ of humans and 
nonhumans that are ‘able to function despite the persistent presence of energies that 
confound them from within’.14 An assemblage exists in a temporality expectant of change and 
contingent upon change, which serves to maintain and to modify its character. 
 
In thinking about cyber security, we need to consider how the cyber security assemblage 
changes and, most importantly, how it maintains its identity and extends itself beyond its 
present configuration. Calls for ‘more’ and ‘better’ cyber security imply both an extension of its 
components and ameliorative changes in its values. Both can be explored through the ways in 
which assemblages (re)produce themselves in space and time, as they must in order to fulfil 
their ontological obligation of continuity through change. As Latour points out, it is insufficient 
to explain the workings of political phenomena like cyber security by simplistic recourse to 
‘power’ as a unitary social force that somehow explains these phenomena, an ‘endless and 
mystical task’ that obscures as much as it reveals.15 ‘Power’ is only effective anyway through 
endless ‘complicities, connivances, compromises and mixtures’, none of which is explained by 
power itself.16 For Latour, the logic of assemblage—or, in his formulation, the ‘actor-
network’—is how it extends its scale through the addition of more actors—human and 
                                                            
12 Nicholas Rescher, Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), 10, original emphasis. 
13 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (London: 
Continuum, 2006), 12.  
14 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 
23-24. 
15 Bruno Latour, ‘Drawing Things Together’, in Representation in Scientific Practice, eds. Michael Lynch 
and Steve Woolgar (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 56. 
16 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 175. 
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nonhuman—and maintains its continuity of identity through the repeated ‘performance’ of 
the links between these agentic nodes in his networks. 
 
The cyber security assemblage extends itself continually, not least because of changes in the 
information-technological networks that comprise one of its principal referent objects. As 
more information infrastructure is created, as increasing numbers of consumers, businesses 
and institutions are connected by it, as more services are provided across it, and as 
unimaginable volumes of information are created and transmitted through these interactions, 
the global ‘landscape’ that influential actors wish to regulate through cyber security practices 
grows larger and more complex. Although cyber security may lay claim to this global 
environment of ‘cyberspace’ as its field of responsibility, it is clear that when ‘the spatial 
domain is conceived as being global in reach, this suggests indeterminate spaces somehow 
defiant of order and control, transcendent of space and time [and] a source of risk and 
danger’.17 Cyber security actors cannot rest whilst these ‘indeterminate spaces’ exist, 
particularly as the emergence of the ‘global’ means ‘that which constitutes the internal is now 
rendered in terms of humanity at large’.18 The ‘ubiquitous’ cyber threat so often referred to is 
ubiquitous in the sense that information technologies, even if they do not make the 
internal/external dichotomy quite as irrelevant as sometimes supposed, at least render threats 
emanating from anywhere in the world as national security issues due to their possible effects 
on domestic assets or populations. Governments are required to respond and extend the 
cyber security assemblage in the hope of regulating both the ‘indeterminate spaces’ from 
which these risks emerge and the global flows of information that mediate these dangers. 
 
Characterising ‘cyberspace’ as a global ‘domain’ establishes the legitimacy of the state to 
extend control over this environment but there are multiple methods through which this is 
                                                            
17 Vivienne Jabri, ‘War, Security and the Liberal State’, Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006): 57.  
18 Ibid., 59. 
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attempted.19 New software is created to effect change in information systems, either through 
protecting one’s own or by creating insecurity in others’. New modes and doctrines of warfare 
are explored, tested and refined. New laws, treaties, memoranda of understanding, policies 
and regulatory instruments are drafted, discussed and implemented. New institutions arise 
and gather to themselves material and immaterial resources for the prosecution of civil, 
industrial, intelligence and military activities. New buildings are erected to house them. 
Through these actions, new links are created and through their repeated performance the 
boundaries of the cyber security assemblage are extended and stabilised, however 
temporarily. Through these processes, too, the identity of cyber security is reaffirmed and 
reinscribed in political discourses of security. Crucially, humans are enfolded into the cyber 
security assemblage through their existing professions, positions and responsibilities and 
through the forms of recruitment narrated in Chapter Six, which are responses to the 
problems of increasing cyber insecurity caused both by the changing information-technological 
landscape and the activities facilitated by it—war, crime, terrorism, espionage. In sociological 
terms, people are ‘recruited’, ‘mobilized’ and ‘enrolled’ into the cyber security assemblage.20  
 
In the recruitment of humans to causes like cyber security, language is an important catalyst, 
either through the articulation of reasons, ‘exemplified by traditional values or personal 
emotions’, or motives, ‘a special kind of reason involving explicit choices and goals’.21 These 
act as cognitive triggers to the behaviour of others, in which they decide to adopt a particular 
course of action aligned with those reasons or motives or not. In cyber security, the reasons 
are straightforward and expressed in terms of national security: the information systems on 
which our societies depend are under threat and we need your help to maintain our way of 
                                                            
19 For a critique of ‘cyber’ as ‘domain’, see Tim Stevens, ‘Information Warfare: A Response to Taddeo’, 
Philosophy & Technology 26, no. 2 (2013): 223. 
20 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 218; Michel Callon, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication 
of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay’, in Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of 
Knowledge?, ed. John Law (London: Routledge, 1986), 196-233. 
21 DeLanda, New Philosophy, 22. 
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life. Appeals to history and national memory are deployed to spark social conscience and 
citizens are presented with a choice: whether to exercise their civic duty or not. To use one’s 
abilities in the national interest is to be ‘ethical’; to elect not to do so is to allow one’s motives 
to be called into question. Many people answer these calls, as shown by their willingness to 
compete for selection by industry and governments—both in situations framed as ‘contests’ 
and ‘competitions’ and through the systemically competitive job market. The inability to 
convince or coerce people into the cyber security assemblage is a serious issue for cyber 
security actors, states especially, who are increasingly disposed to seeing themselves as being 
unable ‘to go it alone’.22 The cyber security assemblage and its effectiveness in achieving the 
ends for which it exists can only be maintained by continuing to ‘enrol’ actors into its networks 
and the unproductiveness of discursive catalysis helps to explain why securitisation moves 
often fail. 
 
However, actors do more than situate themselves in the spatial topologies of the cyber 
security assemblage. Everyone enrolled in cyber security gives their skills, experience and 
labour but also their time. Whilst this is frequently consensual, or at least contractual, this 
relationship is one in which an assemblage attempts to extend itself through the 
‘appropriation of the time of others’, a key facet of chronopolitics.23 The standardization and 
increased commodification of time as a necessary condition of global capitalism are matters of 
substantial intellectual attention and although the precise dynamics are disputed there is 
general consensus, as Anthony Giddens suggests, that the discipline of human affairs ‘can 
proceed only via the manipulation of time and of space’.24 The logic of the assemblage and the 
logic of capital coincide in their reproductive aspects, especially as cyber security is promoted 
                                                            
22 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics: US Efforts to Secure the Information Age 
(London: Routledge, 2008), 137.  
23 Henry J. Rutz, ‘Introduction: The Idea of a Politics of Time’, in The Politics of Time, ed. Henry J. Rutz 
(Arlington, VA: American Anthropological Association, 1992), 7. 
24 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of a Theory of Structuration (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1984), 145. 
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by governments and businesses as a driver of economic growth. In this respect, the time of 
labour is inevitably appropriated by cyber security interests.  
 
Cyber security actors also attempt to appropriate the time of those who cannot yet offer their 
labour in exchange for economic compensation. Claims are made on the time of young people 
in secondary education, for example, who will be ‘identified, inspired and enabled [in order] to 
establish a pipeline of talented people to help Britain succeed in the global race’.25 The 
language of ‘digital natives’ and ‘digital immigrants’ frequently serves as a crude proxy for 
differentiating between, respectively, younger and older generations’ abilities to live with and 
understand contemporary and emerging information technologies.26 Younger ‘digital natives’ 
are perceived as better placed to instinctively engage with ‘cyber’ issues, a characteristic 
desirable to government and industry. The younger generation becomes ‘the next generation 
of cyber professionals’, through which the future will be shaped.27 In order to shape the future, 
the time of young people must be appropriated now, through the various constraints and 
opportunities created on their behalf.28 As concerns grow about future cyber insecurity, the 
cyber security assemblage reaches further into the education system, from tertiary to 
secondary to primary, finding new modalities through which to extend itself, temporally and 
spatially.  
 
7.3 The Logic of Real Time 
 
Cyber security actors make several claims about the temporality of the contemporary world. 
They stress the uniqueness of the present time in world-historical terms: it marks the early 
                                                            
25 Cabinet Minister Chloe Smith, video, https://cybersecuritychallenge.org.uk/education.php, accessed 7 
June 2013. 
26 Marc Prensky, ‘Digital Natives, Digital Immigrants Part 1’, On the Horizon 9. no. 5 (2001): 1, 3-6. This 
highly-influential caricature is robustly challenged on empirical grounds by Sue Bennett, Karl Maton and 
Lisa Kervin, ‘The “Digital Natives” Debate: A Critical Review of the Evidence’, British Journal of 
Educational Technology 39, no. 5 (2008): 775-786. 
27 Michael Chertoff, ‘The Cybersecurity Challenge’, Regulation & Governance 2, no. 4 (2008): 482. 
28 Vera King, ‘The Generational Rivalry for Time’, Time & Society 19, no. 1 (2010): 54-71. 
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stages of a radical transformation in the structures of global life and as a species we are 
experiencing the natal spasms of a new ‘Information Age’, a revolution on a par with the 
prehistoric agrarian revolution and the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Cyber security identifies speed as the ontology of revolutionary postmodernity, a source of 
socioeconomic opportunity and political advantage—and hence the object of desire—and as a 
globalised vector of risk and threat, to be feared and countered. These opportunities and 
problems are intensified further by the acceleration of the rate of technological change, which 
causes a relative deceleration in decision-making capabilities, making timely political effort all 
the more necessary and also potentially ineffectual or unachievable. Caught in a schizophrenic 
temporality of acceleration and deceleration, cyber security actors are permanently anxious in 
the knowledge that politics and practice cannot match the pace of sociotechnical change. As 
the near-future comes to dictate all political actions, cyber security becomes obsessed with the 
present, cutting itself off from the past and the longer-term future in its increasingly desperate 
attempts to regulate the unregulable, an ‘extended present’ in which the future beyond the 
now is increasingly unimaginable and unrealisable.29 Its temporal horizons become 
foreshortened and the politics of cyber security threaten to dissolve in a temporality of pure 
and inertial ‘nowness’, in which humans are no longer able to exercise political agency in a 
world of unimaginably fast technological decision-making and action. 
 
This deep concern with speed and acceleration closely resembles the ‘real time’ of Paul Virilio. 
Virilio posits the existence of a tyrannical regime of technological temporality in which 
democratic politics is replaced by ‘dromopolitics’, the automated exercise of the political 
resource of speed, in which place, identity and ethics erode through the paralysis caused by 
‘the real-time conductivity of images and information’.30 Neither the technical practices of 
cyber security nor the politics that govern it are yet so in thrall to speed and acceleration that 
there remains no space for the exercise of ethical judgement and democratic politics, 
                                                            
29 Helga Nowotny, Time: The Modern and Postmodern Experience (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994). 
30 Paul Virilio, Polar Inertia (London: Sage, 2000/1990), 76. 
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understood not necessarily as Western liberal democracy but as a political system in which 
government is at the very least non-violently responsive to public needs and desires. However, 
the increased automation of technical defence and offence, the possible shift of cyber security 
political decision-making from legislature to executive, and a general sense that existing 
political structures and institutions are inadequate in the face of sociotechnical acceleration, 
suggest that the logic of real time can be detected in the ongoing political development of 
cyber security. 
 
The logic of real time is not something that necessarily reflects empirical reality but is a 
tendency that emerges from the cyber security assemblage and acts as one organising 
principle in the politics of cyber security. It is as much socially constructed as any aspect of 
chronopolitics, albeit one that plays close attention to the temporalities of nonhumans. The 
perspective of real time cleaves to a narrative that prioritises the temporalities of information 
technologies, principally registered through the high speeds of information transmission in 
computer networks. The time of human actors, therefore, is not the only temporality 
appropriated by the cyber security assemblage. In contrast to the recruitment and education 
activities discussed above, which are still at an early stage of becoming institutionalised, the 
temporalities of machines are not only appropriated by cyber security but internalised and 
reproduced in distinctly political—and problematic—ways.  
 
At the root of real time is a radical technological determinism in which the emergence of a 
global temporality of speed and acceleration maps directly onto developments in information 
technology. Although there is great variation in the deterministic arguments deployed within 
the broad field of International Relations, they all, as Daniel McCarthy observes, resolve to a 
fundamental argument that posits that ‘technology develops according to a single linear 
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rationale which causes outcomes of social development’.31 The teleological endpoint to which 
information technologies rush is the ultimate erasure of space by time in the global ‘now’ of 
‘real time’, a perspective that exemplifies the common ground of technological deterministic 
accounts in their effective erasure of human agency from history. Reading history in these 
terms confounds attempts to trace causality through humans as well as nonhumans and, 
importantly, the promotion of a worldview that subscribes to this interpretation of history 
forecloses, as already suggested, the possibilities of democratic politics. Although cyber 
security discourses often stress the variety and heterogeneity of ‘cyberspace’ or ‘the Internet’, 
their conceptions of ‘the time of cyberspace’ or ‘the time of the Internet’ take the opposite 
stance, adopting a deterministic ‘real time’ reading of the global information-technological 
environment as the baseline for their views of the world and what needs to be done about it. 
 
We should, in the first instance, recognise the genealogy of real time in the histories of 
Western modernity that stress the standardisation of ‘clock time’ as a precondition for the 
‘time-discipline’ of industrial capitalism and the subsequent triumphal ‘hegemony’ of this 
temporal regime through the processes of colonialism and globalisation.32 The canonical 
example of this genre is often held—by advocates and critics alike—to be historian E.P. 
Thompson’s 1967 article, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, describing the 
replacement in the 18th century of the ‘natural’ rhythms and tempos of life with the 
standardised and mechanised ‘clock time’ of early industrial capitalism, changes which 
permeated and radically altered the structures of modern life.33 In 1884, the International 
Meridian Conference formalised Greenwich as the prime meridian and divided the globe into 
24 time zones, effectively institutionalising the first unified public global time.34 Almost exactly 
                                                            
31 Daniel McCarthy, ‘Technology and “the International” or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
Determinism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41, no. 3 (2013): 470-490. 
32 Andrew R. Hom, ‘Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of Western Standard Time’, Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 1145-1170.  
33 E.P. Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, Past & Present 38 (1967): 56-97. 
34 Allen W. Palmer, ‘Negotiation and Resistance in Global Networks: The 1884 International Meridian 
Conference’, Mass Communication & Society 5, no. 1 (2002): 7-24. 
253 
 
a century later, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) became the standard global protocol for 
aligning the system clocks in all computing devices to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).35 In 
these developments, we may see the emergence of technological time as the global chronos, 
the always-synchronised time of life and societies and of world history.  
 
Real time is the apotheosis of this historical process, in which instantaneity replaces duration 
and spatial distances collapse almost to irrelevance. For Virilio, the condition of postmodernity 
is a temporal one, in which ‘the “world space” of geopolitics is gradually yielding its strategic 
primacy to the “world time” of a chronostrategic proximity without any delay and without any 
antipodes’.36 In lock-step with the imperatives of war and capital, postmodern humanity 
cannot escape the eternal now, a pessimism that stalks the cyber security imaginary too, in its 
adherence to speed and acceleration as the defining characteristics of contemporary 
temporality. There are premonitions of cyber security in the characterisation of real time as ‘a 
temporality so focused on the intensity or presence of the instant that it elides the richness of 
lived temporality, with its retentions of past sensations and its purposeful yet uncertain 
anticipations of future possibility’.37  
 
These narratives see clock time—technological chronos—as ‘an intruder whose adaptations 
pervert natural time …. [as] omnipotent and omnicompetent: an adaptable, flexible monster 
making its way into every area of human life, producing all manner of time-based obsessions 
and perversions’.38 Time is the enemy in theories of temporal hegemony and in cyber security 
but in both it is also the seducer: the temporality of machines is the object of their critique but 
it becomes the principal concern of their narratives, an horizon beyond which other 
temporalities are obscured, if not totally ignored.  
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The totalising nature of these exclusive conceptions of time is at odds with the empirical 
findings of diverse disciplines, from which we learn that ‘what we call time is an ungainly 
mixture of times—unfolding at different speeds in different spaces—which intersect and 
interact in all manner of ways’.39 The Internet, for example, might appear to impose a 
homogeneous global time but in its empirical detail it is an assemblage of multiple 
temporalities deriving from the relations between its numerous elements, both technical and 
subjective.40 Ulrich Beck and Daniel Levy argue that after traditional, religious and political 
‘epochs’, we are entering a fourth temporal epoch ‘characterized by fragmented times and the 
absence of a dominant, let alone hegemonic, conception of temporality and attendant views 
of futurity’, or of history.41 The linear and teleological account of the shaping of chronos 
through technological means is an account of world time that in the shift from modernity to 
postmodernity loses its privileged position as an explanatory metanarrative. It is not 
abandoned but becomes one element of the heterotemporal assemblage of world politics, ‘a 
shifting and unpredictable conjunction of times’, in which ‘the theorist’s own complex 
structure is implicated in and with that which he or she seeks to describe, explain and judge’.42 
This perspective refuses totalising narratives of the temporal present propounded by 
mainstream political actors and critical voices alike.  
 
The logic of real time facilitates the political construction of the information-technological 
environment as one of risk, threat and negative social transformation but those who 
reproduce such narratives are beholden to a peculiar paradox. Why would anyone promote a 
perspective on the world that diminishes the possibilities of politics whilst also pursuing 
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politics to regulate that world? The answer lies in the fallacy of real time itself. As Robert 
Hassan points out, when Virilio speaks of real time ‘killing’ subjective time, when sociologist 
Manuel Castells theorises ‘timeless time’ as a sort of ‘nontime’, and when others interpret 
global simultaneity as an absolute condition rather than as the subjective impression of 
instantaneity, they are committing to an ontological impossibility: 
 
Real time [is] the final goal of machine/human interaction, the very end of the 
temporal continuum that would stretch from ‘no time’ to the speed of light. To be able 
to achieve true real-time response would mean the ultimate surrender of human 
agency to digital technology, where latencies have been driven out and where lags no 
longer occur. This would constitute the militarist dream of the achievement of 
absolute power through absolute speed and the capitalist Nirvana where production 
and circulation function ‘at the speed of thought’. Both dreams are destined, however, 
to be unrealizable because imperfect humans constantly get in the way of perfect 
systems.43 
 
To exist as a human is always to possess the agency to act politically, regardless of 
technological milieu, even if we cannot necessarily change the conditions of the material 
environment. It is also to return metaphysics to the technological, as Heidegger reminds us we 
must.44 This realisation is at the root of critiques of speed that recognise its dangers but 
embrace the political and emancipatory possibilities of speed and acceleration.45 It registers in 
Christopher Coker’s assertion that, until the technological singularity at least, ‘humans will be 
easing themselves out of the [decision-making] loop at every level except the political: strategy 
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will still be a human monopoly’.46 In a more negative sense, these dynamics are at work in 
cyber security, not just in the insistence on responding faster to the speed of the environment 
but in the metaphorical space that opens up because of the deceleration lag between 
phenomena and the political responses necessary to counter them. The resulting temporality 
is precisely that which creates the conditions for politics; without this dislocation—absent in 
the horizontality of real time—politics would not be possible.47  
 
The logic of real time reduces politics to a figurative singularity, an event, a kairotic moment of 
supreme timeliness in which action must—impossibly—occur now.48 This logic emerges from 
narratives contingent upon highly deterministic interpretations of reality and temporality 
consisting in the minds of observers and critics. Real time is only real insofar as it is socially 
constructed, an observation which does not diminish its potency as an analytical or political 
construct. To the contrary, the logic of real time is a powerful one, albeit one at odds not only 
with empirical reality but also with other aspects of the chronopolitics of cyber security itself. 
In particular, far from being distributed across a hallucinatory skein of centrifugal nowness 
suspended precariously at the illusory juncture of posteriority and futurity, reality has 
temporal depth and texture. This is expressed in cyber security in the continued importance 
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7.4 The Logic of Event  
 
To Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth I’s ‘spymaster’, is attributed the watchful maxim, ‘there is 
less danger in fearing too much than too little’.49 Many cyber security actors would seem to 
have adopted this as a mantra guiding their pronouncements and practices if we are to judge 
by their discursive reliance upon dystopian narratives of future cyber insecurity and its 
existential implications. Not only does an absence of credible and effective security portend a 
generalised state of societal deterioration but political arguments are frequently contingent on 
‘knowing’ that the darkening future will be shaped by events of great magnitude. Somehow, 
even as the future turns back upon us within the extended present, and as the nightmarish 
logic of real time threatens to obliterate the heterotemporality of life and history, the event 
still manages to hold sway in cyber security narratives of the near future. In our contemporary 
‘thickened history’, in which events happen with ever-greater frequency, confounding our 
abilities to understand both them and history, certain types of event are still elevated above 
others.50 Catastrophes and crises are the stock events of the cyber security imaginary and the 
principal means through which to comprehend cyber security futures, prick politicians’ 
consciences and achieve security gains in the present. To the same ends, historical events 
become powerful analogies for what will happen in the absence of appropriate political 
behaviour now, and act as signs corroborating apocalyptic narratives predicting future 
catastrophes. 
 
It will be clear from preceding chapters that these events, historical or speculative, and the 
narratives in which they are embedded, require mediation through news organisations and 
other platforms and institutions in order to reach and potentially persuade their audiences, 
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and to anchor cyber security in a more stable and coherent past.51 This much is established but 
the topic of present interest is why else is this considered necessary and politically expedient: 
what logics peculiar to the event operate in the chronopolitics of cyber security? In Virilio’s 
real time, ‘there is an expectation that the event will be calculated in advance, so that it can be 
packaged and sold to the viewer according to the commercial structures which underpin the 
whole business of news coverage …. [If] the event does not unfold as calculated, the entire 
time of transmission is wasted’.52 I would argue that it is not wasted at all but to demonstrate 
this requires that we move away from understanding the event purely in and of itself—as a 
commodity to exchange or as a discrete temporal moment—but regard it also as an aesthetic 
form.  
 
Reinhart Koselleck suggests that the ‘prospect of the future, raising hopes and anxieties, 
making one precautionary or planful, is certainly reflected within consciousness’; in this 
respect, he argues, ‘even expectation can be experienced’.53 This experience of expectation is 
politicized through Aradau and van Munster’s ‘sensorium of anticipation’, in which all the 
senses are enlisted to create an aesthetic of the future that facilitates security politics in the 
present.54 As Kevin McSorley notes, scholars have argued that visual culture—which we might 
propose is a principal form of mediation in cyber security—should be analysed not only for the 
ideologies and politics it represents or communicates but also in terms of its ‘affective logics’.55 
Carter and McCormack suggest that images do not necessarily transmit messages per se but 
contribute to political cultures in ways ‘excessive’ of ‘representational and discursive logics …. 
as blocs of affective intensity with differential speeds, durations and capacities to affect other 
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kinds of bodies’.56 Although mediated cyber security narratives do convey specific messages, 
they also help to foster an affective aesthetic of the future cyber security event, through which 
to further political ends.  
 
To illustrate this, consider the example of ‘cyber war’, understood provisionally as a societal 
conflict conducted through information technologies, in which public and private 
infrastructures and attendant functionalities are degraded by adversarial ‘cyber attacks’. As 
described in Chapter Four, this form of conflict is a staple of the cyber security imaginary, 
whether or not it constitutes part of a broader strategic-level war or not. Numerous authors 
observe that in postmodernity the boundaries between actual and metaphorical ‘war’ are 
blurred. Christopher Coker argues that contemporary writers have difficulty in comprehending 
and representing the nature of war, so that our ‘accounts of war today tend to be graphically 
visual, not textual’.57 The ‘image rather than the word renders war into an experience that can 
be shared’ and it is ‘the extremities of human experience that make war so vivid’ for an 
observer.58 Narratives of war—real or imagined—need to engage audiences through 
emotional stimulation and ‘cyber war’ is fought principally on such abstracted informational 
terrain that it can only become meaningful, in Coker’s terms, first, through the 
‘materialisation’ of the virtual and, second, through war’s affective embodiment. Both are 
aspects of the chronopolitics of the event, through which the event is politicised in the name 
of cyber security. 
 
The first dynamic entails the translation of the ones and zeroes of informational conflict into 
something material with which audiences can identify. The visual grammar of cyber war is not 
digital, unlike the vehicles of its prosecution—cyber ‘weapons’, as it were—but analogue. 
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Whether it invokes clichés of planes tumbling from the sky and chemical plants exploding, or 
requires more immediate demonstrations of industrial plant malfunctioning to the point of 
destruction, or mock cities in defence contractors’ office blocks, material effects express the 
‘virtual’ threat and the familiar and mundane are transformed into objects of extraordinary 
subversion and sabotage. Although not exclusively visual, these events are at the very least 
made ‘vivid’ through this translation and ‘bring home’ to viewers and readers the experience 
of ‘cyber war’ and its extreme effects on society. These narratives are closely tied—in theory, 
at least—to the military targeting of urban environments, particularly ‘urbicide’, in which the 
deliberate destruction of the city is characterised as a distinct form of political violence, 
intended to eliminate cultural heterogeneity and disrupt the continuity of urban identity and 
memory.59 Although information infrastructures in toto are transnational and global, they are 
also local and predominantly urban, and their targeting in cyber war is similar to the urbicidal 
logics of other forms of war and may elicit similarly emotive responses to the destruction of 
assets with social and cultural value.60 
 
The second dynamic is closely related but asks audiences and observers to become active 
participants in countering potential infrastructural degradation under conditions of ‘cyber 
war’. As McSorley, Coker and others point out, even with the increased ‘technicization’ of war 
through the widespread adoption of information technologies and ‘remote’ methods of killing, 
war is not becoming as disembodied as many critics maintain. Soldiers controlling drones from 
outposts in the American Southwest are not wholly detached from their targets in Afghanistan 
or Yemen but are ‘embodied in the network’ of modern war.61 McSorley theorises the 
emergence of ‘somatic war’ that ‘foregrounds sensory immersion and real feeling, vital living 
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and bodily vulnerability’.62 In similar language, Coker notes that even in the case of a ‘virtual’ 
technology like a flight simulator, it does not merely ‘replicate’ reality but ‘sucks you in; it 
immerses you’.63 This technology does not seek to represent reality but to create it or at least 
‘to propose itself as proxy for the real’.64 
 
The mediated discourses of cyber security, the narratives of physical destruction and the 
semiotic grammars of news reports and other visual representations of cyber insecurity 
encourage an ‘affective excess’ beyond their overt political messages alone. The aesthetic 
significance of a public exercise like Cyber ShockWave lies not only in its ability to instil fear 
and concern but also in its affective resonance with the corporeal and the mundane, which 
assists in countering the decorporealising effects of speed and virtuality. In this example and 
through other ‘awareness-raising’ and ‘education’ activities, the immersion of people in the 
superficially plausible reality of ‘cyberwar’—part of the ‘public sensorium’ of cyber security—
encourages them to recognise the severity of these future events and to reconnect with their 
civic-mindedness. Coker notes that the US military’s ‘Warrior Ethos’ document of 2005 
reminded even ancillary staff that ‘to find oneself under fire required that everyone should 
subscribe to the principles of the warrior ethos’.65 Discourses of ‘cyber war’, in which war is 
fought not only abroad but also on the home front, are an encouragement to citizens to 
rediscover their inner warriors. Although there will always be the need for a professional elite 
of ‘cyber warriors’, there are clear indications that the development of a ‘whole-nation’ 
approach to cyber security is considered desirable and the language of civilian ‘cyber warriors’ 
is never far away.66 Perhaps, if the ‘re-enchantment’ of war relies on ‘putting us back in touch 
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with our humanity’,67 the ‘enchantment’ of cyber security lies in putting us back in touch with 
our warriorhood. The affective excess of speculative events is one way this is attempted. 
 
Richard Grusin’s concept of ‘premediation’ draws a direct link between affective excess and 
the future and points towards the chronopolitics of these operations: 
 
Premediation is not about getting the future right, but about proliferating multiple 
remediations of the future both to maintain a low level of fear in the present and to 
prevent an occurrence of the kind of tremendous media shock that the United States 
and much of the networked world experienced on 9/11.68 
 
Catastrophic futures are rehearsed before they irrupt into the present and help to inure 
publics to the shocks of future events, an outcome which can be read as increasing resilience 
to the future event.69 If the ‘unexpected has the power of surprise, and this surprise involves 
new experience’,70 premediation attempts to exclude as far as possible the element of surprise 
and tries to minimise future ‘new experiences’, preferring to rehearse them in the present 
rather than live them in the future: it tries to ‘prevent the experience of a traumatic future’ by 
acting as ‘a kind of affective prophylactic’.71 These processes are assisted further by 
‘remediating’ past events—like Pearl Harbor and 9/11—and repurposing them in the service of 
security politics, the principle intention of which is to ensure continuity between the present 
and the future. At the same time, premediation of the future creates ‘societal fragilities and 
resentment’ by limiting the number of possible futures: ‘the imagination of some scenarios 
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over others, the visualization of some futures and not others, entails profoundly political work 
that enables and constrains political decisionmaking in the present’.72  
 
Cyber security, in its resilience mode, ‘intervenes in these affective relations to construct an 
order of fear that re-orients life in relation to a potentially catastrophic future’.73 In this 
respect, the evental logic of cyber security is again shown to be consistent with postmodernity 
but we should wonder at the actual efficacy of premediation in generating security outcomes. 
Grusin responded to Cyber ShockWave in a blog, lambasting its simplistic take on government 
decision-making in time of crisis—‘white guys sitting around a room responding to cable news 
reports imagines a model of government already outmoded when Kubrick released Dr. 
Strangelove’.74 This is probably correct but he also suggested the exercise might have ‘some 
small effect on modulating individual and collective affect’ and was, more importantly, ‘part of 
a continued premediation campaign distributed across print, televisual, and networked media, 
a campaign that is in full swing and appears to be heating up’.75 This is certainly the case and 
there are few ‘news days’ without a cyber security story of some description. The severity of 
the events and processes reported varies greatly but their presence ensures that premediation 
continues and intensifies. Many news reports also include ‘what if?’ segments that build 
narrative linkages between past events, reported events and future events. The sources of this 
premediation are many—government, business, journalism, the academy—but all underline 
the central logic of the premediated event: ‘the generation of possible future scenarios or 
possibilities which may come true or which may not, but work in any event to guide action (or 
shape public sentiment) in the present’.76 The efficacy of premediation attempts may be 
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disputed but their chronopolitical logic is apparent and invests in the interpretation of past and 
future events the ability to shape political behaviours in the present.  
 
7.5 The Logic of Eschaton  
 
At several points in this enquiry, most notably in Chapters Three and Four, the issue of finitude 
has been raised with respect to the foreclosure of future temporal horizons. One argument 
commonly made for the distinctiveness of postmodernity is contingent on its apparent 
rejection of teleological metanarratives and its inability, in the face of global existential crises, 
to see for itself a long future. The ‘extended present’ is theorised as the manifestation of these 
deep cultural currents, in which concerns over the near future shape politics in the present, as 
contrasted with politics attempting to mould the long-term future, as might be identified with 
Enlightenment thinking and technological modernity in general. These arguments derive 
principally from Western philosophy of history and help frame political narratives of ‘cyber 
apocalypse’, in which catastrophic events are both imminent and immanent to postmodernity. 
These expressions of secular apocalypticism are not simplistic presentations of ‘the end’ but 
portend passage points through which political order is transformed and more ‘cyber secure’ 
futures are brought into existence. The logic of premediation goes some way to demonstrating 
the political utility of these apocalyptic portrayals, generating an aesthetic of anticipatory 
anxiety that facilitates political action in support of cyber security in the present. The creation 
of this immanent affective state through premediation is a key chronopolitical aspect of cyber 
security involving actors across multiple sectors and mediated through the ‘new media 
ecology’ of global postmodernity.77 
 
                                                            




Although ‘the end’ may never arrive, these narratives disclose a deep concern with finitude, in 
which apocalypse is but one ‘species of the genus eschatology’.78 As Bernard McGinn explains, 
apocalypticism is ‘a particular kind of belief about the last things—the End of history and what 
lies beyond it’, whereas eschatology ‘sees history as a teleological process and believes that 
Scripture reveals truth about its End’.79 Although this may seem a trivial distinction, it is the 
difference between ‘viewing the events of one’s own time in the light of the End of history 
[eschatology] and seeing them as the last events themselves [apocalypticism]’.80 We can learn 
much from exploring the secular apocalypticism of cyber security but we can augment this 
chronopolitical understanding by locating it more firmly within the political logics of 
eschatology as expressed in political theology. As Paul Fletcher argues, liberal modernity has 
distanced itself from the metaphysics of theology but its political authority derives from its 
theological heritage: ‘If the underlying authority of political governance is theological it is not 
because of the manner in which scripture or dogma is espoused or reconfigured—the opposite 
is largely true of the liberal tradition—but because of the ways in which the mundane political 
order is dependent on a (now recurrently unavowed) transcendent order of things’.81  
 
For Fletcher, the ‘war on terror’ represents a resurgence of the metaphysical into the political, 
explicable through the lens of eschatology in its specific telos, the triumph of Good over Evil. 
Michael Dillon proceeds a step further in assigning to the politics of security in general an 
eschatological ontology—‘politics thought in the light of the last things, the limit situation as a 
determinable and determining terminus’, which articulates both a sense of ending (finitude) 
and of ‘ends’ (telos, aims and desires).82 Yet, as we have identified in apocalyptic cyber security 
narratives, the end is not the End but also a beginning—‘the natality’ and the ‘advent of the 
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political’.83 However, there is still more temporal texture than this simple picture suggests. As 
both Fletcher and Dillon recognise, there is a gap between the historical present and the end 
of history (eschaton) that must be accounted for, as it has a distinctly chronopolitical character 
that helps to explain, for example, why the cyber apocalypse never arrives and what politics 
are enabled in the ‘space’ opened up between ‘now’ and ‘then’ when we refuse the totality of 
real time.  
 
Fletcher claims for the ‘war on terror’ a transformation of political time itself, which defers 
forever the possibility of tangible victory. ‘In the present quest for infinite justice there can be 
no goal, no realizable telos and, if the terror (rather than any geopolitically specific antagonist) 
is the object of this endless war, there is no longer an enemy as such’.84 The war on terror 
becomes ‘a security project that finds its condition of possibility in omni-malevolence’.85 In the 
absence of telos there remains only a ‘zone of anomic indistinction’ between present and 
future, a state of exception in which due legal process is suspended and all manner of 
‘emergency powers’ can be enacted.86 This would include the practices of executive 
centralisation discussed in Chapter Three, which were identified with the nascent yet 
unconsummated logic of real time. Again, Dillon expands upon this formulation through his 
identification of this ‘zone’ with the katechon, which in Christian eschatology is the ‘impetus to 
resist, restrain, or otherwise defer’ the messianic eschaton.87 Where they differ is in Fletcher’s 
insistence on the exceptionality of this temporality; Dillon treats it as entirely banal and 
constitutive of liberal modernity itself. In political philosophy inflected by this metaphysics—
notably, the political theology of Carl Schmitt—the katechon becomes, as in Fletcher’s ‘zone of 
anomic indistinction’, that which prevents the end of the present temporal order, the political 
status quo; the katechon is that which maintains order in the face of eschatological fervour for 
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apocalyptic transformation.88 As McGinn notes of apocalypticism understood as a form of 
political rhetoric, it is ‘as often designed to maintain the political, social, and economic order as 
to overthrow it’.89 Therefore, as Dillon notes, eschaton and katechon ‘appear to be in 
continuous war with one another’, particularly as maintenance of the katechon becomes its 
own form of ‘messianic mission’.90 
 
With respect to cyber security, we can locate the various formulations of ‘cyber apocalypse’ 
more concretely within this eschatological framework of Western political philosophy. An 
initial distinction is necessary between those discourses that make explicit reference to 
apocalypse and those in which we can discern an apocalyptic sensibility. It is quite possible to 
belong to the latter category and not the former, as demonstrated by the many examples of 
cyber security actors whose narratives are contingent upon the construction of catastrophic 
end-points but which do not openly evoke ‘cybergeddon’, ‘cyber apocalypse’, or other terms 
loaded with Judaeo-Christian millennial connotations. In both cases, the apocalypse never 
arrives: the cyber apocalypse is ‘inevitable and imminent but perpetually postponed’.91 
Although the apocalypse is frequently portrayed as something desirable and necessary for 
political transformation in the name of cyber security, the apocalypse is not equal to the 
eschaton, which, as Dillon describes it, would be the ‘catastrophic threat of the dissolution of 
the order of things’.92 This, in fact, is precisely not what cyber security actors want. They do 
not desire the end of the temporal order but the transformation of select elements of the 
present order in line with their own desires and those of the national security state, congruent 
with the logics of global capital.  
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This is not to deny the potency of secular apocalypticism or its utility as an analytical heuristic 
but it does challenge cyber security actors’ own apocalyptic narratives. In light of political 
eschatology, cyber security apocalypses do not threaten the political order but support it: they 
are themselves agents of what Dillon calls ‘katechontic securitization’.93 This requires that the 
eschaton, which would announce the end of the state, is constantly deferred, a project that 
‘demands relentless political and ideological work’. 94 Many forms of this have been identified 
previously, not least through premediation and the generation of anxiety and concern about 
the future. We can also find statements of the political utility of apocalyptic language, 
Pentagon officials admitting that although it might be ‘overstated’ it works ‘to put pressure on 
Congress to pass cybersecurity legislation’.95 These narratives overtly frame legislation, 
regulation and other forms of governmentality as the methods through which to prevent 
apocalypse and catastrophe and maintain this katechontic restraint on true political 
transformation.  
 
At the same time, a perpetual reliance on catastrophic narratives serves to ignore cyber 
security initiatives already in place and continues to construct ‘cyberspace’ as an ungovernable 
and dangerously unknowable source of risk and threat, enabling the pursuit and 
implementation of further cyber security.96 As in other areas of life, those who incubate an 
apocalyptic aesthetic are usually the same as those who promise salvation,97 and current 
government and commercial investment in cyber security would suggest that the continued 
deferral of ‘cyber apocalypse’ is good business sense in the form of a burgeoning ‘cyber-
industrial complex’.98 The constant deferral of the end creates a gap in which the cyber 
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security project can be reworked in perpetuity with respect to an infinite number of future 
security possibilities and to a future that never arrives. 
 
It is perhaps too easy to pour into the katechon the malice and machinations of the national 
security state and its supporting infrastructure without considering the more positive 
connotations of eschatological consciousness. The political theology informing the preceding 
discussion channels Schmitt’s own belief that ‘all genuine political theories presuppose man to 
be evil’.99 There seems little room in this schema for hope or optimism, both of which founder 
on the rocks of pessimistic readings of the ‘human condition’. From the perspective of the 
state, we have already encountered distinctly grim perspectives on the present and the future, 
the parlous state of each demanding—as does the logic of eschaton presented so far—that the 
political status quo be maintained and preserved through the instigation of ‘more’ and ‘better’ 
cyber security. Optimism under these conditions seems reduced to keeping the barbarians at 
bay and promoting cyber security as a driver of economic growth.  
 
Hope is central to eschatological consciousness in the Western tradition and becomes not only 
hope for future redemption but also a resource to be exercised in pursuit of a better life on 
earth in the present.100 ‘Progressive’ forms of apocalypse stress the possibilities of cooperation 
and collaboration in effecting earthly salvation (‘progress’) without the need for the violence 
of divine justice.101 Endeavours like eugenics, cryonics and even space exploration share the 
belief that science and technology can improve the future of the human species.102 The 
posthumanist movement, in its concerns with a fast-approaching ‘technological singularity’—
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mischievously dubbed the ‘Rapture of the Nerds’103—is infused with apocalypticism but 
emphasises the positive social benefits made possible through radical information-
technological developments.104 These are expressions of a long heritage of technoscientific 
thought that is secular rather than religious in its apocalypticism, although the two are closely 
related.105  
 
Most cyber security narratives are in the catastrophic tradition but they also frequently stress 
the progressive possibilities of cyber security for enabling social progress, strengthening 
societal resilience, ensuring ontological security and delivering a better future for all. These are 
not aspirations to be dismissed lightly and one can certainly subscribe to them without 
worrying overly about the problematic aspects of how they might be achieved and what 
political ends they disclose. Even in the knowledge that much lies beneath the surface of 
national security discourse, we might adopt the perspective of the imprisoned Antonio 
Gramsci, who maintained his ‘optimism of the will’ in the face of ‘pessimism of the intellect’.106 
Beyond this duality of what is and is not possible, it is hope that ‘energises political agency’ 
due to its ‘refusal to rule out the possibility of a better future’.107 Given the centrality of hope 
to eschatology, if not to political theology, it seems sensible not to exclude it from the 
chronopolitical logic of the eschaton. Even if we reject ‘hope’ as packaged in the trite 
manifestos of electoral politics, we should perhaps retain it as a condition of temporal, and 
therefore political, possibility.  
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7.6 Cyber Security and the Politics of Time 
 
This chapter outlined four prominent strands of the chronopolitical manifold of cyber security, 
the ‘logics’, respectively, of assemblage, real time, event and eschaton, organising principles or 
tendencies that emerge from our analysis of the cyber security assemblage. The analysis of 
these logics looks deeper into the sociotemporality of the cyber security community of 
practice and begins to show why the temporal aspects of the cyber security imaginary are the 
way they are. These logics are not mutually exclusive. The logic of assemblage, for example, is 
one borne of the nature of reality itself, in which continuity and change are two sides of the 
same existential coin; each presupposes and is contingent upon the other. This processual 
ontology requires that an entity characterised as an assemblage—like cyber security—must 
change in order to persist. This requires that the assemblage extend itself in space—through 
enrolling more actors—and time—by appropriating their temporalities—or it will lose its 
identity and potency.  
 
In this light, all other logics can be viewed as expressions of the logic of assemblage, in which 
cyber security finds new ways to extend itself through time and space. Of course, we can make 
the argument that cyber security expands in order to counter the threat of cyber insecurity but 
this would be to graft politics prematurely onto ontological reality. Like all sociomaterial 
assemblages, cyber security too must ‘perform’ itself to remain coherent, although any claims 
that cyber security is a singular entity possessing some limited identity and agency must be 
underwritten by an appreciation of its necessary mutability and contingency. Cyber security 
actors appropriate, internalise and reproduce the ‘real time’ of information technologies; the 
premediation of cyber security events enrols bodies and emotions in an affective sensorium; 
eschatology creates additional ‘space’ to colonise through increased cyber security. The logic 
of assemblage underpins all actions by cyber security actors, even if it does not necessarily 
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explain them: assemblage is a way to conceptualise the world rather than an empirical theory; 
it is a ‘philosophical wager’ about reality, not a claim to reality.108 
 
The question of the construction of reality is a key consideration when discussing the ‘logic of 
real time’. The preoccupation with real time stems from concerns about speed and 
acceleration as ontological conditions of postmodernity, particularly as relates to the 
information-technological collapse of global distance and the globalisation of a single ‘real 
time’. The argument is that real time suppresses the possibilities of political action, as 
registered in cyber security by concerns over the inability to ‘keep up’ with technological 
change and to legislate and regulate sociotechnical environments. The problem with this 
perspective is not that these are not important facets of postmodernity but that those who 
adhere to this narrative tend to ignore the empirical and subjective ‘heterotemporality’ or 
‘pluritemporalism’ of the world. In its concerns with speed and acceleration, the logic of real 
time serves to internalise these temporalities and to reproduce them, exacerbating exactly the 
conditions it sets out to critique. As predicted by our original model of emergent 
sociotemporality and by the logic of assemblage, cyber security appropriates the time of 
machines but it is also seduced by the temporalities of nonhumans, closing down the 
possibilities of politics in so doing. This is a radical technological determinism that enables the 
continued construction of information technology as a domain of risk and threat, facilitating 
the politics of cyber security and the extension of cyber security practices across all 
information-technological environments, regardless of need or ethics.  
 
Cyber security is not yet wholly seduced by the apocalyptic logic of real time, however. Reality 
continues to have temporal depth and texture, as shown by the continued discursive 
investment in the power of the event. Two dynamics are important in the logic of event. The 
first is the use of historical events as analogies for future speculative events; the future is 
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understood with reference to the past. The second is how the possibilities of future events 
prompt political action in the present and help to generate an affective aesthetic of anxiety of 
greater duration than the event alone. Past events are remediated and future events are 
premediated, both of which require that cyber security narratives are communicated through 
the global ‘new media ecology’. This enrolment of media actors into the cyber security 
assemblage is essential to all forms of mediation and is another example of how an 
assemblage attempts to extend itself through social and material relations. So too is the 
intended effect on actors currently outside the cyber security assemblage, who may be 
recruited into the assemblage through their affective responses to the remediation of 
historical events and the premediation of speculative ones, which appeal to national memory 
and identity and to notions of civic responsibility. The premediation of events serves a further 
political purpose in attempting to reduce the shocks of future events by rehearsing them in the 
present, although this attempt at resilience is eroded by limiting the number of possible 
futures and by creating anxieties that might otherwise not exist. 
 
One key area in which premediation works is the construction and maintenance of apocalyptic 
anxieties that disclose the eschatological nature of the politics of security itself. In the political 
theology that underpins the Western liberal tradition, the end of history spells the end of the 
state, which deploys all available techniques to avoid that end. The state seeks to maintain the 
temporal distance between now and the end, mainly through the implementation of 
technologies of security framed as measures to avert catastrophe, itself an obvious expression 
of the logic of assemblage. The substantial increase in cyber security spending and the 
emergence of a cyber-industrial complex can be read as an expression of this desire to prevent 
the end of the state, especially given wider concerns about the impact of information 
technologies on traditional notions of sovereignty, territoriality, power and dominion.109 This 
hiatus between now and the end is also the space opened up by the logic of real time, 
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between the technologically supercharged speed of postmodernity and the cumbersome 
bureaucracies of modernity, in which the cyber security assemblage can be reworked and 
refashioned in any of an almost infinite number of possible configurations. 
 
If we are to define a chronopolitics of cyber security, it is as an assemblage of complementary 
and competing temporal logics that inform and influence the politics of cyber security and 
which become embedded in practice. These logics encompass the nature of reality itself, the 
social construction of reality, ways of seeing the future and ways of interpreting the past, and 
the experience of living in a world of seemingly unprecedented change. The cyber security 
imaginary particular to the community of cyber security practice is in part constructed through 
these ways of perceiving time and temporality (chronotypes), which together constitute the 
sociotemporality of cyber security. We reconstruct this sociotemporality through the 
narratives cyber security actors tell about time and themselves and about their relations with 
reality. As befits this social epistemological and constructivist approach, we must recognise 
that actors are not simply interpreting unmediated reality but ‘rather are squinting into the 
dark, telling themselves stories about what the world is like, and then acting on the basis of 
what they think is “out there”, while competing with others who have different notions’.110 
These notions will change through time, in response to internal and external stimuli and 
processes, as befits any social group or other assemblage we might identify as a suitable unit 
of analysis. The drivers and discourses identified in this enquiry will change over time and 
should not be treated as static or definitive, or as an exhaustive statement of the 
chronopolitics of cyber security. 
 
Yet we are thrown back upon the nature of security itself, established at the beginning of this 
enquiry as an inherently temporal proposition, particularly in its characterisation as a perennial 
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exercise in futurity. Do the claims of cyber security or its chronopolitical logics alter this 
relation with time, or require the modification of the ontology of security with respect to this 
orientation to the future? I would suggest not, as the eyes and minds of cyber security actors, 
both by nature and choice, are still firmly fixed on the future and their actions are principally 
intended to both shape the future and ensure that cyber security itself persists into the future. 
What does require attention is the nature of the future itself, which has become almost a 
proxy for the concepts of uncertainty and risk. In contemporary ‘risk society’, writes sociologist 
Frank Furedi, the future ‘is seen as a terrain which bears little relationship to the geography of 
the present’.111 For this reason, William Gibson, the science-fiction writer most frequently 
cited in discussions of cyber security, has said that when writing about the future he is just 
‘squinting at the present in a certain way’.112 The concept of the ‘extended present’ expresses 
this uncertainty, in which existential concerns about the future shape politics in the present, 
rather than projecting the present into the future. Furedi summarises this pessimism in survey 
results that show that for the first time since World War II, parents expect that their children’s 
lives will be worse than their own.113 In such perceptions dies the Enlightenment dream and 
security, through the practices of risk and premediation, is left to ‘imagine, harness and 
commodify’ what remains of the uncertain future.114  
 
If cyber security is concerned with securing the future, we must also wonder at the future of 
cyber security itself. As a term, its days are perhaps numbered. The contemporary rush to 
prefix all nouns with ‘cyber’ is a response to the ‘foreshortening of the horizon of new 
technologies’, in which scholars, media and politicians are in ‘a breakneck race to enunciate 
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the immediate moment’.115 Most products of this ‘neologorrhea’—like ‘cyber security’—are 
destined to become ‘painfully anachronistic clichés’ rather quickly.116 This may be so but it 
should not detract from the importance attributed to cyber security, whether it retains that 
moniker or not.117 Cyber security is not just ‘epiphenomenal, a consequence of the computer 
and Internet revolution’, as some authors suggest.118 It is, rather, a condition of that revolution 
itself, a transformation in which state, commercial and civil actors alike have invested 
substantial cognitive, material and emotional resources.  
 
Whatever we call it, cyber security or something like it will persist in its attempts to secure the 
information infrastructures and informational flows upon which societies and economies 
depend. What we can be much less certain about is the balance of desires that will determine 
cyber security’s future complexion with respect to appropriate levels of control and authority. 
A key dimension of this evolution will be how time is politicized. We may succumb to the 
imperative to act always in the now, seduced by ‘a metaphysics of crisis and its attendant 
temporality, the mood of which is unequivocally imperative’.119 We may convince ourselves 
that doing something in the name of national security is always better than doing nothing, 
even if this creates further insecurities through the circumvention of democratic politics and 
due legal process.120 Alternatively, we might recognise the plurality of temporalities that play 
into the political sphere, allowing us to take stock before embarking on a purely technologised 
security future. In all cases, however, political practices will continue to evolve and must 
continue to attract considered and careful attention as they do so. It is my contention that a 
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crucial aspect of this watchful analysis will be how conceptions of time and temporality inform 








In 1984, it was possible to write an article purporting to cover all of computer security, 
detailing the ‘concepts, techniques, and measures relating to the protection of computing 
systems and the information they maintain against deliberate or accidental threats’.1 In the 
same year, a British MP’s use of an office word processor—‘which I have found to be of 
enormous benefit’—was sufficient to establish his credentials before a House of Commons 
Select Committee on parliamentary IT systems.2 Three decades later, it is inconceivable that 
either situation would be possible or tolerated, given enormous changes in the nature and 
distribution of computer networks and their relations with security and politics. It has been 
argued that the perceived risks and threats arising from the uses and abuses of information 
technologies constitute ‘the central security policy concern today’.3 Subjective though this 
assertion may be, what has become known as ‘cyber security’—variations in local priorities 
aside—occupies a central position in national and international security policy and is a key 
condition for the transacting of individual and collective economic, social and political life. 
 
As such, the rate of cyber security policy adoption, implementation and change is very rapid—
particularly since the late 2000s—notwithstanding the protestations of those lamenting the 
opposite, of course. Accordingly, there has been a significant increase in the volume of policy-
oriented work in both the academic and popular arenas and it has become difficult, as Barry 
Buzan remarked of security discourses thirty years ago, not to be ‘swept away by the hectic 
empiricism of the field’.4 The present enquiry is an attempt not to resist that tide, as such, but 
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at least to question this temporality of speed and acceleration and, from that starting point, to 
query more expansively the relations between the cyber security assemblage and time and 
temporality.  
 
The principal task has been to explore how time and temporality are conceived and 
experienced by the community of cyber security practice. These examinations have been 
predicated upon a theorisation of the world as socially constructed, a constructivist 
perspective concerned both with epistemology—how knowledge is socially constructed—and 
with ontology—how social reality is constructed. Whilst this does not deny the existence of 
material reality, it does privilege human cognition of the world as a means through which the 
world is understood and through which knowledge of the world is generated in human 
communities. In this sense, intersubjective epistemology becomes of ontological importance in 
social reality. The principal way in which we begin to understand how social reality is 
constructed is through analysing the utterances of actors concerned with, in this instance, 
cyber security. How cyber security actors articulate their reality and interpret the realities of 
others constitute discourses that express the aims and intentions of cyber security as a field of 
practice. Their norms, desires, ethics, expectations and intentions are manifest and stabilised 
materially through the technical and political actions so encompassed. In this register, the 
thesis contributes to the literature on cyber security and its antecedent and related practices 
within IR and security studies, especially that corpus of constructivist work concerned with 
cyber security discourses and the securitisation of ‘cyberspace’. 
 
I have proposed the existence of a ‘cyber security imaginary’ as one modality through which 
the community of cyber security practice negotiates social reality. To paraphrase Joelien 
Pretorius, the cyber security imaginary is that part of the broader social imaginary specific to 
society’s common understanding and expectations about cyber security that makes practices 
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related to cyber security possible.5 The present enquiry has focused upon three aspects of the 
cyber security imaginary. First, that which pertains to an identifiable community of cyber 
security practice, as distinct from wider societal understandings and expectations of cyber 
security. This has required attention to the statements of politicians, policymakers, military 
leaders, intelligence officials, journalists, the security commentariat and commercial security 
professionals. Although internally heterogeneous, as is any community, there are 
commonalities in the ways in which these ‘elite’ actors imagine their roles in the world and 
how they imagine that world itself.  
 
The second area of interest has been the shared temporal biases expressed by these actors, 
the chronotypes that emerge from their intersubjective understanding of time and 
temporality. In the model of emergent temporality presented here, derived from J.T. Fraser, 
these chronotypes exist at the level of sociotemporality, the collective knowledge about time 
that enables social groups to order reality and reproduce themselves over time. Importantly, 
this level of temporality incorporates within itself the temporalities of entities at all levels of 
reality, from the atomic to the animal. Our ability to know these nonhuman temporalities is 
enhanced by reason and by technologies that extend the human senses. In the sense that we 
can begin to know but never truly inhabit these nonhuman temporalities, sociotemporality is 
socially constructed, an assembled form of knowledge. The emergent model of temporality 
provides an important conceptual bridge between human and nonhuman and potentially 
constitutes a new basis for understanding time in IR and international politics. It augments the 
idea of ‘assemblage’ within political studies, which is principally concerned with material 
entities and topology, by providing temporal texture to the otherwise relatively flat ontologies 
of assemblage theory and related conceptual schema. 
 
                                                            




In the present work, chronotypes are closely interwoven with the third area of concern, which 
shows how chronotypes influence and shape the politics of cyber security. Through 
exploration of these chronotypes, we have seen how time and temporality gain ‘practical or 
conceptual significance’,6 specifically in the politics and practices of cyber security. Thought of 
as narratives that cyber security communities tell about themselves and their world, these 
chronotypes guide political action, many examples of which have been described and 
examined within Chapter Three to Six. Chronopolitical practices range from the all-consuming 
belief in the revolutionary nature of the contemporary ‘information age’ that encourages 
ahistoricism and the imperative to ‘act now’, to desires for a cyber apocalypse as a passage 
point to a more cyber secure future, to the use of history to analogise catastrophic futures, 
and various means of rehearsing and even populating the future. All these and more have 
further political and ethical implications that remain to be resolved. It is apparent to this 
author that attention to the temporal foundations of political practices—beyond the well-
established notion that politics and security are always oriented to the future—is a productive 
mode of enquiry that contributes to a renewed interest in such matters in International 
Relations. 
 
From this manifold of chronotopes and chronopolitical practices are extracted deeper logics, 
chronopolitical meta-strands which emerge from the cyber security assemblage and which 
inform and shape the politics of cyber security. They are here referred to as the logics of 
assemblage, real time, event and eschaton, and have potential application beyond cyber 
security, as they may perhaps be detected in other forms of security and politics. If the 
description of a field of security as an ‘assemblage’ has any validity, for example, we should 
expect that observations of other forms of security will also yield the temporality characterised 
here as the ‘logic of assemblage’, the inherent necessity of such an aggregate entity to 
reproduce itself in time, as well as in space. Given the ontological pretensions of such a 
                                                            
6 John Bender and David E. Wellbery, ‘Introduction’, in Chronotypes: The Construction of Time, eds. John 
Bender and David E. Wellbery (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 4. 
282 
 
characterisation, this must necessarily be so. The logic of real time, too, has aspirations as a 
global explanans for the politics of the ‘information age’. It underpins media studies work on 
the politics of news cycles, for instance, and the pressures of real-time connectivity and 
communications have become of great interest to military and security practitioners, 
particularly since 9/11 and the commencement of global counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency campaigns. The seduction by real time also poses critical questions for the 
possibilities of democracy in an environment that almost demands less political reflection and 
deliberation. The impulse to act, for instance, logically presupposes a derogation of 
bureaucratic process, or at the very least an erosion of democratic transparency. These 
tendencies are registered in the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden of the surveillance 
activities of the NSA and GCHQ, secret undertakings of dubious legal and constitutional basis 
that share many of the basic technologies and motivations as cyber security.  
 
The logic of event also draws upon a range of theoretical resources to explore how events—
past and future—are invested with political significance by cyber security communities. With 
respect to future events—crises, disasters, catastrophes—it has long been recognised, as by 
Arnold Wolfers, that such events ‘must always remain a matter of subjective evaluation and 
speculation’.7 In cyber security, these future events are substantially premediated and 
rehearsed to mitigate uncertainty and prepare state and public entities alike for their possible 
occurrence. The forms of premediation, affective engagement, event inhabitation detailed 
here develop and complement critical work in security studies and media studies, interrogating 
the foundations of security politics and practices, particularly forms of anticipatory security 
governance rooted in the contemporary ‘risk society’. Although in many ways a subset of 
events, the discussion of apocalypse and finitude wrapped within the logic of eschaton is 
broadly applicable to questions of political order, as befits the political theology thesis that 
informs and supports it. In its treatment here, eschatology can also return some hope to 
                                                            




security scenarios that are often, as much of this thesis illustrates, rife with pessimism and 
truly dark visions of futurity. 
 
Despite the potential contributions of the thesis to the potential interrogation and 
understanding of other forms of security and politics, it would be inappropriate to attempt to 
extrapolate or apply these findings with uncritical vigour. The overall orientation has been an 
historical one and I make no apologies for being selective in source material or in the 
orientation towards the Anglophone cyber security communities of the UK and US. However, 
this does raise a key issue that future enquiries might address. Much of the discussion of time 
and temporality has been with reference to Western philosophy of history and, as stated, to 
Anglophone sources in general. This is justifiable because of the author’s predilections but it 
does not allow us to generalise our findings beyond the Western context, although that was 
not an original aim of this enquiry. The thesis intended to develop a credible narrative of how 
and why time is important to political behaviour but non-Western and subaltern perspectives 
on time and temporality are excluded from that narrative and are likely to differ on key issues, 
particularly with respect to national and cultural histories and the philosophy of history itself.  
 
Cyber security makes significant claims to the global and the international and it would be 
illuminating to see how Western cyber security processes and practices interact with non-
Western temporal perspectives and orientations, especially given the warnings offered in this 
thesis against adopting totalising conceptions of time. Cyber security is but one aspect of a 
developing conflict over the global Internet, which often divides along ‘East-West’ lines, and 
the resistance of the US, in particular, to greater multilateralism in the global governance of 
the Internet reflects American insistence on policy that favours American interests above all 
others.8 Accusations of American colonisation of the Internet and networked imperialism are a 
                                                            
8 Ryan David Kiggins, ‘Open for Expansion: US Policy and the Purpose for the Internet in the Post-Cold 
War Era’, International Studies Perspectives (forthcoming); also, Tim Stevens, ‘A Cyberwar of Ideas? 
Deterrence and Norms in Cyberspace’, Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (2012): 148-170. 
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staple of contemporary critique and, in this respect, analyses of cyber security might provide 
another opportunity for the culturally non-European to ‘return the gaze’, exploring Western 
politics of security through non-Western theoretical frameworks, including philosophies of 
history and time.9 
 
An additional charge of exclusion might also be brought. The thesis cites the multivocality of 
group formation but then excludes several classes of voice which impact upon the politics and 
practices of cyber security. Where are the voices of citizens, consumers, voters, of civil society 
in general? What do they have to say about time and politics? What do they say about cyber 
security? What are their roles in the cyber security assemblage and what do they think and say 
about these? What are their reactions to the forms of premediation and discourse directed at 
them by cyber security actors? These are important questions that beg answers, without which 
the foregoing analysis is undeniably partial to elites and to their views and opinions. We might 
venture that these elites would also be better represented by finer-grained analyses that 
might emerge from the application of different methods in which direct interlocution is 
preferred to the analyses of secondary and mediated sources. This might reveal how 
conceptions of time differ between elites, both vertically in terms of communities but also 
horizontally between nations.  
 
In common with other forms of security, the language of cyber security is, as articulated by 
political elites, a bipartisan idiom that facilitates threat politics and the potential suppression 
of rights.10 Elite political conflicts tend to arise over pace and scale of implementation rather 
than substantive conceptual matters, which imparts a certain integrity to the elite politics of 
cyber security. It may be that chronotypes are not substantially contested between elites but 
                                                            
9 See, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 200), 29. 
10 Corey Robin, ‘The Language of Fear: National Security in Modern Politics’, in Fear: Across the 




the language of imminent threat, for example, is surely open for contestation by civil society 
actors and suggests that political opportunities arise from the conflict between elite and civil—
for want of a better dichotomy—conceptions of time and temporality. These are tasks for 
other researchers but their findings would undoubtedly enhance our understanding of how 
time and politics inter-relate and would illuminate aspects of the global cyber security 
imaginary not attended to in this thesis. 
 
In closing, the principal contribution of this thesis has been the development of chronopolitics 
in IR. Its central contention is that conceptions of time shape political behaviours, a 
proposition which I hope to have advanced, if not necessarily proven. A central ambition has 
been to open up the chronopolitics of cyber security and to challenge the dominant readings 
of time and temporality we find there. Friedrich Schlegel wrote that ‘No time has ever been so 
strongly, so closely, so exclusively, and so generally bound up with the future than that of our 
present’.11 That he wrote this in 1828 should remind us that, despite the urgencies thrust upon 
us by looming existential crises, there is always time to reflect upon courses of future action. 
We may be, as Schlegel supposed, at a critical moment of importance in human affairs, stood 
upon the cusp of new era, but this should not dissuade us from questioning dominant 
conceptions of political time. It is only through bringing time to the forefront of our attention 
that the ‘invisible is given form’.12 This intuition has guided the present enquiry and similar 
impulses will hopefully guide future investigations into politics and security, the need for which 
could not be more timely or, indeed, timeless.  
 
 
                                                            
11 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, vol. 9, Philosophie der Geschichte (1828), 417, 
quoted in Koselleck, Futures Past, 242. 
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